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Chapter 1
Introduction
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
Social inclusion has been widely discussed and conceptualised in policy debates since the
1970s. Over the years, in the form of multidimensional poverty measures (Alkire and Foster,
2011) and the capabilities approach (Sen, 1985a), research has focussed on discrimination based
on identities such as race, gender, ethnicity, and other disadvantaged groups within countries.
However, only until recently the term has regained a voice in the development discourse, when
the United Nations in their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) committed to reducing not
only material or income inequality, but also inequalities based on different social identities. It
includes a rights-based approach enabling participation of all individuals in the society, ensuring
equal access to resources, voice and self-respect. In a detailed report ’Leaving no one behind’
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016) the UN highlighted three
broad domains where exclusion can occur; namely denial of opportunities or pre-market exclusion,
unequal access to resources such as wealth and income, and unequal participation in society
(non-market interactions). This dissertation studies behavioral responses to economic inequalities
faced by individuals from different social identity groups through the lens of the abovementioned
domains.
One of the key questions put forth by researchers critically assessing the ’LNOB’ agenda of
the UN, is the need to conceptualise and provide necessary instruments to measure those left
out. A popular framework discussed by both Klasen and Fleurbaey (2019) and Kabeer (2014) is
to focus on the intersection of two distinct approaches to inequality. On one hand is the vertical
approach wherein inequality is measured in the form of income, assets or including non monetary
metrics such as capabilities at the household or individuals level. The second approach is the
horizontal inequality that emphasises on social discrimination or group based disadvantages that
individuals face based on their identities at birth such as gender, caste, ethnicity, race, age and
forms of disability (Stewart, 2009). While each of these inequalities exist independently, Kabeer
(2016) emphasises ’it is the intersection between these different forms of inequality that serves to
define the most severe and often the most enduring form of social exclusion in socieites’.
The thesis advances the discussion on consequences of the intersection between horizontal
and vertical inequalities in the following ways: (a) The first study observes subjective earnings
expectations for children across different identity groups such as lower caste, Muslims and females
relative to the priviledged Hindu males. This analysis is an important descriptive study as
differences in expected returns to education could explain early school dropouts and demand
for human capital accumulation among different social identity groups in India. The study is
categorized under the domain of denial of opportunities or pre-market exclusion. (b) The second
study addresses how men and women respond to wage inequality - especially when the gender
of the advantaged coworker is known. Using a field experiment, we observe the interaction of
income and gender based inequality within the labor market. This paper falls in the domain
of unequal access to resources or market exclusion. (c) The third and fourth paper focus on
reducing inequalities within a relatively less researched domain of non-market interactions. The
third paper addresses motivations that encourage altruistic behavior towards recipients who
are economically deprived but belong to a different religious group in India. The fourth paper
identifies the importance of solidarity norms that contribute to collective risk sharing, thereby
lowering risks of individuals who are economically vulnerable in Colombia. Both the papers study
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how norms of social preferences such as altruism and reciprocity are associated with age. Inorder
to measure the impact of identity based exclusion and existing inequalities, each chapter uses a
combination of economic experiments and surveys. The thesis follows a behavioral framework
combining theories in pyschology (role of deliberative and automatic thinking (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974)), sociology (priming and social identity theories, (Tafjel and Turner, 1986;
Tajfel and Turner, 2019)) and economics (Li et al., 2009; Lane, 2016; Falk and Knell, 2000;
Bertrand et al., 2005).
Priming and making identities salient has also been used in previous studies. By using such
methods, it is possible to reveal how individuals ’see’ or ’think’ or ’activate’ their mental models
as normalised by society or the context they live in (Latour and Douglas, 1988). However, in
most cases, the findings show individuals from minority or disadvantaged group are discriminated
against (a detailed review of these studies can be found in Field experiments in Discrimination
(Bertrand and Duflo, 2017)). While these studies document how disadvantaged social identities
could be the target of the limited information models that propel ’statistical discrimination’
(driven consciously or unconsciously by prejudice - See (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Dickinson and
Oaxaca, 2009)), very few studies show how negative stereotypes and prejudice become self
fulfilling prophecies. In other words, they not only encourage the individuals who discriminate
but also affect those discriminated. Social psychologists have argued in favor of the reverse causal
channel, whereby the statistical based discrimination of cateogorizing certain groups as less
productive, intern causes these groups to be less productive. They term this as self expectancy
effects or the stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson, 1995). Few studies in economics have
attempted to reveal the disadvantaged group’s tendency to self affirm the negative stereotypes
about their own group. The study by Hoff and Pandey (2006) stand out in the literature
who show that priming and making caste identity salient, results in a strong and robust caste
gap in performance. A replication study was conducted in China by Afridi et al. (2015), and
performances of children between 7 to 12 years old was observed. The social identity made salient
was the location of residence; namely urban and rural. This distinction was based on a four
decade long differential treatment whereby the urban residents have always been favored in terms
of housing, education, jobs and public benefits. The authors found a significant drop in own
performance for the rural or low category children after making their hukou (housing category)
identity salient. Apart from performances in real effort tasks, some studies also measure risk,
time and social preferences of individuals when their social identity was made salient. These
studies shed light on the sensitivity of social cues on individual’s preferences (Benjamin et al.,
2010; Li et al., 2009).
The dissertation attempts to observe such self fulfilling stereotypes in more realistic environments.
A main contribution of the thesis is to understand how inequality traps can impede the progress
on equality and inclusion within each of the domains of the UN’s conceptual framework. It
further suggests potential policy measures that can help break existing inequality traps. The first
domain where exclusion can occur is through pre-market discrimination or denial of opportunities.
We contribute to the literature by studying how subjective earnings expectations vary among
excluded and marginalised identities. We find collective mobilisation of marginalised groups and
their representation in the form of political leadership as important variables to promote demand
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for higher education among the excluded groups. The second domain under consideration is
unequal access to resources, specifically income and employment. We conducted a RCT among
university students in India with the aim to study how inequality in wages affects productivity
of workers. The paper particularly, focusses on how individuals respond to wage inequality when
they know the gender of the advantaged coworker. One of the main contributions of the study is
to highlight the assymmetric responses of males and females towards inequality depending on
who is their reference group. We find women in our sample evaluate a male advantaged coworker
as better performers and tend to justify the pay difference. The paper proposes need for more
macro and meso policies that finance gender equality. Apart from gender sensitive policies
such as affirmative action and skill training, there is a need to exogeneously invest in public
infrastructure that lowers burden of care work, and free up time for women in reproductive labor
activities.
Finally, in the third and fourth chapter we consider participation in non market interaction.
The third chapter highlights the development of altruistic giving in children and observes if
favoritism for own religious group lowers voluntary contributions towards members of the
outgroup. Our contribution through this study is to highlight the presence of religious
discrimination, if any, among children between 7 to 17 years. In our sample of children
from the city of Mumbai, we do not observe religious identity based discrimination when norms
of solidarity (altruism) are considered. Similarly, in the study in Bogota (Colombia), we focussed
on motivations of altruism, reciprocity and deservingness. We found altruism and reciprocity to
be strong motivations contributing to informal risk sharing with other members in civil society.
In both chapters we propose the promotion of norms of solidarity among middle and high school
students as important non-cognitive skills.
While assessing exclusion among different social identity groups, a common thread throughout
the dissertation is its focus on children and young adults. Children across identities are considered
one of the most vulnerable groups exposed to social exclusion (Klasen, 2001; UNICEF, 2014;
Molinas Vega et al., 2011). A World Bank report on equality of opportunity (also known as
the Human Opportunities Index) reveals disparity in education, health and the public life,
particularly for children based on pre-existing characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, education
of parents (Molinas Vega et al., 2011). Apart from external factors such as provision of education,
health and other public services that can ensure equality of opportunity, there is a growing
literature in economics that observes how internal preferences, primarily non-cognitive skills
such as self control, time preferences, fairness and prosociality develops for children across
different social identity groups (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Sutter et al., 2019; Harbaugh et al.,
2007; Harbaugh and Krause, 2000). Heckman et al. (2018) was one of the first studies to show
the benefits of developing non cognitive skills as crucial for life outcomes.
We contribute to this literature by studying the development of social preferences and norms
of solidarity across a large age spectrum i.e 7 to 17 years. The study in Colombia builds a panel
dataset following the same children over three years. Such a longitudinal study enables us to
observe the development of risk sharing preferences that can contribute to reducing economic
inequalities. Furthermore, we are able to identify important phases in the early childhood and
adolescence wherein a certain non-cognitive skill either develops or depreciates. By considering
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factors such as socio economic status, parental preferences and peer effects, the studies can
provide a holistic understanding of how norms of risk sharing and solidarity develop in children.
Given the importance of non cognitive skills in enriching life outcomes and contributing to enable
equality of opportunity, identifying these internal social preferences in children is an important
policy question.
In the next paragraphs I provide a roadmap summarizing the objectives, methodology,
findings and contributions for each chapter.
1.1 Roadmap
The first chapter studies demand side factors that could impact decisions for schooling and
gaining higher education for students across different social identity groups. We measure
subjective monetary returns for different levels of education; namely high school, diploma and
college. It has been shown in the literature that subjective expectations are important reference
points used by individuals in their decision making (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009; McKenzie
et al., 2013; Auspurg et al., 2017). By using primary data and innovative survey techniques
such as calculating the probability distribution (Dominitz and Manski, 2006; Attanasio and
Kaufmann, 2014), our contribution is to study the differential earnings expectations for a sample
of students from different social identity groups. The survey took place over two consecutive
years (2017 and 2018) in Mumbai (India) among children between 12 to 17 years of age. Using a
balanced panel dataset, we are able to observe whether there is an aspirational gap, measured
as monetary returns to education, among children from different minority, disadvantaged and
privilidged identities. In addition, the paper using novel statistical technique known as the
Distributional regression (Hohberg et al., 2017) as a complimentary method to mean estimations.
The Distributional regression not only incorporates the arithmetic mean but also other moments
of the distribution such as variance and skewness in the analysis. The findings show students from
marginalized identity groups, especially girls and Muslims expect lower monetary returns from
education and schooling compared to children belonging to privilidged social groups. However,
disadvantaged caste groups who face systematic discrimination in the labor market and have
low actual earnings, overestimate their expected earnings relative to the existing wage gap.
In the second chapter, we study gender based wage inequality at the workplace. The aim
of the study was to experimentally test the paradox of the female contented worker (Dawson,
2017; Parks et al., 1995; Poggi, 2010). The paradox suggests that despite the persistence of
gender wage inequality, women tend to report higher job satisfaction than men. In this paper,
we observe workers response to wage inequality. Furthermore, we study how men and women
vary in their response to wage inequality, when the gender identity of the advantaged coworker
is made salient. Contributing to the question on why gender based discrimination in the labor
market continues to persist, the study focusses on the behavioral responses (measured by effort
and subjective satisfaction) of workers who face wage inequality when the gender identity of
the advantaged coworker is salient. In order to test this phenomenon, we conducted a field
experiment across three universities in Kolkata, India. The experiment is based on the theoretical
framework of the wage effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1984). We hired students as research assistants
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for a data entry task. All students worked for two consecutive sessions in teams of two. The
groups of students were further divided into four groups - Control group where all students
recieved the same wage, T1(Unilateral wage cut) one of the coworkers experienced a wage cut.
In T2(Wage cut- Known Ingroup identity) and T3(Wage cut- Known Outgroup identity), a
coworker not only recieved the wage cut, but the gender identity of the advantageous worker
was made salient. In the first session all the workers recieved the same wage. We introduced
the wage cut for one of the coworkers in the second session. The experiment design allowed
the use of a difference in difference regression method to analyse our results. We find that
receiving unequal wages compared to a coworker whose gender identity is unknown impacts the
productivity of the worker negatively. When identities of the coworkers are made salient, we
find that there is a differential response to wage inequality by females and males respectively.
Male workers reduce their effort supply under wage inequality irrespective of the gender of the
coworker. However, female workers negatively respond to wage inequality only when paired with
coworkers of the same gender. When female participants are paired with male coworkers, wage
inequality does not result in changes in productivity. In our sample, no change in effort under
wage inequality is driven by those females who expect their performance levels to be lower than
their male coworkers and hence do not percieve the inequality as unfair. Our study contributes
to the literature by (Hoff and Pandey, 2006) and (Afridi et al., 2015) who show how long term
cultural inequalities and social norms can have behavioral consequences, particularly on the
individuals facing these inequalities.
In the absence of formal institutions for social protection, social preferences play an important
role in risk sharing and reducing economic inequalities (Dercon, 2002; Kinnan and Townsend,
2012; Angelucci et al., 2015). The third and fourth chapter provide evidence of the strong
presence and development of social preferences such as altruism and reciprocity. In the third
chapter, we implement a field experiment to study two main motivations for altruistic giving;
namely pure altruism and warm glow (Andreoni, 1990; Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017; Vesterlund,
2016) among children. Our study aims to understand how motivations of altruism can affect
voluntary contributions (a) for different age groups (b) when the recipient is either from the
same or different religious identity group as the donor. Through this study we contribute to the
literature on motivations driving social preferences. Particularly, we are able to disentangle the
relative importance of two motivations of giving - pure altruism and warm glow. In the domain
of identity based discrimination, previous studies have found strong evidence of discrimination
or ingroup bias(Chai et al., 2011; Chakravarty et al., 2016; Hoff and Pandey, 2006). We provide
empirical evidence of ingroup bias (religious) among school age children in Mumbai, India.
The field experiment was a between-within subject design based on a modified dictator game
by Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017). The within subject design wherein each participant made 6
donation decisions was used to disentangle pure altruism and warm glow. The between subject
design tested two contextual factors affecting giving behavior; namely age and the religious
identity of the potentital recipients. The survey and experiment was conducted across 8 public
schools in Mumbai in 2018 keeping in mind Hindu and Muslim dominant localities. Our sample
size was 1600 students from 7 to 17 years of age. Apart from disentangling the relative importance
of the two motivations of voluntary giving, for the analysis we used a Cobb Douglas function
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and specified a structural estimation to obtain the pure altruism and warm glow parameters
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006; Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017). The children in our sample show
both pure altruistic and warm glow preferences and there is a shift in the relative degree of
warm glow giving (or pure altruism) based on the contextual factors. We find pure altruism
(warm glow) to be positively (negatively) correlated with age. However, warm glow forms the
dominant motivation driving voluntary contributions. We do not observe an ingroup bias in
altruistic giving based on the recipient’s religious identity. In addition to the experiment, we
conduct household surveys with both parents of the children to understand the influence of
parental opinions on the child’s preferences for fair and equitable distribution towards different
identity groups. Apart from mapping the development of motivations for altruistic giving in
children, our study is particularly important in the debate of voluntary contributions for public
goods in areas with heterogeneous and salient identities. We find that despite living in diverse
environments, children upto the age of 17 years do not lower the total voluntary contributions
when the recipient is from a religious outgroup.
In the fourth chapter, we study intrinsic motivations for solidarity norms and risk sharing
among school age children. The study focusses on identifying the development of different
intrinsic motivations such as altruism, reputation, reciprocity and deservingness in sustaining
informal risk sharing. Our novel experiment design allows to test all the above motivations, in
addition to observing the importance of reducing informational asymmetry. Our research context
is Bogota, Colombia. While there is evidence of risk sharing among adults, our contribution to
the literature is to study the development of solidarity norms for risk sharing among children.
Using a panel dataset, we trace the development of social norms in children over three years by
implementing a solidarity game from Selten and Ockenfels (1998). The novelty of the study is
that we are able to follow 500 children and observe how norms such as altruism, image concerns,
reciprocity, deservingness change with cognitive development and contribute towards sustaining
informal risk sharing and solidarity networks. The within-between experiment design is a
modified version of the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). Students are randomnly
selected into groups of three. One of the students experiences an economic shock and looses
all their earnings. The other students in the group have to decide how much they would like
to transfer to this student faced with the exogeneous economic shock. The students make the
transfer decisions over four rounds. The modifications in each round is able to test which social
preference motivates the student’s willingness to transfer. We find that there is a substantial
degree of risk sharing measured as the proportion of children who transfer income to members of
the group affected by an idiosyncratic negative income shock. Yet, the proportion of endowment
transferred is relatively low. Altruism increases between the age of 9 and 11 years and remains
stable thereafter. Another important norm contributing to informal risk sharing is reciprocity or
conditional altruism whereby giving is positively correlated with previous transfers made by the
beneficiary. Finally, we find that image concerns are important for the youngest cohort i.e 9
years old. However, it is not an important motivation to participate in informal risk sharing for
older children. In both India and Colombia, we find altruism to be a strong motivation while
making solidarity transfers. For the sample of children in Mumbai, we do not observe significant
differences in altruistic giving when the identity of the recipient differs. Similarly, in Bogota,
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children are contributing based on the neediness of others but do not differentiate based on the
effort levels or the income earned by the participants who lost their earnings. However, past
behavior of the beneficiaries are given importance.
Chapter 2
Subjective returns to education:
Rational expectations of
disadvantaged groups in India
I would like to thank Marcela Ibanez, Fredrick Carlsson, Stephan Klasen, Ashwini Deshpande, Peter Pütz,
Franziska Ellen and all the participants at the 2019 UNU-WIDER and 2019 Feminist Economics conference for
helpful comments on the paper.
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Over the last 40 years, countries have shown an increasing trend in secondary and tertiary
educational attainment owing to the demand for an educated workforce (Fasih et al., 2012; Desai
and Kulkarni, 2008). However, at the same time, educational disparities between groups and
social strata is increasing (Kabeer, 2014). Based on the World Inequality Database on Children,
the Global Education Monitoring Report of the UNESCO has provided an overview of these
inequalities. The report shows across different continents, children from lower income groups,
rural areas and conflict-affected communities have low mean education and higher likelihood
of being out of school. Similarly, the likelihood of completing higher and tertiary education is
lowest for females and children from minority tribes and ethnicities(UNESCO, 2015). In this
paper we investigate the drivers of persistent gaps in school enrollment and attainment of higher
education across children of different social identities in India. Our hypothesis is that biases in
perceptions on returns to education could explain early drop out of minority and traditionally
discriminated groups. We focus on specific groups such as females, disadvantaged caste and
minority religions in India. The earnings expectations is observed for three levels of education;
completion of high school, technical education and college.
The study tests whether Muslims, females and lower caste groups expect lower returns to
education compared to Hindu male and upper caste students(Kingdon, 2005; Kingdon and
Unni, 2001; Duraisamy and Duraisamy, 2017; Madheswaran and Attewell, 2007). Despite its
complexities and varied groups or ’Jatis’, the caste system in India is classified into three broad
categories for comparison; namely, General category (Upper caste or advantaged group), Other
Backward Caste (OBC) and finally, Scheduled Caste and Tribes (SC-ST) based on the Census
survey of India. Among the two discriminated caste groups (OBC and SC-ST), the inequalities
faced by the SC-ST groups are considered to be more severe than the OBC category. While the
OBCs are in the lower ranks of the caste hierarchy, the SC (Dalits) were considered to be outside
of the caste system and deemed ’untouchables’. Similarly, the ST or tribals were stigmatized and
considered primitive with an inclination of having criminal tendencies (Deshpande, 2013). Such
historical exclusion can be observed today not only in the form of economic deprivation but also
low standard of living, extreme poverty and health deprivation (Thorat and Newman, 2010).
As a result, we expect subjective earnings expectations from education for SC-ST groups to be
lower than OBC relative to the advantaged upper caste groups. Apart from caste, gender has
been an important component when inequality in access to education and equal opportunities
is discussed. Studies observing actual earnings in the labor market, show females to have low
returns to education compared to males (Kingdon, 2005; Kingdon and Unni, 2001; Duraisamy
and Duraisamy, 2017; Madheswaran and Attewell, 2007). Considering inequality traps whereby
lower returns in the labor market further impedes investment in the same, we expect females
in our sample to have lower earnings expectations relative to males (Bourguignon et al., 2007;
Deininger et al., 2013). Among females, upper caste girls are expected to have higher earnings
expectations compared to Muslim and lower castes. The hypothesis is supported by recent
secondary data evidence that human development outcomes are far more inferior for SC (Dalit)
and Muslim women compared to upper caste females. The 2011 Indian census shows that while
64% of the upper caste Hindu women were literate, this statistic was only at 56% for SC-ST
and Muslim women.
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Stated beliefs have been used to observe decision making in various domains such as migrant
behaviour McKenzie et al. (2013), environmental concerns Luseno et al. (2003), credit constraints
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) to name a few. In the context of demand for education and
schooling decisions, subjective expectations are shown to differ for students across different
economic backgrounds. Studies by Avery and Kane (2004); Dominitz and Manski (1997, 2006);
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) find actual returns and subjective returns are not correlated, and
low income students either tend to underestimate expected earnings or overestimate tuition costs.
As a result more credit constrained students are likely to drop out (Attanasio and Kaufmann,
2014). Controlling for the student’s socioeconomic background, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2014) find academic and cognitive abilities of children to explain higher subjective expectations
from education. Another mechanism that impacts demand for schooling, through increasing
monetary expectations is parental interest (Dizon-Ross, 2013; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014).
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) measure percieved earnings for education not only among
children but also their mothers. They find the mother’s expectations regarding their child’s
earning capabilities as an important indicator of demand for schooling. Dizon-Ross (2013) find
parents in Malawi have inaccurate perceptions regarding their children’s academic capabilities
resulting in less investment in education. She emphasises the effect to be particularly significant
among low income households.
This study contributes to the above literature by focussing on whether horizontal inequalities
based on an indivdual’s social group could impact subjective returns1. Controlling for economic
and educational backgrounds of the parents, the paper estimates stated beliefs regarding returns
to education for children from disadvantaged and minority groups such as females, Muslims and
lower castes (OBC and SC-ST). The closest to this study is work by Huntington-klein (2015) who
estimated subjective returns at different educational levels among students in Washington (USA)
with a particular focus on the heterogeneity across children from different races. Furthermore, a
comparison of the subjective and observed data show them to be uncorrelated. While he does
not find a gender difference in the subjective and projected earnings, black students have a
higher projected return, but seem to have low subjective expectations. Other studies focusing on
race in the US find similar results (Henderson et al., 2011; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Connor,
1999). However the study has two drawbacks; firstly returns are estimated only using a point
estimate and second, since he has cross sectional data, the author is unable to provide evidence
of whether the data is driven by measurement error or it captures the actual education choices
made by the students.
We extend this work and contribute to this scarce literature in three ways; (a) Implement
rigorous methods to illicit subjective responses from individuals belonging different social identity
groups. Following the studies by (Delavande, 2009; Attanasio and Augsburg, 2016; Dominitz
and Manski, 2006), the paper collects information on the minimum and maximum earnings
(thresholds) that students expected to earn for different levels of education and the likelihood of
1Except for two papers I am aware of, Maertens (2011) reports subjective earnings expectations for girls and
boys in rural India and finds the former to expect lower earnings. A second paper by Chari and Maertens (2014)
also find parents report lower earnings for girls compared to boys and explain this disparity based on differing
abilities. Both the studies do not use robust methods to ellicit subjective earnings and they are conducted for a
small rural sample in India.
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earning an amount greater than the midpoint of this self indicated threshold (See (Delavande
and Rohwedder, 2008; Delavande, 2009)). This method allows to construct a distribution of
subjective earnings for each individual for each level of education. One of the main reasons
to use the conditional probability distribution is the need for comparability. Dominitz and
Manski (2006) shows that individuals formulate expectations of the point estimate based on
different thresholds and there is extensive heterogeneity on how people update their beliefs.
The probability distribution for each individual, controls for this level of uncertainty2. (b)
Secondly, the paper analysis a panel data of the student’s subjective returns over two years.
This dataset allows to use statistical methods that controls for individual specific unobservables
thereby testing whether the expectations reported by the students are consistent. (c) A third
contribution of this paper is on the methodological front. By using the novel Distributional
regression technique, the study is able to analyse the differential effect of belonging to a specific
social identity not only on the mean outcome variable (subjective returns to education) but the
entire conditional distribution of the outcome. This method is developed as complementary
technique to OLS estimation that only observes a linear change of explanatory variables on
point estimates of the outcome (Stasinopoulos et al., 2018; Hohberg et al., 2017). Finally, as
a comparison to the Huntington-klein (2015) study, I correlate the inflation adjusted actual
earnings for the three levels of education with the subjective earnings reported by the students.
The findings reveal females expect to gain lower earnings compared to males for all three
levels of education. While Muslims expect low returns compared to upper caste Hindus for
high school and technical education, the difference is not significant for college. Rejecting our
hypothesis, lower caste groups (SC-ST and OBC) expect higher returns from college education
relative to the Hindu upper caste males. Incorporating other moments in the distribution,
we find females, Muslims and SC-ST students have significantly more left skewed earnings
distribution for school and diploma education. Past projected earnings are not correlated with
current subjective returns. While most subsamples underestimate their earnings relative to
actual earnings, male lower caste groups eg. SC and ST have higher subjective returns despite
low actual returns. The final section of the paper discuses potential mechanisms explaining this
result.
2.1 Local context
With the increasing violence and exclusion of certain social groups, it is important to study how
different social identities perceive opportunities such as education, employment and economic
growth in India. In this study, the focus is specifically on the perception of returns to education
for females, disadvantaged caste groups, Muslims. There is an attempt to extend the analysis
to study intersectionality; namely the responses of females from lower castes and Muslim
communities.
There is extensive secondary evidence that the above mentioned disadvantaged groups have
been excluded from the economic prosperity that India is experiencing. The Sachar Report in
2(Dominitz and Manski, 2006) find individuals to have the same point estimate but vary in the level of
uncertainty, overconfidence bias resulting in downweighting of the mean and heterogeneity in each individual’s
process of belief updating.
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2006 pointed out the mean years of schooling for Muslim children has been consistently low
with nearly 25% of Muslim children between ages 6 and 14 years have either never attended
school or have dropped out of school. A recent study by Asher et al. (2017) show a decrease in
upward mobility for a child born into a Muslim family. Relative to other social groups, their
likelihood for economic mobility drops from 31.5 in 1960 to 29 in 1980. Although overall dropout
rates have drastically reduced among Indian children, the difference in dropout between all
Indian youth and lower caste youth has significantly increased from 4% in 1989 to 16.21% in
2008. Further disaggregating disadvantaged caste groups as Other Backward castes (OBC) and
Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC-ST) (Deshpande, 2013)3, the National Sample Survey (NSS)
in 2000 shows 37% males of the SC-ST groups and 44% of OBC have never enrolled in formal
education, compared to 17% among the upper caste Hindus or the general category (Desai and
Kulkarni, 2008; Dreze and Sen, 2001; Thorat and Newman, 2010).
One aspect that distinguishes the two disadvantaged groups - Muslims and lower caste group
such as the OBC, SC and ST is the provision of affirmative action (AA) or quotas that benefits
the latter. With such institutional policies for the SC-ST and OBC, their situation is slightly
better than Muslims who do not have institutional policies to overcome their consistent exclusion
(Asher et al., 2017; Goel and Deshpande, 2016). A common thread across the disadvantaged
religious and caste groups is the status of women within the Indian context. Relegated to the
role of a second class citizen (Dyson and Moore, 1983), across the identity spectrum, women
face discrimination. Right from birth, the culturally ingrained parental preference for a son can
be observed from the increasing sex ratio in favor of men (Sharma, 2016; Pike, 2011), decreasing
labor force participation (Sarkar et al., 2019) and entry into educational institutions (World Bank,
2014). This study provides evidence of whether the actual discrimination in education returns
are reflected in the minds of youth, particularly children who are yet to complete schooling.
The study focusses on highlighting whether these marginalized groups have internalized such
overt discrimination and adjusted their beliefs on expected earnings. I hypothesize that the
identity groups such as females, muslims, OBC and SC-ST castes expect to earn lower income
from higher education levels compared to the privilidged groups; namely, Upper caste Hindu
males and females.
2.2 Data and Methodology
This section provides a detailed description of the data collection procedures, measurement of
the subjective earnings, summary statistics and finally the empirical strategy used to estimate
the subjective expectations for the different social groups.
2.2.1 Survey procedure
A survey was conducted in 2017 and 2018, among children from 12-17 years of age in public
schools across different parts of Mumbai, India. Information on subjective earnings expectations
3Despite the caste system being complex with a number of groups under an established hierarchy, most studies
follow the categorization by the National Census and the Affirmative Action (AA) program that divides the caste
groups into broadly four categories; the general (Upper or privilidged) caste, OBC (other backward castes), SC
(untouchables also known as Dalits) and ST (tribals)
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was collected for three levels of education; high school, diploma or technical education and college.
High school includes 10 years of education but does not provide any skills or specialisation in
the labor market. Technical education or diploma can be considered as an alternative for college
or university education. It provides technical skills and focusses on immediate employability.
The courses can last from 6 months to 2 years4. Finally, college or a university degree results in
15 years of education within the Indian system.
In both years the exact same procedure was followed for the students. First, all the children
completed an ’Education survey’ in their classrooms. The survey included questions on socio-
demographics and detailed information regarding their earnings expectations for different levels
of education. In the subjective earnings schedule of the survey, the students had to answer
the following questions: In the future, when you will be 28 years old, do you think you will be
working if you completed 12th standard(high school)/ Diploma (technical education) / College
(University)?. For each education level: namely high school, diploma and college only if the
student mentioned ’Yes’ they had to answer the follow up question regarding earnings 5:
• In the future, when you will be 28 years old, what is the minimum (maximum) monthly
income do you think you will earn if you complete 12th standard (high school)?
• In the future, when you will be 28 years old, what is the minimum (maximum) monthly
income do you think you will earn if you complete diploma or a technical education course?
• In the future, when you will be 28 years old, what is the minimum (maximum) monthly
income do you think you will earn if you complete college?
For the first question regarding whether the students expect to work for a given level of
education, a total of 18 students said they will not work 6. These 18 students did not answer
the earnings question for the specific level of education. For the remaining students who said
they will be working, we calculated the midpoint for the earnings at each education level. The
midpoint was based on each student’s reported minimum and maximum threshold. After two
days, we went back to the same schools and conducted a one on one interview (’Exit survey’)
with the children. In this survey, the children were asked what is the likelihood (from a scale of
0 to 10) of earning greater than or equal to the midpoint of their self reported threshold (Guiso
et al., 2002; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014). A final survey was conducted few weeks after the
Education and the exit survey, where our enumerators made phone calls to the parents of our
respondent and asked them a few questions regarding their children and their perceptions on
equal opportunities in work and education for all genders, religious and disadvantaged caste
groups.
2.2.2 Measuring subjective earnings
Subjective earnings expectation was calculated from the education and exit survey based on the
following information; range of self-reported earnings expectations, midpoint and the likelihood
4The courses include information technology, medical technician, accounting, home science to name a few
5However if the students wished to respond to the expectations questions they could, but we undertake the
analysis conditional on this response
6Out of the 18 students, 7 said they will not be working after completing high school, 4 student will not work
after diploma and 8 will not work after completing college education.
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for earnings to the right of the midpoint. The paper follows the method that has been used
in the recent literature to ellict expectations (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2008; Delavande,
2009; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014; Dominitz and Manski, 1997). By using the conditional
probability distribution, the study is able to control for the variation in the inter-quantile range
and account for heterogeneity across the different social identity groups of interest. The expected











where ym and yM are the log self reported minimum and maximum earnings by student i
conditional on working full time with educational degree d (school, diploma or college). We make
certain assumptions to calculate the individual specific expected mean of the elicited subjective
distribution; first, the likelihood p that earnings are to the right of the midpoint is given by
p = Prob(y ≥ (ym + yM )/2). Second, we assume the the probability mass within the two
thresholds ie. [ym, ymid] and [ymid, yM ] has a triangular distribution7(Attanasio and Kaufmann,
2014; Guiso et al., 2002) (See Appendix 2 for details). Following the work by Huntington-klein
(2015), the study additionally compares the projected returns for the three levels of education.
The projected weekly earnings was calculated using the National Sample Survey (2011-12) for
urban Mumbai using the Mincer equation. It was adjusted for the consumer price index of 2018
when the survey took place.
2.2.3 Descriptives of the data
This section discusses the descriptives of the sample. Table 2.1 shows the sample characteristics
of the children who were on average 13 years old, 48% of the students were girls and 75%
belonged to the Hindu religious group. The cognitive ability of the students was assessed using 6
Ravens matrices. Thus the score could range from 0 (no correct answer) to 6 (all correct answers).
On average, the children answered 4 correct questions. Regarding the parent’s responses, the
father’s monthly income within the household is on average Rs.16,000 and the mother’s income
is Rs.8000. Both parents have completed on average 10 years of education. When asked about
the parent’s subjective opinons on gender equality and discrimination against minorities, 41% of
the parents supported gender equality. But they believed that when jobs are scare, men should
be given priority (65%). When asked whether minorities and caste groups face discrimination
at the workplace and in school, on average 75% of the parents agreed to this.These results are
similar to the responses in the nationally implemented World Value survey.
In the Education survey, apart from collecting information on earnings expectations, we also
collected detailed information on the aspirations of the children such as What work would you
like to do to earn an income? and What is the highest level of education you want to attain?.
These two questions on aspirations regarding work and education was not asked in an one to
one format by the enumerator, but was included in the main survey that the children completed
on their own. The question on aspirations is a categorical variable. Similarly, the caste identity
of the children is also categorical. Table 2.6 provides a twoway frequency of the disaggregated
7Studies have used both uniform and triangular distribution. (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009) used the
triangular distribution which gives larger weight to the responses closer to the midpoint rather than the extremes
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Panel A: Children
Age 13.07 1.29 10 17 408
Female 0.49 0.50 0 1 408
Muslim 0.25 0.43 0 1 408
Cognitive ability 3.89 1.53 0 6 408
Leader caste 2.10 0.59 1 3 187
Panel B: Father
Income 16458.96 13658.63 1000 90000 268
Gender equality 0.38 0.49 0 1 269
Men get more jobs 0.64 0.48 0 1 269
Minorities discriminated work 0.74 0.44 0 1 269
Minorities discriminated edu 0.66 0.47 0 1 270
Assets 0.67 0.47 0 1 270
Education years 10.84 3.27 0 15 386
Quota 0.71 0.45 0 1 115
Panel C: Mother
Income 8367.31 7897.87 500 40000 52
Gender equality 0.37 0.48 0 1 275
Men get more jobs 0.63 0.48 0 1 275
Minorities discriminated work 0.75 0.43 0 1 276
Minorities discriminated edu 0.71 0.46 0 1 278
Assets 0.76 0.43 0 1 277
Education years 10.63 3.66 0 17 399
caste categories and the levels of education they wish to attain. The distribution of caste in my
sample is 38% upper caste or general, 49% OBC (Other Backward caste) and 12% of SC-ST
(Scheduled caste and tribes or Dalits i.e the oppressed). Regarding non monetary aspirations,
38% and 33% of our sample wish to complete upto diploma or college education. 13% reported
wanting to complete high school and 14% said they didnt know.
Table 2.2 is the raw data of the earnings calculated for each level of education. It shows
the minimum, maximum and midpoint earnings reported by the students. Using the range of
variation, Log Expected Income (Subjective) and Log weekly income (Subjective) is calculated
from the Equation 2.1. Log weekly projected income is the actual earnings estimated using
the National Sample survey (2011-12) for urban Mumbai. Similar to the projected weekly
income, the students on average expect highest earnings from a diploma or technical education.
The last row is the probability mass to the right of the midpoint earnings. Figure 2.2 in the
Appendix shows the correlation between projected and subjective earnings for school, diploma
and college. Similar to Huntington-klein (2015) and Jensen (2010) there is no correlation between
the projected and subjective earnings specifically for this sample. Following Delevande et al.
(2011), we could observe whether the students understood the basic property of probabilities.
We asked each child two questions about nested events (1) What is the likelihood (between 0
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Table 2.2: Raw earnings - Subjective (2018) and Projected (NSS 2011-12)
School Diploma College
Minimum 77.29 (566.0) 156.44 (1135.9) 81.71 (432.5)
Midpoint 93.97 (439.7) 186.77 (857.2) 128.21 (534.4)
Maximum 110.65 (403.9) 217.10 (880.4) 174.71 (671.6)
Inter-Quantile range 33.35 (440.1) 60.66 (1091.8) 93.00 (366.3)
Monthly Income (Subjective) 5.44 (3.475) 6.17 (3.769) 6.26 (3.755)
Weekly Income (Subjective) 1.84 (1.230) 2.19 (1.351) 2.08 (1.292)
Weekly Income (Projected) 6.03 (0.492) 6.81 (0.413) 6.55 (0.498)
Probability > Midpoint 5.10 (2.820) 5.83 (2.911) 5.77 (2.920)
Test for Monotonicity 0.90 (0.294) 0.90 (0.294) 0.90 (0.294)
Observations 408 408 408
All earning variables are presented as logs. Projected log returns were calculated using the National
Sample survey data collected in 2011-2012 by the National Statistical and Survey Organisation in India.
and 10) that you will finish your homework in the next two day? (2) What is the likelihood
(between 0 and 10) that you will finish your homework in the next two weeks? As a test to
understand probability, the students should assign a larger likelihood to finishing the homework
in two weeks compared to two days. Except for 39 students, the rest obey the nesting property
and assign larger likelihood to completing their homework in two weeks (relative to two days) 8.
As we are keen to study how different social identity groups form earnings expectations, an
interesting descriptive is a comparison between the projected and subjective earnings for each of
the sub-groups. The projected earnings is calculated using the NSS data for Mumbai and corrects
for selection bias using Heckman’s two step procedure 9. Figure 2.1 shows the standardized
projected earnings in the y-axis and standardized subjective earnings in the X-axis. All the
points on the red line passing through the origin (at 45 degree angle) is when the subjective
and projected earnings are equal. Points above the line denote underestimation of earnings and
those below reveal an overestimation of earnings. For schooling, we find most of the groups
tend to be close to the 45 degree line. Muslim females and male lower caste groups who have
lower earnings in the labor market tend to overestimate their expectations. A similar pattern is
observed for college education among SC-ST males and females where they overestimate their
earnings relative to the actual income. For diploma, females across caste and religious groups
overestimate their earnings unlike males, eventhough their projected earnings (compared to the
mean) is lower.
2.2.4 Empirical strategy
In this section, I describe two methods; namely the OLS or point estimates and Distributional
regression to estimate the subjective earnings expectations for different social identity groups.
Controlling for other covariates such as parental education, income, child’s cognitive capacity,
8Delevande et al. (2011) find 17% of their sample giving a 50-50 likelihood while the remaining follow the
nesting rule. Their sample included rural boatman compared to adolescent urban students in our sample
9Therefore, we compare the subjective earnigns to projected earnings that the groups could recieve if there
was no identity based discrimination in the labor market
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and subjective responses of parents regarding equal opportunites for different socio economic
groups, the OLS and random effects specifications are described in Equation 2.2 and 2.3.
E(y)id = β0 + β1Ii + β2X ′i + β3F ′i + β4M ′i + β5ProjYid + εid (2.2)
E(y)idt = β0 + β1Ii + β2X ′it + β3F ′i + β4M ′i + β5ProjYid + εidt + ui (2.3)
Equation 2.2 is the OLS model which uses the pooled sample of all students who participated
in the survey over the two years. yid is the subjective expected earnings for each individual i
and is repeated for each education choice d. Equation 2.3 is the random effects model which
includes all the students who participated in the survey in both 2017 and 2018. yidt is the
subjective expected earnings for each individual in time t and the specification is repeated for
each education choice d. The levels of education are three counterfactual situations; namely
completing school or diploma (technical education) and college. Iidt is the social identity (I)
variable such as gender (male or female), religion (hindu or muslim) and upper or lower caste
groups (OBC and SC-ST). X ′idt comprises a vector of individual level characteristics such as age,
number of siblings and cognitive capacity. F ′id is a vector of covariates for the father such as
income, education, subjective opinions on equality of opportunity for different social identities in
India such as gender, caste and religion. Mid are the same measures obtained from the mother
and ProjYid is the inflation adjusted weekly projected earnings calculated using the NSS data
for Mumbai10.
The OLS and random effects framework implies that the coefficients β0 and βi linearly
determine the expectation (average) of the dependent variable. A subgroup analysis or interaction
term can be used to observe the average linear effect of a specific covariate. However, both these
techniques have a shortcoming - the former reduces the sample size. The latter is problematic if
the variable that determines membership of the individual eg. gender or religion is also one of the
outcomes of interest Hohberg et al. (2017). An alternative to point estimates or averages, this
study uses Distributional regression as a methodological contribution. Distributional regression,
henceforth DR (Hohberg et al. (2017); Stasinopoulos et al. (2018)) goes beyond the mean
and takes into account variation over the entire distribution of the dependent variable for the
covariates of interest. Using a maximum likelihood estimation, the distribution of the outcome yi
can be described as a density function p(yi|θi1, θi2, ..θik) where θi1, ..θik are k different parameters
of the distribution such as mean, standard deviation and skewness. For each parameter the
following equation can be specified:
gk(θik)dt = βθk0 + β
θk












it + εid (2.4)
where gk is the link function which models a non linear relationship between the parameter
θs and the explanatory variables. After selecting a suitable conditional distribution that fits the
10I run the specification in Equation 2.3 for all the pooled sample as well as the panel sample over two years
(in 2017 and 2018). I have a sample of 120 students that were surveyed over the two years. Taking advantage
of a panel format of the data, I rerun the Equation 2.3 using a random effects model, incorporating earnings
expectations in 2017 and 2018. 80 children who were in my sample in 2017 dropped out and I could not survey
them in 2018. In the last section of the paper, I discuss the impact of dropouts for the results in the study.
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outcome variable, the model (with relevant covariates) is estimated using maximum likelihood.
The model presents effects of the selected covariates on the distribution parameters. If there
are n observations, the model produces n distributions of the outcome variable. In this study,
after a suitable distribution is selected based on the data, maximum likelihood estimates three
parameters of the distribution; mean, standard deviation and skewness for each observation in the
sample. A bootstrap sample is generated comprising of randomnly drawn estimated distributions.
The DR is reestimated for this bootstrap sample. Now consider any two ’representative agents’
that need to be compared eg. Female hindus and muslims, a conditional distributional comprising
of the three parameters are obtained for the two groups. An estimate which is a combination of
all three moments is computed for each group and the difference is called ’Estimated marginal
treatment’ effects (MTE). This process is repeated for many bootstrap samples and multiple
estimate MTE are obtained and a bootstrap percentile confidence interval (at 95%) is computed.
In the results section, table 2.4 shows the estimates for each of the moments mean, variance and
skewness. The table 2.5 in the appendix includes the estimated MTE for each of the groups of
interest, including a 95% confidence interval for the estimate.
In this study, since the outcome of interest is not the direct difference in the treatment
and control group but rather the comparison of an entire distribution, DR can be considered a
useful complement to the OLS framework. Although distributional measures (moments) can be
individually calculated and used as dependent variables, the advantage of DR is that it yields
one model from which several distributional measures can be obtained. Thus consistent and
comparable measures are estimated since it is from the same model. Finally, as Hohberg et al.
(2017) point out, if the aim of the study is to only compare distributions of the outcome variable
for the treatment and control, we do not require DR - since we can compare the histograms or
kernel densities. However, since this study does not compare only treatment and control groups
but estimates the effects of non linear covariates in the final analysis, the implementation of the
method is a useful contribution to the literature.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Mean effects
In this section, linear regression techniques are used to estimate the mean effect of different
identity groups on their subjective earnings expectations. For more robust estimates of how past
actual earnings and different social identity groups explain subjective earnings expectations, I
estimate an OLS and RE model using Equations 2.2 and 2.3. The OLS specification include
seemingly unrelated coefficients based on the pooled data11, while the RE model uses the panel
data comprising of students who answered the survey in both 2017 and 201812. Table 2.3 shows
OLS and RE estimations for each level of education. Considering the OLS models, the inflation
adjusted projected earnings are not correlated with subjective earnings expectations for the
11Keeping in the mind, the error terms of the three models -school, diploma and college can be correlated, we
report the coefficients for seemingly unrelated regressions.
12I use random effects model (and not fixed effects), since I am interested in studying between indivduals time
invariant characteristics such as the identity. In FE, the model controls for these unobservables and only show the
within individual variation over time
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children (Descritives in Figure 2.2 show a similar result). This finding is also observed in previous
studies by (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009; Huntington-klein, 2015; Jensen, 2010) across other
student samples.
For the OLS models, females expect to earn significantly lower wages after completing a
diploma or college. This is not the case for completing high school. For the average estimates,
Muslim children expect significantly lower earnings compared to the Hindu males only for
diploma. Comparing the two low caste groups (OBC and SC-ST), we reject the hypothesis
that the latter expect lower earnings for higher education levels compared to the Upper caste
groups. Specifically for college education, we find OBC and SC-ST expecting significantly higher
subjective earnings relative to the reference (General/upper caste) group. Column 2,4 and 6
are random effect models that only consider children who participated in the survey in both
years. Unlike Huntington-klein (2015), we are able to control for individual unobservables over a
period of two years by using a panel dataset. However, this panel sample entails the risk of not
considering the dropouts. If we include only those students who continued their education, we
do not find significantly lower earnings expectations for both females and Muslims. However,
Table 2.7 in the Appendix is a linear probability model that shows both females and Muslims
are significanltly more likely dropout. Therefore,the lower earnings expectations for females and
Muslims is driven by the students who dropped out in the next year. These implications of the
dropout are discussed in the last section of the study.
Other important controls such as higher cognitive capacity measured by the Raven’s matrix
is positively correlated with earnings expectations for diploma education. Years of education of
the father has a positive and significant effect on the earnings expectations for school (only in
the OLS models). Actual earnings in the labor market are not correlated with present subjective
expectations.
As a robustness check, Table 2.8 in the Appendix includes a pooled model for all three levels of
education. We find similar results, whereby females have significantly low earnings expectations
in the OLS model. However, there is no significant difference in earnings expectations for females
in the random effects model that does not include the dropouts. For Muslim children, we do
not find a significant difference in earnings expectations relative to the Hindu male upper caste.
Children from the OBC caste group have significantly positive earnings in the pooled OLS and
random effects model. Thus, both specifications (pooling all the education choices and analysing
them separately) show similar patterns for mean estimates. However, given the significance of
diploma as a technical course that offers immediate employment relative to college education
and has higher actual returns, we think it is important to consider each education level as a
counterfactual. Therefore, the study focusses on presenting the mean effects for each education
level independently.
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Table 2.3: Subjective Expectations - OLS and RE
School Diploma College
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Female -0.044 0.106 -0.201*** 0.069 -0.154** 0.040
(0.076) (0.153) (0.077) (0.204) (0.070) (0.180)
Muslim -0.017 -0.104 -0.250** -0.029 0.019 -0.031
(0.117) (0.202) (0.106) (0.296) (0.075) (0.228)
Age -0.007 -0.015 0.018 0.106 -0.003 0.027
(0.023) (0.092) (0.028) (0.132) (0.026) (0.112)
OBC(low caste) 0.006 0.145 0.082 0.235 0.253*** 0.262
(0.114) (0.228) (0.088) (0.267) (0.077) (0.248)
SC-ST(low caste) -0.142 -0.343 -0.082 0.023 0.351** 0.137
(0.203) (0.358) (0.137) (0.322) (0.141) (0.352)
Cognition -0.023 -0.033 0.062** -0.065 -0.033 -0.014
(0.021) (0.039) (0.025) (0.053) (0.027) (0.051)
Father education 0.021* 0.030 0.016 0.016 -0.005 0.035
(0.011) (0.024) (0.011) (0.031) (0.009) (0.029)
Mother education 0.009 0.018 -0.013 0.021 0.005 0.024
(0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.027) (0.010) (0.025)
Actual earnings -0.082 -0.242 -0.059 0.017 0.082 -0.091
(NSS) (0.127) (0.205) (0.077) (0.176) (0.066) (0.185)
2017 0.093 0.129 0.008
(0.103) (0.145) (0.138)
Constant 1.768** 2.602 1.537** -0.336 1.042* 1.066
(0.877) (1.943) (0.686) (2.287) (0.582) (2.084)
Observations 376 222 356 208 376 222
R sq 0.016 0.047 0.023
Adj R sq 0.004 0.034 0.011
R sq B 0.099 0.035 0.078
Column 1, 3 and 5 are pooled OLS models controlling for past actual earnings. Column 2, 4 and 6 are
random effects and includes the sample of students who reported earnings expectations in both 2017 and 2018.
The dependent variable for the above specifications is the log subjective earnings expectations. The OLS models
are seemingly unrelated regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01
CHAPTER 2. SUBJECTIVE RETURNS TO EDUCATION 22
2.3.2 Distributional effects
In the previous section the estimates showed on average, females have lower subjective returns in
the pooled sample, but we do not find significant mean differences for the panel sample. Other
disadvantaged groups such as Muslims do not show significantly different returns. Similarly,
OBC and SC-ST groups show significantly higher earnings relative to male upper caste groups
for college education in the OLS specification. As described in the Section 3.3, when the analysis
does not entail a clean treatment and control comparison, and other explanatory variables
are used in the final analysis, there are shortcomings when only point estimates are provided
(Hohberg et al., 2017). This is true for the current study. As the objective of the paper is to
observe the effect of explanatory variables, that are not independent of the outcome, one way
of conducting robust (complementary) analysis would entail not only the mean but also other
moments of the distribution eg. standard deviation and skewness.
We include a complimentary analysis known as the Distributional regression. Based on
the gamlss code in R, we first observe which distribution fits the outcome variable (Subjective
earnings). We compare the lognormal and Burr distrbution which are distributions frequently
used to measure income. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 are the diagnostic plots for each distribution.
The plots shows the Burr distribution fits the data better than the lognormal distribution as
the latter has a distribution with a heavier right tail when comparing it to normalised quantile
residuals. Using this preliminary evidence as support to continue the analysis, we assuming the
data to have Burr distribution (Hohberg et al., 2017).
As a first step, we obtain the estimates for the moments of the distribution for the groups of
interest. Table 2.4 shows the estimates of the three moments; mean, standard deviation and
skewness for each education choice. Apart from the familiar mean effect, standard deviation
shows the uncertainty or variance of the expected earnings and skewness reveals the extent
to which the distributions of the two comparison groups are significantly left or right skewed.
In the second step, we calculate the Marginal treatment effects (MTE) i.e. the difference in
subjective earnings between any two comparative groups evaluated at the mean values for other
explanatary variables13. The MTE is a combined estimate based on three moments forming a
conditional distribution i.e θik from Equation 2.4. The MTE is shown in Table 2.5. Both the
moments and the MTE based on these moments are calculated for the panel sample of students
over the two years14. We will first discuss the estimates for each of the moments of the groups
we are interested in. Next, we will discuss the combined effect of these moments as the MTE.
In Table 2.4, we find females have significantly lower mean earnigns expectations for school
and college. The standard deviation is significant and positive for the females compared to the
Hindu male upper caste group i.e. significantly more variation (uncertainty) in the responses of
the females. Finally, for school and diploma education choices, females have significantly more
left skewed distributions. Although Muslims do not show significantly different mean earnings
expectations (except for diploma which is positive at 0.194), their earnings expectations are
significantly more left skewed for school and diploma compared to the Hindu male upper caste.
13The other variables includes controls used in the OLS such as parent’s education, cognitive ability of the
student and past actual earnings
14The Distributional regression with the pooled sample showed similar results. Since RE is a more robust model,
we include the latter in the paper.
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Particularly, for school and diploma, both females and Muslims have significantly left skewed
earnings distribution compared to the Upper caste hindu male. There is no significant differences
in earnings expectations for the OBC (low caste group). However, the SC-ST group show on one
hand higher mean earnings expectations and on the other hand, show significantly left skewed
earnings distributions in the school and diploma education choice.
In table 2.5, we estimate the Marginal Treatment effect (MTE) which is a combined estimate
of the three moments. In the first panel, we compare males and females where column 1 is
the MTE of being a male and the 2nd column is the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for
the MTE. We can interpret the MTE as follows: For a male (at the mean values of all other
control variables), the subjective earnings expectation is higher compared to a female by 0.224
units. This MTE is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval for all three education
levels. Similarly considering panel 2 (religion), we find the subjective expectations is significantly
higher among Hindus for school and diploma, but not at the college level. The third and
fourth panel compares OBC and SC-ST caste groups to the General caste. We find the MTE
are not significantly different across all education choices. Table 2.9 in the Appendix further
disaggregates the groups for males and females respectively.
Females show significantly lower MTE across all levels of education and this result is driven
by not only the mean but also the skewness of the distribution. For Muslims, eventhough the
mean earnings expectations are not significantly different, the MTE is lower for Muslims due
to their left skewed distributions. For the OBC, there is no significant difference in the MTE
and this is also observed across the estimates of the moments. However, for the SC-ST, while
we do not find significant differences in the MTE, we observe their mean earnings expectations
to be higher while their earnings distribution is significantly left skewed. Comparing the OLS
and DR techniques, we find combining three moments that form a distribution provides more
robust estimates compared to the linear OLS. Especially for females, we now observe their
subjective earnings expectations to be significantly lower than males across all three education
levels. Similarly, for Muslims we observe significantly low MTE compared to the Hindus for




























Table 2.4: Distributional Regression-Mean, Standard Deviation, Skewness
School Diploma College
Mean S.D Skewness Mean S.D Skewness Mean S.D. Skewness
Female -0.006* 0.39*** -0.43*** -0.105 0.262*** -0.33*** -0.196* 0.131* -0.174
(0.06) (0.05) (0.092) (0.07) (0.052) (0.099) (0.081) (0.052) (0.102)
Muslim 0.065 -0.11 -0.255* 0.194* 0.08 -0.44*** -0.096 0.057 -0.096
(0.064) (0.055) (0.10) (0.088) (0.057) (0.11) (0.089) (0.059) (0.11)
OBC 0.057 0.051 -0.15 -0.052 -0.073 0.099 -0.126 -0.029 -0.088
(0.063) (0.054) (0.097) (0.085) (0.057) (0.108) (0.087) (0.057) (0.11)
SC-ST 0.243* 0.138 -0.359* 0.402*** 0.33** -0.59*** -0.027 -0.005 -0.015
(0.108) (0.088) (0.165) (0.119) (0.094) (0.166) (0.14) (0.089) (0.173)
Constant 0.26* 1.65*** -0.983*** 0.508*** 1.233*** -0.54* 0.532 1.249*** -0.609**
(0.106) (0.172) (0.234) (0.132) (0.137) (0.215) (0.145) (0.151) (0.234)
Observations 652 632 652
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log earnings expectation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 2.5: Distributional Regression
Difference MTE 95% Confidence Intervals
Gender Male-Female LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School 0.224 0.007 0.437
Diploma 0.342 0.059 0.507
College 0.326 0.074 0.399
Religion Hindu-Muslim LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School 0.224 0.0013 0.306
Diploma 0.209 0.027 0.403
College 0.18 -0.0427 0.459
Caste General -OBC LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School 0.433 -0.048 1.384
Diploma 0.357 -1.397 1.609
College -0.325 -1.72 1.639
Caste General - SCST LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School 0.282 -0.166 1.38
Diploma 0.358 -1.526 1.557
College -0.559 -1.867 1.639
The difference MTE is the difference in Log Earnings expectations between male-female, Hindus-Muslims and General-
OBC and SC-ST respectively. This difference is calculated for school, diploma and college. Column 2 and
3 are 95% confidence intervals for the MTE. LB and UB are the upper and lower bounds of the CI. The
difference in MTE is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval only if the bounds do not contain 0.
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2.4 Discussion and Mechanisms
The primary objective of this study is to provide a descriptive picture of how students from
social identities that are historically discriminated in the labor market, tend to form subjective
expectations regarding their returns from human capital investment. Particularly when estimating
different moments of the distribution, we find females and Muslims to have a lower earnings
expectations for school and diploma, which no longer exist at the college level for Muslims. The
discriminated caste groups, on the other, do not expect significantly different earnings relative
to the Upper caste group. In this section, potential moderating factors are discussed, such as
parent’s opinions on gender equality, non monetary aspirations for education, knowledge of
policies such as Affirmative action and the strong presence of local leaders that could impact the
children’s expectations on earnings. In addition, concerns regarding the study is also highlighted.
Gender
Controlling for cognitive ability and parents education, girls in the sample consistently have
significant and lower earnings expectations for school and diploma education compared to the
boys. The MTE from distributional regression also shows that females have significantly lower
earnings expectations compared to males(Table 2.5). Contrastingly, table 2.6 in the Appendix
shows the percent of girls having a higher aspirations of gaining education (44% of girls compared
to 31% of the boys aspire to complete college education, p=0.000).
For this sample, we find girls to have high non-monetary aspirations from education and
schooling but they do not expect this education to translate into higher monetary benefits.
Women in India are found to have a 12% lower likelihood of being employed compared to men.
Even those in employment, earn annual incomes that are lower by 36% compared to the males,
ceterius paribus (Mitra (2019); Bhandari and Bordoloi (2006)). Studies by (Maertens, 2011),
(Drèze and Kingdon, 2001) and (Kingdon, 2005; Kingdon and Theopold, 2008) show the social
norm of getting the girls married between the age of 18 and 23 further deters the parents from
investing in her education. This inturn may likely impact the girls perspective of lower benefits
from attaining higher education, but greater non monetary valuation of education eg. gains in
the marriage market.
In my survey with the parents, I correlate the opinions of the parents on gender equality and
the student’s self reported earnings expectations. I asked the parents of the children in a phone
call survey, their opinions on a positive and negative statement on gender equality. They had to
answer whether they Agree or Disagree to each statement. Based on the study by Dhar et al.
(2018) that observe a positive correlation between parent’s attitude towards gender equality and
the children’s attitudes, I expect the girls whose parents support gender equality will have higher
subjective earnings expectations across all three levels of education. Figure 2.3 in the Appendix
shows in the y-axis the mean expected earnings for boys and girls. However, we do not find a
correlation between opinions on equality and higher earnings expectations for the girls.
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Religion
The distributional regression show Muslim children to have lower earnings expectations compared
to the Hindu children for schooling and diploma. While this might not be evident in the point
estimates (Table 2.3), the distributional regression reveals significantly lower earnings for Muslim
driven by their left skewed distributions (Table 2.5). Muslims, unlike the OBC and SC-ST
caste groups do not benefit from targeted programs such as affirmative action. A recent study
by Asher et al. (2017) show in terms of intergenerational mobility, while SC/STs and OBCs
groups have experienced better upward mobility over the last 30 years, Muslims have a drastic
decline. In this study a similar trend is observed for the sample of students in Mumbai, whereby
earnings expectations and aspirations of Muslims is lower than expectations for children from
disadvantaged caste groups.
Caste
Comparing the earnings expectations of disadvantaged caste groups; namely OBCs, SC-ST to
the General category, I find both OBC and SC-ST students have marginally higher earnings
expecations when considering the pooled sample. However, the RE or DR models show no
difference in earnings expectations. Despite facing extensive discrimination in the labor market
not only in terms of earnings gap but also the type of employment opportunities (Madheswaran
and Attewell, 2007; Deshpande, 2012)15, we find students from even the SC-ST caste groups
having no difference in earnings expectations. Furthermore, the SC-ST groups overestimate
their earnings compared to the inflation adjusted projected earnings.
Although widely debated (for a detailed discussion see (Deshpande, 2012) and (Deshpande,
2013)), the study postulates a potential role of affirmative action in favor of the OBCs, SC-ST
groups to explain their high earnings expectations despite glaring labor market discrimination.
Figure 2.4 plots the log earnings expectations for all caste groups depending on whether they
are aware about the policy of Affirmative action (AA) and its benefits in education and the
labor market. However, this is not statistically significant16.
Another explanation for high earnings expectations of lower caste students can be attributed
to the strong presence of OBC and Dalit (SC-ST) political movements in Mumbai. Many parts
of Mumbai has experienced extensive Dalit and low caste mobilisation such as the Dalit Panthers
in the 1970s17 and emergence of local leaders Figure 2.5 plots the log earnings expectations of
students from each caste group depending on the caste of their local leader18. We do find a
15The projected earning calculated using the NSS for 2011-12 shows SC-ST have significantly lower rates of
return across all levels of education.
16Table 2.10 in the Appendix is an OLS result and shows the total effect of the interaction term of awareness
regarding AA and the caste category. The first two rows is total effect of the interaction between knowledge of
AA policies for a OBC student relative to the General caste. The 3rd and 4th row are the mean estimates from
knowledge about AA for a SC-ST student compared to the General caste. Controlling for individual and parent
covariates, I find that both SC-ST and OBC students whose parents have the knowledge about AA policies report
higher levels of earnings expectations compared to the general or upper caste category. However these estimates
in Table 2.10 are not statistically significant
17(Pien, 2018; Collins, 2017; Deshpande, 2013) The movement emerged as a voice against the oppression against
the Dalits(SC-ST) and the need for change.
18The local leader is not at the individual level. Given that many students come from a similar locality, they
also have a common local leader of MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly). As a result, our sample size is small
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positive correlation (p=0.05) between earnings expectations of SC-ST students and the caste
identity of the local leader(being the same). Similarly, when the local leader is from the general
caste, the earnings of SC-ST students is significantly low (p=0.02). Future studies can explore
these mechanisms by including diverse samples such as low caste groups in rural areas and urban
cities that have not benefited from strong dalit movements.
2.4.1 Further concerns
In this section, I point out some concerns for this study. As described earlier, the survey was
implemented for students in Mumbai across two years - 2017 and 2018. In an attempt to
create a panel dataset, we found 80 students out of the 324 surveyed in 2017 to have droped
out. Table 2.7 in the Appendix is a linear probability model on the likelihood of droping out.
Over two years, the likelihood of droping out was higher for females, Muslim and OBC females.
Father’s education significantly decreased the likelihood of droping out for the pooled sample
and the boys. There is a significant decrease in dropout for older male students. Particularly
in this sample, it could reflect the opportunity cost of dropping out which is higher for older
students as they are closer to completing their high school degree.
A notable concern that is likely to cause a downward bias in the earnings expectations of
females is the working age stated in the question. All students were asked how likely they are to
work after completing an education at the age of 28. It could be that most girls do not expect to
be working at 28 years (on account of marriage and family responsibilities). One way to observe
this is how many females said they do not expect to work for a given education at 28 years.
Prior to asking the earnings question, I had asked if the students were likely to work. In this
sample 9 females said they would not be working after completing either one of the education
levels 19. Although the results hold without including the 9 students, the high working age
stated in the survey for females must be considered while observing their earnings expectations.
2.5 Conclusion
Based on both the OLS and distributional regression methods, females and Muslims (particularly
at school and diploma) expected significantly lower earnings compared to upper caste males.
However, students from disadvantaged caste groups such as the Other backward castes (OBC),
Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC-ST), did not have different earnings expectations
compared to the Upper caste groups. The distributional regression revealed other moments
of the earnings distribution such as uncertainty (variance) and left skewness to be prominent
estimates impacting lower earnings expectations for females and Muslims.
Additionally, comparing projected and subjective earnings for each of the subgroups, we
observe SC-ST students to overestimate their earnings compared to what they could earn in the
labor market. On the other hand, advantaged groups such as male upper caste students who
experience above the average projected earnings, underestimate what they could earn in the
labor market. An important take away from this result is re-assessment of interventions that
19Out of the 9 females, 4 said they would not work after school, 2 would not work after diploma and college
respectively, and 1 claimed not to be working after both diploma and college
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provide information about earnings to households and individuals as a potential policy option.
While females and Muslims (who underestimate their earnings in the labor market) could benefit
from such information interventions, it may not be beneficial to disadvantaged caste groups who
have high aspiration levels.
This study shows that existing educational inequalities have been internalised by females
and Muslim students. Inorder for these groups to expect gains and actively particapte in the
education and labor market, they will require to have significantly higher aspirations. On the
other hand, lower caste groups, that have been historically discriminated, do not seem to update
their earnings expectations based on the discrimination in the labor market. Particularly in
this study, the disadvantageous caste students belong to urban areas where the discrimination
might not be explicit at the school or household level. Additionally SC-ST and OBC groups
have been able to assert for their rights through collective political and social mobilisation over
the recent years. Future studies can undertake a similar exercise amongst lower caste students
from rural areas. Finally, inorder to gain closer to SDG goals such as ’Target4: Ensure inclusive
and equitable quality education for all’, it is also essential to urge for policy interventions
on the supply side that encourage inclusive and accessible education from the primary levels,
employment opportunities and subsequently enhance the agency of excluded social and economic
groups.
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2.6 Appendix A
Table 2.6: Highest Education level by Groups
HighestClass
Dont know High School Diploma College Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Gender of student
Male 122 21.2 90 15.7 170 29.6 193 33.6 575 100.0
Female 70 9.5 86 11.6 340 46.0 243 32.9 739 100.0
Total 192 14.6 176 13.4 510 38.8 436 33.2 1,314 100.0
Caste
General 59 10.4 56 9.9 311 54.9 140 24.7 566 100.0
OBC 105 18.4 90 15.7 159 27.8 218 38.1 572 100.0
SC-ST 28 15.9 30 17.0 40 22.7 78 44.3 176 100.0
Total 192 14.6 176 13.4 510 38.8 436 33.2 1,314 100.0
Religion
Muslims 74 14.6 108 21.3 137 27.1 187 37.0 506 100.0
Hindus 118 14.6 68 8.4 373 46.2 249 30.8 808 100.0
Total 192 14.6 176 13.4 510 38.8 436 33.2 1,314 100.0
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Age -0.076*** -0.133*** 0.033
(0.024) (0.033) (0.033)
Muslim 0.175*** 0.167** 0.123**
(0.046) (0.082) (0.054)
Cognitive 0.005 0.024** -0.060**
abilities (0.012) (0.011) (0.026)
Aspiration 0.027* 0.014 0.034
(0.014) (0.019) (0.023)
OBC(ref:General) -0.036 0.013 -0.084*
(0.047) (0.081) (0.048)
SC-ST(ref:General) -0.027 -0.083 0.136
(0.052) (0.075) (0.092)
Education father -0.011* -0.021*** -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Education mother -0.009 -0.007 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Minimum earnings -0.024 -0.019 0.025
(0.031) (0.032) (0.095)
Midpoint -0.127 -0.088 -0.245
(0.085) (0.094) (0.232)
Maximu earnings 0.140** 0.108 0.181
(0.061) (0.070) (0.158)
Constant 1.365*** 2.157*** -0.020
(0.332) (0.499) (0.401)
Observations 351 213 138
R sq 0.182 0.297 0.229
Adj R sq 0.153 0.259 0.161
The linear probability model estimates the likelihood of dropping out based on the outcomes used in the final
analysis. The dependent variable for all 3 models is a dummy (1-drop, 0-did not drop). Column 1 is pooled over
gender, Column 2 and 3 are separate estimates for male and female respectively. Robust standard errors in




























Fig. 2.1: Subjective vs Projected earnings - Subsample analysis of returns to School, diploma and college education
(a) School (b) Diploma
(c) College
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Table 2.8: Subjective earnings - Pooled
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3)
b/se b/se b/se
Female -0.123** -0.099* 0.058
(0.052) (0.056) (0.136)
Diploma(Ref:School) 0.154** 0.213*** 0.265***
(0.061) (0.068) (0.089)
College(Ref:School) 0.185*** 0.245*** 0.253***
(0.060) (0.065) (0.081)
Muslim -0.044 -0.082 -0.040
(0.061) (0.066) (0.118)
Age of student 0.013 0.013 0.034
(0.019) (0.019) (0.064)
OBC(Ref:General) 0.185*** 0.141** 0.256**
(0.057) (0.063) (0.120)
SC-ST(Ref:General) 0.074 -0.035 0.028
(0.072) (0.103) (0.175)
Cognitive ability 0.001 0.001 -0.036
(0.018) (0.018) (0.044)
Education father 0.020** 0.020** 0.026
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023)
Education mother 0.002 0.002 0.023
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
Actual earnings -0.090 -0.049
(NSS 2011) (0.058) (0.080)
2017 0.075
(0.088)
Constant 0.919*** 1.508*** 0.628
(0.278) (0.477) (1.219)
Observations 1473 1473 652
R sq 0.029 0.030
Adj R sq 0.022 0.022
R sq B 0.093
The dependent variable for all 3 model specifications is log earnings expectations. Model 1 and 2 are OLS (with
and without controlling for projected earnings). Model 3 is a random effects model for students who participated
in the survey in 2017 and 2018. It controls for projected earnings. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p <.1,
** p <.05, *** p <.01.
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Table 2.9: Distributional Regression
Male Female
Religion H - M LB 0.025 UB 0.975 H - M LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School 0.0003 -0.011 0.056 -0.002 -0.01 0.01
Diploma 0.192 0.04 0.28 0.125 0.024 0.16
College 0.25 0.048 0.34 0.145 0.026 0.23
Caste H - OBC LB 0.025 UB 0.975 H - OBC LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School -0.0004 -0.0009 0.004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Diploma 0 -0.0001 0.00013 0.00012 -0.00017 0.0001
College -0.0003 -0.0001 0.00013 -0.00015 -0.0008 0.00045
Caste H - SCST LB 0.025 UB 0.975 H - SCST LB 0.025 UB 0.975
School 0.0003 -0.001 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.001 0
Diploma -0.0037 -0.023 0.0025 -0.001 -0.0035 0.0003
College 0.00024 -0.0034 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0077 0.0003
Estimated Marginal treatment effect MTE for subsamples at 95% confindence intervals
Each panel is estimated difference between upper caste and Muslims or disadvantaged castes
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Fig. 2.2: Projected vs Subjective earnings
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Fig. 2.3: Equal Opportunities - Gender
Panel A: All girls and boys should have equal opportunities in education and job. Panel B: When there
are fewer jobs, men have more rights in getting the job than women
Fig. 2.4: Affirmative action and Earnings expectations
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Table 2.10: Affirmative Action policies - OLS
School Diploma College
(1) (2) (3)
No benefit(OBC vs General) -.925 .823 .868
(1.61) (0.719) (0.599)
Benefit (OBC vs General) .143 .459 .740
(0.521) (0.513) (0.74)
No benefit (SC-ST vs General) -1.151 -.106 .538
(1.616) (0.635) (0.500)
Benefit (SC-ST vs General) .401 .084 .901
(0.691) (0.681) (1.056)
Observations 119 119 119
R sq 0.104 0.163 0.074
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log earnings expectation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Fig. 2.5: Caste of the local leaders
The bars represent the caste identity of the students. Each of the sub-groups in the X-axis denotes the
caste identity of the local leader. Leader General: General vs SC-ST p=0.02**, Leader OBC: General vs
OBC p=0.002***, Leader SC-ST:General vs SC-ST p=0.05*
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Fig. 2.6: Log Normal Distribution
Fig. 2.7: Burr Distribution
2.7 Appendix B
We assume the probability distribution for the expected earnings to have an assymmetric
triangular distribution given by Figure. In our case, the most likely value is assumed to be the
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midpoint calculated from the minimum and maximum threshold (If the triangular distribution
was symmetric, the most likely value would be equal to the mean). The expected value of a left
triangular distribution is given as E(y) = p2ymid+yM3 and for a right triangular distribution is
E(y) = (1− p)2ymid+ym3 .
Therefore, the expected mean can be written as;





Fig. 2.8: Triangular Distribution
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5. How old are you?:
6. Are you a boy or girl?
2 Boy
2 Girl
7. What is your caste?:
8. What is your home address?:
9. What is your phone number?Landline or parent’s mobile phone:
10. What has your father studied?
2 1-4 (Primary school)





2 I do not have a father
11. What does your father work as?
2 Office job
2 Daily wage laborer
2 Small business
2 Big business
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2 At home
12. What has your mother studied?
2 1-4 (Primary school)





2 I do not have a mother
13. What does your mother work as?
2 Office job




14. How many younger siblings do you have?
2 Brothers
2 Sisters
15. How many of you siblings go to school? (excluding you)
2 Brothers
2 Sisters












18. How much time does it take for you to come to school?
minutes
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19. Is this the nearest school to your house?
2 Yes
2 No
20. What is the highest class you would like to complete?
2 Class 7 2 Class 8 2 Class 9 2 Class 10 2 Class 12 2
Technical course 2 College 2 I do not know
21. In the future what work would you like to do to support yourself and your
family?:
22. In the future, when you are 28 years old, do you think you will be working
if you completed 12th standard (high school)
2 Yes
2 No [Skip to 24]
23. When you are 28 years old, what monthly income do you think you will earn
if you complete 12th standard?:
Minimum: Maximum:
24. In the future, when you are 28 years old, do you think you will be working
if you completed diploma or technical education?
2 Yes
2 No [Skip to 26]
25. When you are 28 years old, what monthly income do you think you will earn
if you complete diploma or technical education?:
Minimum: Maximum:
26. In the future, when you are 28 years old, do you think you will be working
if you completed college or graduation?
2 Yes
2 No [Skip to 28]
27. When you are 28 years old, what monthly income do you think you will earn
if you complete college or graduation?:
Minimum: Maximum:
28. What are the reasons for coming to school?
2 To study
2 Meet my friends
2 To get a job
2 Parents told me to go
29. Do you want to do the same work as your father?
2 Yes
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2 No




Note: The exit survey includes questions on the probability distribution of earnings expectations
for different levels of education.
I. Control questions
On a scale from 0 to 10, 0 being not possible at all and 10 being completely possible:
31. Between 0 to 10 what is the likelihood that you will complete your homework
in the next two days?: 2
32. Between 0 to 10 what is the likelihood that you will complete your homework
in the next two weeks?: 2
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II. Subjective earnings
33. Between 0 to 10 what is the likelihood that you will earn greater than
the midpoint if you completed high school education?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
34. Between 0 to 10 what is the likelihood that you will earn greater than
the midpoint if you completed diploma or technical education?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
35. Between 0 to 10 what is the likelihood that you will earn greater than
the midpoint if you completed college education?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Chapter 3
Social Comparison at the workplace:
A field experiment in Kolkata, India
We would like to thank Marcela Ibanez, Fredrick Carlsson, Stephan Klasen, Bruno Witzell, Lennart Kaplan
and all the participants at the 12th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics at Gothenburg,
Sweden, 2018 Feminist Economics conference, PhD CollEcons meetings and participants of the GLAD seminar at
University of Göttingen for helpful comments on the paper.
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Unjustified inequality can introduce a costly burden on firms from the point of view of the
employees, through eroding worker morale (Greenberg et al., 2007; Krueger and Mas, 2004),
affecting turnover levels (Card et al., 2012), absenteeism (Breza et al., 2017) and reducing effort
supply (Gächter and Thöni, 2010; Cohn et al., 2014; Ku and Salmon, 2012). Despite the cost of
discrimination from the employees perspective, unequal treatment of workers continue to persist
in the form of wage gaps (ILO, 2016; Donohue and Heywood, 2004; World Bank, 2014; Fuller,
2008).
Our study focusses specifically on gender based discrimination wherein women across the
world face worse employment conditions than men. According to an ILO analysis of 83 countries,
women in paid work earn on average between 10 to 30 percent less than men. This inequality
extends to part-time jobs where the gender gap is estimated to range between 3 and 13 percentage
points (ILO, 2016). In addition to being disadvantaged in income (Kilbourne et al., 1994; Brady
and Leicht, 2008; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993), women face higher turnover rates (Fuller, 2008),
lower promotions (Acker, 1990; Baldi and McBrier, 1997; Baron and Newman, 1990), and lower
authority at the workplace (Baxter and Wright, 2000).
Despite the persistence of gender inequality at the work place, women report higher level of
job satisfaction than men (Desmarais and Curtis, 1997; Wright et al., 1995; Parks et al., 1995;
McDuff, 2001; Dawson, 2017). This phenomenon is known in the literature as the paradox of
the contented female worker. One explanation for this paradox is the Social Comparison theory
which expects individuals to compare themselves to a similar other or In-group in terms of
skills, traits and circumstances (Festinger, 1954). In explaining why individuals fail to recognize
discrimination directed towards one self, various theories in psychology provide alternative views
to the Social comparison theory (Crosby, 1984; Blanton et al., 2001; Blaine and Crocker, 1993)
For instance, Crosby (1984) and Blanton et al. (2001) describe the tendency of disadvantaged
groups to compare their outcomes with those of an In-group, rather than with the relatively
advantaged out-group. This is considered to be a defense strategy to protect the "self-concept"
and avoid psychological distress resulting from being a victim of discrimination. There is also a
tendency to accept and rationalize the prevailing social hierarchy in an attempt to integrate in
the existing system (Jost, 1997; Jost and Andrews, 2011; Jost et al., 2004; Blaine and Crocker,
1993). As a result, members of stigmatized groups may believe that they possess lower ability
than members of the out-group, hence attributing their failure to themselves instead of external
prejudice directed towards them (Bylsma and Major, 1994; Auspurg et al., 2017; Buchanan,
2018).
In reference to the above theories, we propose that gender identity of the reference groups
plays an important role when workers evaluate equality in the workplace. Our hypothesis is
that in-group wage inequality reduces productivity or effort supply more than an out-group
wage inequality. This is relationship between wage inequality and effort supply, when the gender
identity of the advantaged coworker is known will differ for men and women respectively. Although
there are notable recent contributions that study the impact of inequality on productivity at
the workplace, to our knowledge only few studies attempt to empirically examine the impact of
the reference group identity on equity considerations (Clark and Senik, 2010; Carlsson et al.,
2009). To test the above hypothesis, we conducted a field experiment that exogeneously varies
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wages and group compositions in a between-subject design. The experimental design allows
us to examine the workers’ response toward horizontal wage inequality when the coworker is
of the same or different gender. Apart from effort supply, in a post experimental survey, we
also included subjective responses of the workers such as the work satisfaction and own and
coworker’s performance evaluations.
The field experiment was implemented in Kolkata, India. In the experiment, recruited student
assistants worked in teams of two for two successive working sessions in return for a fixed wage
per hour. Workers were randomly assigned to one of the following treatment groups (1) a control
treatment T1 (2) a unilateral wage cut treatment T2; (3) In-group wage cut treatment T3 and
(4) Out-group wage cut treatment T4. The unilateral wage cut treatment (henceforth denoted
by HL) and the In-group or Out-group wage cut treatment are similar such that they include a
unilateral wage cut in the second working session. The only difference between these treatments
is that workers in the HL treatment did not know the gender identity of their co-worker, while
workers in the In-group and Out-group identity treatment, were made aware of the gender
identity of their coworkers (in addition to a wage cut)1. Participants in the control group did not
experience change in wages nor were they subjected to information on inequality. Productivity
was measured in terms of the quantity and quality of entries completed in each session.
We find that both men and women reduce their productivity when unilateral wage cuts
are introduced. This result is similar in sign and magnitude to existing experimental studies
addressing the impact of horizontal pay inequality on productivity (when the identity of the
coworker is not known). In addition, results show that male workers reduce their productivity
when experiencing inequality, regardless of whether information on the gender identity of the
co-worker is known or not. On the contrary, female worker’s response to inequality was affected
by the gender identity of the advantaged co-worker. In the post experimental survey, we find
that beliefs regarding the relative performance of the coworker impacts how workers perceive
inequality. We find female workers, on average, believe their performance is worse than that of
their male colleagues, a fact that contributes to their mild response to out-group inequality.
The findings of this paper show that when inequality is consistent with the existing social
hierarchies i.e. when women experience wage inequality relative to a coworker who is male,
the former do not retaliate by lowering their productivity. This is specific to females who have
internalized discrimination to an extent that they justify this unjustified inequality. We show
evidence of this justification from their subjective evaluation of own and coworker’s performance.
The results highlight need for demand side policies that increase the cost of unjustified inequality
in the labor market. Our results also shed light on the limitation of the Social comparison
theory that assumes a symmetric response of males and females to wage inequality. We find
males reduce their effort under inequality irrespective of whether their coworker is from the In
or Out-group. Furthermore, we do not find differences in their response to inequality when the
coworker is female.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
literature and our main hypothesis of this paper. Section 3 presents the experimental design and
1Ideally we would have liked to include a fourth treatment comparable to the control treatment yet with the
gender identity of the co-worker made salient. This, however, was not possible given the number of applicants
that we have received. Adding this treatment would have compromised the statistical power of the experiment.
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procedures. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and results, and finally section 6 discusses
possible mechanisms and concludes.
3.1 Literature Review and Hypothesis
Our study relates to the literature on the impact of inequality not only in comparison to one’s
past but also relative to others on individual’s subjective assessment of utility (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Luttmer, 2005; Poggi, 2010; Easterlin, 2009; Clark and Senik,
2010; Van Praag et al., 2011). To capture a response to inequality, lab experiments mainly use
ultimatum and dictator games. The studies find that participants are averse to advantageous as
well as disadvantageous inequality, with the latter having a larger effect on utility (List, 2007;
Camerer, 2003b; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
A similar theory is postulated based on the wage effort hypothesis by Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) which depicts workers as striving to restore fairness when actual wages deviate from
what is perceived as fair (Akerlof, 1982, 1984). According to Akerlof (1982) workers respond
to cognitive dissonance caused from inequality by either adjusting their beliefs concerning the
fair wage or by adjusting their effort supply. In the lab, wage effort hypothesis is tested using
gift exchange games that model bilateral exchange between workers and firms. These studies
randomnly allocate participants to the role of a worker and an employer; the worker is asked to
decide on the level of effort they want to supply in response to the wage level chosen by the
employer. Results show that workers’ effort choices are sensitive not only to changes in their
own wages but also to changes in the wages of others (Clark et al., 2010; Gächter and Thöni,
2010; Abeler et al., 2010; Fehr and Goette, 2007; Charness, 2004). Our experiment focusses on
such a horizontal comparison between workers in systems of wage inequality.
Similar to our study is a paper by (Cohn et al., 2014) who conducted a randomized field
experiment in Germany to test the impact of general and unilateral wage cuts on productivity.
The paper finds a negative and significant impact of wage cuts on performance, with a stronger
drop in productivity associated with unilateral wage cuts. Another study by (Breza et al., 2017)
in India, find that differential wages reduce output by 0.45 standard deviations and attendance
by 18 percentage points. In additon, Breza et al. (2017) show that making the worker’s effort
visible mitigates the negative impacts of wage disparity. While both studies reveal a negative
impact on worker productivity under unilateral wage cut, our study contributes to this literature
but addressing worker’s response to wage cuts when the gender identity of the advantageous
worker is known.
A theory that addresses the impact of the reference group’s identity on worker response to
inequality is the Social Comparison theory. Initially proposed by Festinger (1954), the theory
postulates that individuals prefer to compare themselves to others who are more similar in
characteristics and abilities. This explanation has been utilised by several other studies that
measure an individual’s utility based on relative income or consumption (Clark and Senik, 2010;
Clark et al., 2010; Buchanan, 2012). Life satisfaction and well-being are observed to be lower
when individuals are further away from their reference or comparison group Luttmer (2005);
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Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015); Card et al. (2011)2. Despite substantial evidence on the impact
of group composition on behavior (Gneezy et al., 2003; Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Chen and Li,
2009), to our knowledge none of the existing experimental studies examine the impact of group
composition and coworker’s identity on perceptions of equity. As an exception, Carlsson et al.
(2009) implement a hypothetical choice experiment to study the impact of income comparisons
within and across castes in India on utility. Their findings show that an increase in the mean
income of one’s caste group relative to own income, reduces utility significantly more than a
relative increase in the mean income of an out-group caste. The study uses subjective measures
of well-being and hypothetical choices in a questionnaire setting3. We are able to exogeneously
vary the reference group and test the causal response of workers to wage inequality when their
coworker’s gender is known. We postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In unequal wage systems, workers reduce their effort supply when they are
matched to coworkers of the same gender. Therefore, both males and females will reduce their
effort when they face unequal wages compared to a coworker who is of the same gender.
Hypothesis 2: In unequal wage systems, effort supply of workers does not respond to an
increase in wages of their coworkers of a different gender. Therefore, both males and females
will not change their effort supply when they face unequal wages compared to coworker from a
different gender.
Based on the Social Comparison theory, workers will only respond to inequality when they
are matched to advantageous coworker from their ingroup (in this case same gender). However,
this theory does not account for assymmetrical response of men and women when they are
compared to advantageous co-workers from the out-group. The ’paradox of the contented female
worker’ is an empirical evidence reflecting this assymmetry, whereby women tend to be satisfied
with their wages despite being aware of the discriminatory practises against them (relative to
men) by the firms. Contrastingly, male workers tend to show their dissatisfaction for lower
pay. One of the theories that accounts for the asymmetry is the theory of System Justification
Jost and Andrews (2011); Jost and Burgess (2000); Jost et al. (2004). It is recognised as an
inclination to view group differences in social status as justified even when such differences are
not beneficial for one of the groups. Recent study by (Sengupta and Sibley, 2013) apply the
theory of System Justification to not only gender but also other minority or disadvantaged
groups to find that unequal systems persist over time because even the most disadvantaged by
these systems are motivated to support them.
Other theories within the labor market domain that complement the System Justification
theory, are Depressed Entitlement effect Major and Testa (1989) and the Rewards Expectation
theoryAuspurg et al. (2017); Buchanan (2018). A core assumption of these theories are that
gender is no longer a nominal character and takes the form of a status. In social contexts where
women are treated as second class citizens and gender inequalities already exist (in favor of
men), higher abilities and competency are associated with men, further reproducing existing
2Few studies show evidence of a tunnel effect wherein disadvantaged individuals consider their reference group
as a signal of future growth (Poggi, 2010; Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973). However, in our case this channel
will not be considered since our experiment is a one shot interaction and we promise no future employment
opportunities
3The use of subjective measures of agency may result in a number of systematic biases related to order, scale,
reputation, and halo-effects Podsakoff et al. (2003).
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inequalities. Findings show that female workers allocate lower rewards to themselves (Hogue
and Yoder, 2003) and justify the unequal treatment they experience (Butler, 2016). This is
complemented by empirical data showing decreasing female labor market participation, self
selection into segregated jobs (Sarkar et al., 2019; Biju Varkkey et al., 2012) and increasing
gender wage gaps. In our third hypothesis, we are able to test whether expectations regarding
coworker’s effort supply is associated with the coworker’s gender identity.
Hypothesis 3: In unequal wage systems, females expect their advantageous coworkers to be
more productive when their reference group is male (Out-group) compared to female (In-group).
Males, on the other hand, expect their advantageous coworkers to be less productive when their
reference group is female (Out-group).
In the following sections we discuss the cultural context and the experimental design, results
and discussions regarding the mechanisms and future research.
3.2 Cultural context
Gender based discrimination is a pervasive and long-running phenomenon in India. The culturally
ingrained parental preference for sons in the country has been linked to poorer conditions for
women on different measures of well-being (Gonsalves, 2002; Sharma, 2016; Pande and Astone,
2007). Despite recent reforms and progressive steps towards equality, the prevailing social
stratification system in India continues to assign women to a second rate citizen position (Dyson
and Moore, 1983). There is extensive evidence of the discrimination faced by women in India,
particularly in the labor market such as participation (Biju Varkkey et al., 2012; Sarkar et al.,
2019), stagnant wage gaps (World Bank, 2014) and gender based work segregation(Duraisamy
and Duraisamy, 2016).
Despite the 6 percent growth in GDP that India experienced in the past decade, female labor
force participation has declined from 34 to 27 percent. In addition, the male-female wage gap in
India has been stagnant at 50 percent. Our study which took place in the urban city of Kolkata
resembles to a large extent the average status of Indian women as described on a national level
(Biju Varkkey et al., 2012; Mukherjee, 2001). Kolkata is the capital of West Bengal state, the
third most populous metropolitan cities in India. Gender indicators for West Bengal reveal that
despite more women being enrolled in education institutes, they constitute only 25 percent of
the work force (World Bank, 2014). Statistics regarding female labor force participation and
education levels in West Bengal and Kolkata are similar to the national level (Biju Varkkey et al.,
2012), supporting the external validity of the context. Often the response to workplace inequality
for the disadvantaged gender has been involuntary unemployment and dropping out the labor
force (Sarkar et al., 2019) or self selecting into segregated jobs (Duraisamy and Duraisamy,
2016).
Apart from labor market discrimination, the cultural views and subjective perceptions on
gender roles are also biased against women. Using data from a representative sample of young
Indians, the World Value survey finds that more than 50 percent of men and women agree to the
statement that "men must be more entitled to a job under conditions of work scarcity compared
to women". More than 50 percent of respondents agree that "men make better leaders and
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executives at the workplace than women" and more than 70 percent agree that "when a mother
works for pay, children suffer".
These perceptions are correlated with behavioral traits adopted by women in India that
may contribute to further worsening their status. For instance, in her article on Feminism in
India(Mukesh, 2017), Mudra Mukesh discusses the low tendency of women to negotiate higher
wages, show confidence and compete at the workplace. This argument is supported by surveys
undertaken in India by tech companies showing that women set very low salary expectations
relative to their male colleagues. These expectations are seven percent less than the expectations
reported by men (Biju Varkkey et al., 2012).
The cultural setting and social hierarchy prevailing in India constitute an environment where
the gender identity is percieved as a status. Therefore, we examine the main research question
proposed in this paper in India.
3.3 Experiment Design
3.3.1 The Experimental Set-up
Our design is based on the studies by Cohn et al. (2014) and Breza et al. (2017) who observed
the impact of unilateral wage cuts on worker productivity. In addition to the Unilateral wage
cut treatment, we included two more treatments that not only included the wage cut but also
revealed the gender identity of the coworker. To answer our research question, we recruited
student assistants who worked for two sessions in the same day. There was a 30 minute break
between each session. All workers in the pre-intervention stage (session one) were assigned a
fixed hourly wage of 350 rupees, regardless of the effort level supplied.4 To test the impact of
wage cuts on productivity, some participants experienced a unilateral wage cut of 140 rupees in
the second working session while others did not.
Recruitment Stage
We coordinated with three public universities in Kolkata: Jadavpur University, University of
Kolkata, and Presidency University, to advertise a job vacancy for student assistants. Potential
subjects were recruited via university websites and mailing lists in addition to direct appeal
to students during their undergraduate and graduate courses. The announcement read that
this was a one-time job that would take place over two sessions with a short break in-between.
Students were informed that the job would take place in offices on campus, hence reducing
transportation and other forms of costs that workers may incur in order to get to the work
station. The advertisement emphasized that the job would not be repeated and was not related
to any future hiring opportunities by the employer. This addition was necessary to rule out
any fear of dismissal from the job and to eradicate reputation effects. Given the differences in
payment across treatments, we refrained from mentioning the hourly wage in the advertisement.
Instead, the job was advertised as a student job, thus allowing participants to formulate more
4350 rupees was slightly higher than the average hourly wage for students at the three universities where the
experiment took place.
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or less accurate expectations regarding the hourly income.5 Interested applicants submitted a
short application form answering a set of socio-economic questions, in addition to questions on
their field of study, average grade attained, and previous work experiences.
Interested participants received an email confirming their participation and were invited to
a training session. In the training, the session coordinator thoroughly explained the purpose
of the task to the workers and highlighted its value to the employers. The coordinator then
described the task and conducted several examples using booklets similar to the ones used in
the real task.6
The Task
The advertised vacancy was for a data entry task that aims at putting together a large data set
to be later used in a systematic review by one of the authors of this paper. The task required
participants to extract numbers from a set of descriptive and statistical tables, and in some cases
to copy variable names and significance levels. This data entry task is particularly well-suited
for our experiment as it allows for a precise measure of the two main outcome variables: the
quantity, and quality of work produced. Quantity is measured by the total number of entries
copied in each of the working sessions and quality is measured by the total number of mistakes
made in each session. The number of mistakes is measured as the total number of incorrectly
typed words or numbers. Misspelled words and deviations from the original text (omissions or
additions) were counted as errors. In addition multiple errors in the same word were counted as
a single error. Two research assistants worked independently on merging the data entered by
each participant with the final data set. To calculate the final number of mistakes the assistants
used a program that detects and counts differences between the two merged files.
Finally, the task used is relatively simple and can be done individually without the need to
refer to the coordinator with questions and guidance requests.
Treatments
Participants were grouped in teams, every team was assigned a unique booklet of data that
differed from that assigned to other groups. The data entered by participants working on
the same booklet was merged together at the end of the experiment in a standard procedure
for data cleaning and quality control. To create a reference point of comparison, participants
were aware of the wage information of only one of the colleagues in the team. Depending on
the treatment, some participants also had access to information on the gender identity of this
co-worker. The information regarding gender identity was revealed in both sessions. To further
emphasize the role of the co-worker as a reference, we kept group compositions fixed throughout
the experimental session.7
5We do not have data on these expectations, however, there is no reason to believe that students would
formulate income expectations that are far from the range that their university usually pay for student jobs.
6Participants were not informed that this project is lead by international researchers nor that it belongs to an
international institution.
7Given that this paper examines the impact of disadvantageous inequality on productivity but not visa versa,
participants had access only to the wage information of colleagues not experiencing a wage cut.
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Participants were randomnly assigned to one of the following treatment groups (see Table
3.6 in Appendix): (1) A control treatment: in this treatment the two workers of the same
team received a similar payoff of 350 rupees in both working sessions; (2) A unilateral wage cut
treatment: in this treatment unilateral wage cuts were introduced in the second working session
i.e., only one of the two team members experienced a wage cut. Note that in both of these
treatments workers were kept blind to the gender identity of the colleague they are matched with.
(3) In-group wage cut treatment: in this treatment, the workers were matched to coworkers of
the same gender identity. The gender of the coworker was made salient in both session one and
two. However, the unilateral wage cuts were introduced only in the second working session. (4)
Finally, the Out-group wage cut treatment: in this treatment, the workers were matched to
coworkers of a different gender. Given the potential impact that gender group composition could
have on performance, information about the gender of the team partner was revealed in both
sessions.
3.3.2 The Experiment procedures
In the first working session, workers were assigned desks and computers in an office-like rooms
within the university campus. Participants were instructed to sign an attendance sheet at the
beginning of each working session to indicate their presence. The attendance sheets are an
important feature of our experiment, they are used to make certain information about the
co-worker salient to the participant. The attendance sheet was attached to the first page of
each booklet and had two rows of information, each referring to one of the two workers assigned
to work on the booklet. Participants were asked to sign next to the row resembling their
identification number. The information presented on the attendance sheet for all the treatment
groups were: each worker’s identification number, and the hourly wage. In addition the gender
identity was revealed only for participants assigned to the identity wage cut treatment. The
gender identity was made salient by adding the first name of each team member next to their
identification number, we abstain from including the full name given that family names in India
can be used to deduce information on the caste identity.8
Each session lasted for one hour with a half an hour break in between. Workers were left to
work unmonitored, the coordinator only interfered to announce the end of the working sessions
and to pay the hourly wages. To reduce any potential bias, both the workers and session
coordinators were blind to the research question and to the fact that this was an experiment.
In the second working session (post-intervention phase), workers returned to their desktops
and were again asked to sign the attendance sheet before they continued working on their
assigned booklets. This time, however, workers in the Unilateral wage cut treatment (T2) and
In-group and Out-group wage cut treatments (T3,T4) experienced a unilateral wage cut and
their new hourly wage was reduced to 210 rupees per hour as indicated next to their identification
numbers.9 Following the work by Cohn et al. (2014) the session coordinators were instructed
8We however have information on the caste identity of each worker which we use later in the analysis to test
for heterogeneous effects of the treatment by caste groups. Our results remain robust regardless of the caste that
the participant belongs too.
9210 rupees per hour is the average hourly wage paid for student assistants at each of the three universities in
which we conduct our experiment.
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not to give any further explanations or rationalizations for the cut, instead, workers had the
full freedom to leave the session following the announcement of the new pay. It was clearly
announced that workers who choose to leave the session would still be fully compensated for
their efforts in the first working session, that is they would still receive the 350-rupee hourly
wage for the work they had done earlier. None of the workers chose to leave the session.
At the end of the second working session the coordinator returned to the room to announce
the end of the task and to pay the participants their wages for both sessions. The coordinator
distributed short feedback forms that were filled in by all workers prior to payment. The feedback
form incorporated questions on job satisfaction, the perceived difficulty of the task, and the
clarity of instructions. In addition, participants were asked to indicate their beliefs on their
performance and the performance of their co-worker.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample included a total of 312 student assistants. To conduct our analysis, we merge three
forms of data sets: data extracted from application forms submitted before the experiment,
experimental data, and finally data extracted from feedback surveys conducted at the end of the
experiment. The application forms provide us with data on the basic demographic characteristics
of the sample. The Table 3.7 in the Appendix shows the sample consists mainly of young
workers between the age of 18 and 26. Participants were mostly single, Upper caste Hindus, and
with little to no previous work experience. Finally, student assistants were hired from different
disciplines including sciences, engineering, arts, and commerce.
Table 3.1 shows the average number of entries and average number of mistakes made by
workers per entry in each treatment group. In the In-group treatment, workers are matched
to coworkers of the same gender and they experience a wage cut relative to their coworker. In
the Out-group treatment, the workers are matched to coworkers from a different gender, in
addition to a wage cut in the second session. Table 3.1 shows that workers in the control group
completed an average of 223.06 entries in the first session The number of entries drop in session
two in the treatments that introduced a wage cut. Furthermore, this drop is especially evident
in Treatment 3 (In-group) where workers are unequally treated relative to a coworker of the
same gender. In the regression analysis, we further divide our sample into males and females
and compare the average number of entries in session one relative to session two within and
across treatments. Similarly, Panel B of Table 3.1 shows the average number of mistakes made
in each of the sessions subject to the number of entries. Table 3.1 shows that the number of
mistakes decrease in session two compared to session one. This decrease is evident across all
treatments and could be associated with experience and a better understanding of the task.
3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
In this section we use regression analysis to estimate the causal effect of wage inequality on
workers’ effort supply. Workers exerted effort in two dimensions: quantity (number of entries
produced) and quality (correctness of information entered). We, therefore, examine each of these
57
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Control Unilateral In-group Out-group
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Productivity
Session one 223.06 150.93 213.76 94.16 214.36 104.17 202.62 117.60
Session two 261.91 142.09 171.33 144.21 134.25 84.16 199.36 100.81
Number of Mistakes
Session one 22.71 34.53 19.32 27.29 20.06 25.99 12.29 16.55
Session two 15.89 26.09 6.66 12.65 13.47 26.83 10.89 24.56
Total Observations 60 60 97 95
Productivity is measured as the number of entries.For the productivity in each session across treatments,
panel 2 measures the number of mistakes.Bonferroni test for mean comparisons across treatments: Session one
p=0.7423, Session two p=0.000. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
outcome variables separately using the following specification:
Yit = α+φi+β1Sessionit+β2HLit×Sessiont+β3Ingroupit×Sessiont+β4Outgroupit×Sessiont+εit
(3.1)
The dependent variable in Equation 3.1, Yit represents each of the two outcome variables of
interest, quantity (number of entries) and quality (number of correct entries). The coefficients
β2, β3 and β4 estimate the effect of the treatments relative to the omitted control treatment.
The constant α captures average number of entries in session 1 (before the intervention), φi
represents individual fixed effects, and the variable Sessiont is a dummy variable that captures
the time effect. Sessiont is equal to one if the work was undertaken in session two (after the
intervention) and is zero otherwise. This coefficient (Sessiont) measures the change in the
outcome variable by comparing the performance in the post-intervention phase (session 2) to
the average pre-intervention performance (session 1). Finally, εit is the idiosyncratic error term.
In addition to randomizing treatment assignment, the panel structure of the data allows us
to control for worker’s pre-treatment heterogeneity in ability and performance on the data entry
work.
Quantity Produced
Based on the estimation strategy described above and specification from Equation 3.1, we begin
this section by examining the Wage Effort Hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) that states Unilateral
wage cuts decreases worker’s effort supply.
Table 3.2 is the difference-in-difference coefficients for each treatment group compared to the
base group: Control treatment. To test the validity of the Wage Effort Hypothesis we refer to
the estimates presented in the second row of Table 3.2. The coefficients show a negative and
significant impact of the unilateral wage cut treatment (HL) on productivity. Columns 2 and
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3 show that this result holds for both male and female workers. The decrease in productivity
is smaller for females compared to males. We compare the impact of unilateral wage cuts on
productivity with other studies by examining the percentage change in output from session one
relative to session two for each treatment. Figure 3.1 shows an average increase of 18 percent
in session two relative to the average in session one for the Control group. This increase can
be attributed to possible learning effects resulting from practice and familiarity with the task
at hand. Figure 3.1 shows a significant decrease in productivity following the introduction of
unilateral wage cuts in the HL treatment. This drop is equivalent to 19 percent and resembles a
performance elasticity of 0.5.10 This result is consistent with the findings reported by previous
literature examining the impact of inequality on productivity.11 The study closest to our work
is by Cohn et al. (2014). Following the introduction of unilateral wage cuts, the authors find a
performance elasticity of 0.6 and a drop in productivity of 15 percent.
Similarly, Figure 3.2 presents the percentage change in performance in session two relative to
session one, by gender. Panel one in Figure 3.2 shows a positive increase in output for both male
and female workers in the control group, with female workers increasing their output slightly
more than men. In contrast, panel two shows that male and female workers reduce their effort
levels following unilateral wage cuts. This drop is slightly larger for men (23 percent) than
women (16 percent). These gender differences, however, are not statistically significant.
Next, we test our Hypothesis 1 that expects workers to reduce their effort relative to
advantageous coworkers of the same gender, under wage inequality. To test this hypothesis, we
compare workers’ productivity in the In-group treatment, to the control group. Using the control
group as a base, results show that revealing the gender identity of the co-worker introduces
a larger drop in productivity. This drop is especially relevant for the in-group comparison
where Figure 3.1 shows a significant post-treatment reduction of nearly 38 percent. The drop in
productivity for the in-group treatment is mainly driven by male workers matched with other
male colleagues, as Figure 3.2 shows this reduction is equivalent to 42 percent for men and 30
percent for women. This gender difference is significant at the five percent level. Therefore, we
cannot reject Hypothesis 1.
To test Hypothesis 2, we examine the impact of unilateral wage cuts for participants assigned
to the out-group treatment. The difference-in-difference coefficient in Table 3.2 indicates a
significant decrease in productivity with respect to the control group. According to Figure 3.1,
this decrease is equivalent to a reduction in productivity of 4 percent in the post-treatment phase.
As Figure 3.1 shows, productivity decreases less in an out-group comparison than in previous
treatments. This decrease is 8 percent lower than that of Unilateral wage cut treatment and 30
percent lower than that of the In-group comparison, with both differences being statistically
significant. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.2 show that gender differences in response to out-group
inequality are driving the result.
Panels two, three, and four of Figure 3.2 show that male workers reduce their productivity
10Elasticity of performance is calculated as a ratio of the percent change in output relative to the percent change
in wages.
11Performance elasticity in Kube et al. (2012) =0.6, output drops by 20 percent, in Cohn et al. (2014)=0.6,
output drops by 15 percent,
in DellaVigna et al. (2016)=0.04, output drops by 2 percent,
in Heinz et al. (2017)=0.6,output drops by 12 percent.
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Number of Entries Number of Entries Number of Entries
Session two 38.84*** 42.52*** 34.63*
(12.65) (15.63) (19.51)
HL × Session two -81.28 *** -75.12** -89.02**
(51.10) (31.12) (38.18)
In-group × Session two -118.9*** -102.8** -142.9***
(18.93) (20.75) (24.71)
Out-Group × Session two -42.10** -10.36 -103.9***
(19.35) (17.41) (25.47)
Constant 211.9*** 197.0*** 233.7***
(5.222) (3.512) (4.952)
R squ. 0.186 0.180 0.326
Observations 624 370 254
Results from OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. Dependent variable is the number of entries
produced in each working session. Results do not change for using the difference in number of entries as a
dependent variable. HL, In-group, Out-group are treatment dummies set to one for the corresponding treatment
(and zero otherwise). Standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
when subjected to a unilateral wage cut, regardless of the gender identity of the co-worker. Male
workers drop their productivity by 11 percent in the out-group treatment and is not significantly
different from the In-group treatment. Comparing effort supply for women workers in all four
panels, Figure 3.2 shows that female workers’ effort choices under conditions of inequality,
unlike men, are affected by the gender identity of the co-worker. Female workers receiving a
wage cut relative to a male co-worker reduce their effort supply by 3 percent with respect to
the control group (p=0.810). Nevertheless, the decrease in productivity for female workers
in the out-group treatment is significantly lower than that of Unilateral wage cut (p=0.053)
and in-group-treatment (p=0.000). Our empirical findings show women who are compared to
advantageous male workers do not decrease their effort supply under wage inequality. On the
other hand, men significantly decrease their effort supply under wage inequality irrespective of
the gender identity of the coworker, although the decrease is less in the out-group. We cannot
reject Hypothesis 2 for the females, however, males decrease their effort supply irrespective of
the gender identity of the reference group.
Quality of Work Produced
Next, we test for the impact of unilateral wage cuts on the quality of work produced. The
difference-in-difference coefficients of Table 3.3 show no significant effect of any of the treatments
on the quality of work produced by the workers with respect to the control group.
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Fig. 3.1: Post-treatment effect on quantity produced
Figure 1 reports the change in the number of entries as a percentage of the pre-intervention average. Interval bars
show the 95 percent confidence intervals
Fig. 3.2: Post-treatment effect on quantity produced, by gender
Figure 2 reports the change in the number of entries as a percentage of the pre-intervention average divided by
gender. Interval bars show the 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Number of Mistakes Number of Mistakes Number of Mistakes
Session two -0.845 3.030 -3.324
(4.880) (6.196) (6.302)
HL ×Session two -10.27 -10.14 -12.89
(6.188) (7.007) (10.02)
In-group× Session two -5.359 -6.722 -10.58
(6.074) (7.728) (8.103)
Out-group×Session two -0.454 -7.048 5.928
(5.359) (6.428) (9.405)
Constant 16.92*** 15.15*** 18.15***
(3.155) (4.102) (5.119)
R squ. 0.065 0.094 0.102
Observations 312 185 127
Results from OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. Dependent variable is the number of mistakes
produced in each working session. Results do not change for using the difference in number of mistakes as a
dependent variable. HL, In-group, Out-group are treatment dummies set to one for the corresponding treatment
(and zero otherwise). Standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figure 3.7 (in the Appendix) presents the percentage change in the number of mistakes made
relative to the average pre-intervention phase. Figure 3.7, shows that the number of mistakes
does not change significantly for all treatments compared to the control group. Running the
same specification this time controlling for the number of entries filled in each session, does not
alter the results.
The findings show that workers assigned to the out-group treatment have a mild change
in the number of mistakes made. Dividing the estimation by gender we see that this result is
mainly driven by male workers who have higher number of mistakes relative to the control group
(see Figure 3.8 in Appendix).12
3.5 Post-experimental survey and Discussion
After the completion of the second session, we invited all workers to participate in a feedback
survey. The survey asked the participants to rate how they believed to have performed in the
task and how well they believe their co-worker had performed in each session. This helps us test
Hypothesis 3 on whether the evaluation of the coworker’s performance is associated with the
gender identity of the reference group. In addition, the survey measured workers’ subjective
levels of work satisfaction in each of the two working sessions.
12The absence of statistical significance can be explained by the small point estimates of this variable and the
large standard errors. In addition, the confidence intervals include both reasonable and less reasonable effect sizes.
Our focus is thus on the fact that we generally see a drop in the number of mistakes in session two, and less on
the estimated magnitude.
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3.5.1 Performance Evaluations
The field experiment revealed a decrease in productivity resulting from wage cuts for females
when they were matched to a coworker of the same gender but not when their coworker was
male. The male coworkers, on the other hand, significantly decrease their effort supply under
wage inequality irrespective of the gender identitity of the coworker. We observe that Social
Comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) can only partially explain this behavior. The theory
assumes that individuals respond to in-group and out-group comparison in the same direction
and does not recognise the behavioral impact that gender identity could have given the cultural
context. In other words, the theory does not take into account that males and females could
each have a different response when matched to an out-group.
On the other hand, depressented entitlements (Major and Testa, 1989), rewards expectation
theory (Auspurg et al., 2017; Buchanan, 2018) and theories of cognitive dissonance (Jost and
Andrews, 2011) argue that societies consciously value certain groups such as males to be more
competent, thereby legitimizing and providing reasons to validate unjustified inequalities (Bylsma
and Major, 1994; Hogue and Yoder, 2003; Butler, 2016). At the end of the experiments, in
our feedback survey, we asked the workers to evaluate the performance of their coworkers for
each session across all treatments. The participants indicated on a scale from one to five, the
performance of their coworker relative to theirs for each session - one being worse than own and
five being better than own performance. We hypothesize that women in the Out-group wage
cut treatment might expect the performance of their (male) coworkers to be better that their
own.Similarly, we should observe the males to percieve the performance of their coworkers in the
Out-group treatment as very low.
Figure 3.3 shows on average both male and female worker’s expectation regarding their
coworker’s performance in session 1. In this session, the wage cut has not been introduced but the
gender identity of the coworker is revealed in the In-group and Out-group treatment. We observe
no significant difference in worker’s expectations regarding coworker’s performance in the control,
Unilateral wage cut and Ingroup wage cut treatments. However, in the Out-group treatment,
women expect their coworkers performance to be better than own and this is significantly higher
than male expectations about coworkers in the same treatment. Table 3.4 confirms this result.
Table 3.4 presents the correlation between the treatment and the variable measuring performance
evaluations. If team composition does not matter, we should not find a significant difference in
performance evaluations between participants in the identity treatment (gender of partner known)
and participants in Unilateral wage cut treatment (gender of partner unknown). Interestingly
Table 3.4 shows that female workers assigned to the out-group treatment, on average, expect
their coworker’s performance to be better than own performance. Particularly for women, we
cannot reject Hypothesis 3 - female worker’s evaluation regarding coworker performance is
significantly higher when the advantageous coworker is male (from the out-group).
In addition, we test whether actual productivity mirrors the expected beliefs, we compare the
number of entries across treatments in the first working session prior to introducing the wage cuts.
Figure 3.6 in the Appendix show that female participants assigned to the out-group treatment
have a significantly lower performance with respect to male participants assigned to the same
treatment. This difference in performance is also significant with respect to female workers
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Fig. 3.3: Relative Performance evaluations of coworkers in Session 1
Figure 5 plots the mean of expectations formulated on the relative performance (effort supply) of the
co-worker in session one, by gender. Participants indicate on a scale from one to five. Three indicates the worker
expected equal level of effort supplied by the co-worker and themselves.A vote above three indicates that the
worker expects the co-worker to be supplying higher effort levels. We expect that workers attempt to explain
wage inequality in the second working session by formulating beliefs about their performance and the performance
of the co-worker in the pre-intervention phase.




HL 0.278* 0.107 0.486**
(0.156) (0.210) (0.227)
In-group 0.180 0.161 0.208
(0.123) (0.191) (0.138)
Out-group 0.532*** 0.773*** 0.071
(0.129) (0.197) (0.107)
Constant 2.820*** 2.821*** 2.818***
(0.093) (0.154) (0.084)
Observations 301 182 119
R sq 0.053 0.118 0.064
Adj R sq 0.043 0.103 0.040
Dependent variable is the expected relative performance of the co-worker in Session 1. This variable is
measured using a scale from one to five. The omitted reference category is the control group. Standard errors
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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assigned to the in-group comparison. While women on average have a lower performance than
men in the first working session, this difference is only significant for the out-group treatment
(p-value: 0.0303).
3.5.2 A Subjective Measure of Satisfaction
Previous literature find that female workers have higher or comparable job satisfaction levels
relative to men despite their lower remuneration and working conditions (Crosby, 1984; McDuff,
2001; Donohue and Heywood, 2004; Parks et al., 1995).
Similar to existing studies, we ask participants to subjectively determine their level of job
satisfaction using a scale from one to five, where one indicates a very low satisfaction level
and five indicates a high level of job satisfaction. Figure 3.4 below shows the average levels
of satisfaction reported by male and female workers for each of the two working sessions. On
average, there is no significant difference in job satisfaction between males and females in the
control group. We do not observe a difference in job satisfaction between men and women in
session one (before the wage cuts) across treatments. Following the introduction of unilateral
wage cuts in the second working session, workers report reduction in their satisfaction levels and
this is not significantly different between men and women (p=0.418). While work satisfaction
decrease for both men and women in the In-group and Out-group wage cut treatment, it is
significantly lower for men (p=0.003, p=0.014). This result is corroborated in Table 3.5 that
estimates the linear effect of the treatment on the change in job satisfaction in session two
relative to session one. This specification is estimated for males and females. Thus, when
identity is salient, men report significantly lower job satisfaction than women both in the In
and Out-group treatments. This result finds support with the ’paradox of the contented female
worker’ narrative.
3.5.3 Further Concerns
This section describes certain points to be considered regarding the study design and outlays
potential questions for future research. During the experiment we did not clarify to the
participants whether we valued high quality data or high number of entries. Therefore, if the
participants had chosen to invest their effort into producing data of higher quality, then we
would see, similar to our findings, a reduction in the total number of entries completed in session
two. One way we mitigated this is by paying the participants a fixed wage and not a piece
rate wage. However, we also test for this possibility, by controlling, in the main regression, the
average change in the number of mistakes made in each treatment. Table 3.8 (in the Appendix),
shows that our main findings are robust with mild changes in the magnitude of the coefficients
of interest.
While our experimental design allows us to carefully control the work environment and
reduce potential biases, the chosen methodology does not come without drawbacks. Given the
limited number of applicants we received (312) we had to constrain the number of treatment
groups to four in order not to compromise the statistical power of the study. As a result our
experiment design is unable to distinguish the change in productivity that is due to the wage cut
and wage inequality. To do so, we need an additional treatment group in which all participants
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Fig. 3.4: Job satisfaction by gender
Figure 3.4 reports mean level of work satisfaction by treatment. The graphs show mean level of work satisfaction
for pre and post-intervention phases. Interval bars show the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Table 3.5: Impact of Unequal Treatment on change in Job Satisfaction
All Female Male p-value (2)vs(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se
HL -0.378*** -0.301* -0.486** 0.418
(0.108) (0.171) (0.232)
In-group -0.575*** -0.315** -0.910*** 0.003*
(0.105) (0.149) (0.194)
Out-group -0.729*** -0.534*** -1.042*** 0.014*
(0.098) (0.144) (0.196)
Constant 0.000 -0.032 0.042 0.549
(0.058) (0.117) (0.152)
Observations 283 167 116
R sq 0.124 0.079 0.230
Adj R sq 0.114 0.062 0.210
Dependent variable is a an ordinal variable measuring the change in job satisfaction from session 1 to session
2. It is based on a scale from one to five. Male is a dummy variable equal to one if the participant is a male and
zero otherwise. Regression (1) reports correlations between the different unilateral wage cut treatments and
change in job satisfaction. Regression (2) examines change in job satisfaction by gender. Standard errors reported
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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in the same treatment receive an equal wage cut in session two. In addition, we limit our analysis
to examining the impact of only disadvantageous inequality on productivity at the workplace
without addressing the impact of advantageous inequality. While both of these distinctions
are valuable from a policy perspective, we limit the experimental groups to those that would
serve the main research question of this paper. In addition we base our choice on the existing
empirical evidence showing a very small or no impact of advantageous inequality on productivity
(Cohn et al., 2014; Gächter and Thöni, 2010).
Based on the feedback survey after the experiment, we observe that female workers in the
Out-group wage cut treatment expected the performance of their male coworkers to be better
than own performance. Thus one of the plausible mechanisms could be that females justified
the inequality and therefore, did not respond negatively. However, having higher expectations
regarding coworker performance might be subject to bias since the data was collected at the
end of the experiment. Nevertheless, it points to an important question for future research
about how justification of the inequality and introducing transparency in effort supply of others
could impact fairness concerns. Breza et al. (2017) find that making effort observable mitigates
the negative morale effects of wage inequality when the justification for the pay differences is
transparent. While they do not have the identity component, future research could focus on
disentangling response to wage inequality when the cause of inequality is observable.
An important factor to consider when analyzing the treatment effect is the degree of clarity
as well as the degree of difficulty of the task as perceived by workers in each treatment. For that
purpose we collect data on two main control questions addressing these points. The questions
ask the participants to indicate on a scale from one to five how much they agree with the
following statements: "The task was clearly explained to me by the trainer" and "I found the
task difficult/challenging to execute". Figure 3.5 below, plots the average for each of the above
questions by treatment. It shows that workers, on average, perceived the task to be clear and
moderately difficult. More importantly, little difference is found across the different treatments
for both questions, indicating that differences in the perceived difficulty or clarity of the task
may not be confounding our results. Finally, our study is able to provide external validity of the
importance of social comparison and the wage effort hypothesis. Although the experiment was
conducted at the university, we recruited students assistants in the second and final year of their
studies who would be entering the labor market. Furthermore, since the selected universities are
public funded, the students come from diverse backgrounds and do not belong to the elite or
high income households.
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Fig. 3.5: Control questions on the degree of clarity and difficulty of task
Figure 6 reports answers to two control questions the first addresses the perceived clarity of instructions given
during the training session, and the second the perceived difficulty of the task. Answers are based on a one to five
scale. A relatively high vote on the first scale indicates that the worker thought the task was clearly explained. A
high vote on the second scale indicates that the worker perceived the task to be difficult. Interval bars show the
95 percent confidence intervals
3.6 Conclusion
This paper uses data from a field experiment to examine the impact of wage inequality at
the workplace on productivity. We collaborated with three public universities in Kolkata to
temporarily hire student assistants for a data entry task. Students were paired into teams of
two and had identical tasks. They were paid the same hourly wage in the first session of the
experiment. We subsequently implemented three treatments that enabled us to examine social
comparison effects on productivity under conditions of inequality.
Similar to the existing literature, we find that unilateral wage cuts impact the quantity of
work produced by both male and female workers. We, however, do not find any significant impact
of inequality on the quality of work produced. On average, our findings show that in-group
inequality introduces a bigger reduction in productivity relative to an out-group comparison.
This is especially due to female workers who reduce their productivity significantly more when
the advantaged co-worker is a female compared to a male co-worker.
In addition, we also find female workers’ equity evaluations are associated with the gender
identity of the reference group. Those females matched with male coworkers believed that
their advantageous coworkers performed better and therefore did not respond negatively to
wage inequality. This is contrary to male workers who reduce their productivity regardless of
the gender identity of the advantaged co-worker. The paper suggests evidence for the role of
performance evaluations as a mediating channel leading to the main findings. In particular, we
find that, when effort is not observed, participants formulate evaluations of their performances
relative to other co-workers. The gender identity of the coworker play an important role in
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formation of these expectations, particularly for women.
The findings of this paper with respect to women is consistent with social comparison theories
which expect individuals to compare themselves to the most similar other (Festinger, 1954).
There is also evidence of identity based expectations that affect how minority and disadvantaged
groups respond to inequality (Jost, 1997; Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost and Burgess, 2000; Carlsson
et al., 2009; Crosby, 1984; McDuff, 2001; Donohue and Heywood, 2004; Parks et al., 1995). In
this paper we find that the impact of inequality on productivity is mitigated if workers expect
pay differences to be justified leading to self-perpetuating inequality.
The findings suggest that heterogeneity in equity evaluations allows the cost of inequality to
vary, hence reducing the incentive for firms to adopt an equal pay policy. This cost is especially
low when inequality is consistent with the existing social order. The results encourage the need
for exogenously imposed policies that increase the cost of discrimination and restore equality.
In addition to interventions that offer disadvantaged groups equal access to opportunities, our
results point at the need for future studies to implement interventions that make effort or

































Control HL In-group Out-group (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (2)-(3) (2)-(4) (3)-(4)
Gender(male=1) 0.475 0.451 0.412 0.463 0.807 0.451 0.889 0.654 0.898 0.506
(0.066) (0.070) (0.050) (0.056)
Religion(Hindu=1) 0.966 0.902 0.866 0.887 1.000 0.468 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.024) (0.042) (0.035) (0.036)
Caste(general=1) 0.831 0.922 0.835 0.863 0.156 0.942 0.606 0.145 0.304 0.616
(0.049) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Age 1.407 1.588 1.656 1.362 1.000 0.506 1.000 1.000 0.146 0.025
(0.065) (0.070) (0.064) (0.057)
Marital status(married=1) 0.000 0.059 0.010 0.013 0.148 0.435 0.392 0.165 0.225 0.897
(0.000) (0.043) (0.010) (0.013)
Years of Education 0.661 0.588 0.885 0.925 1.000 1.000 0.221 1.000 0.305 1.000
(0.071) (0.085) (0.063) (0.075)
Field of Stud (sciences and engineering=1) 0.676 0.625 0.510 0.585 0.152 0.099 0.098 0.016 0.134
(0.054) (0.063) (0.051) (0.056)
Average grade 0.875 0.960 0.895 1.075 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.155 0.992 0.232
(0.045) (0.057) (0.046) (0.046)
Work experience(yes=1) 0.085 0.314 0.219 0.275 0.014 0.066 1.000 0.088 1.000 1.000
(0.037) (0.066) (0.042) (0.050)
Total 60 60 97 95
Columns (1) to (4) report mean values per treatment group. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Columns (6) to (10) report the p-values resulting from running orthogonality test (t-test) of the differences
of means across the treatment arms. Gender is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the worker is a male and zero otherwise. Religion is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the worker is from the
Hindu religion and is zero otherwise. Caste is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the participant is of high caste. Non-Hindu participants i.e Muslims are considered low caste. Age is a continuous variable
indicating the average age of the hired workers in each treatment group. Marital status is a dummy that is equal to one if the worker is married. Years of education is a continuous variable equal to the average
number of years spent at the university till the date of the experiment. Field of study is a dummy variable equal to one if the participant is a student in the field of sciences and engineering and is equal to zero
if the participant is a student in the field of arts and commerce. Average grade is a continuous variable indicating the average grade attained in the previous semester. Work experience is a dummy equal to one
if the worker had any work experience before the interview date.
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low caste 41 10%
Age
[17 to 21] 153 49.2%





Less than a year 108 34.7%
[1 to 4] 170 54.78%
More than 5 years 33 10.6 %
Field of study
sciences and engineering 193 62.1 %
arts and commerce 118 37.98%
Average grade
Less than 60 31 10.2%
[61 to 80] 256 83.9 %
[81 to 100] 18 5.9 %
Work experience
no 243.0 78.1%
yes 68.0 21.9 %
Universities
Calcutta University 144 46.15 %
Jadavpur University 82 26.28%
Presidency University 86 27.56 %
N 312 312
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Fig. 3.6: Average performance in by male and female workers in Session 1
Figure 7 reports mean number of entries produced in session 1. Interval bars show the 95 percent confidence
intervals.





Fig. 3.7: Post-treatment effect on quality of work
Figure 8 reports the change in the number of mistakes as a percentage of the pre-intervention average.Interval
bars show the 95 percent confidence intervals
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Fig. 3.8: Post-treatment effect on quality of work by gender
Figure 9 reports the change in the number of mistakes as a percentage of the pre-intervention average.Interval
bars show the 95 percent confidence intervals
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Table 3.8: Impact of unilateral wage cuts on quantity produced
Total Female Male
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Entries Number of Entries Number of Entries
Session two 46.14*** 46.66*** 44.77*
(14.81) (17.33) (25.47)
HL × Session two -82.72*** -70.53* -97.58**
(28.01) (36.23) (45.61)
In-group × Session two -126.9*** -105.4*** -163.3***
(18.58) (22.07) (30.42)
Out-group × Session two -50.87*** -11.27 -117.6***
(17.41) (18.92) (30.49)
Number of mistakes -0.497 -0.988*** 0.740
(0.377) (0.216) (1.057)
HL × Number of mistakes 1.272 2.113 -0.184
(0.848) (1.588) (1.380)
In-group × Number of mistakes 0.563 1.378*** -1.560
(0.569) (0.463) (1.296)
Out-Group × Number of mistakes 0.624 1.998*** -0.581
(0.511) (0.628) (1.091)
Constant 206.1*** 187.7*** 227.0***
(5.162) (6.344) (8.256)
R squ. 0.205 0.218 0.365
Observations 312 185 127
Results from OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. Dependent variable is the number of entries produced in each working session.
HL, In-group, Out-group are treatment dummies set to one for the corresponding treatment (and zero otherwise). Controls account for
the difference in quality of work produced with respect to the control. Standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
75
Table 3.9: Impact of unilateral wage cuts on quality produced
Overall Female Male
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Mistakes Number of Mistakes Number of Mistakes
Session two -0.845 3.030 -3.324
(4.880) (6.196) (6.302)
HL × Session two -10.27* -10.14 -12.89
(6.188) (7.007) (10.02)
In-group × Session two -5.359 -6.722 -10.58
(6.074) (7.728) (8.103)
Out-group × Session two -0.454 -7.048 5.928
(5.359) (6.428) (9.405)
Number of entries -0.0466 -0.140 0.0377
(0.0519) (0.0852) (0.0407)
HL × Number of entries 0.0773 0.163* -0.00495
(0.0591) (0.0902) (0.0646)
In-group × Number of Entries 0.0514 0.173* -0.0904
(0.0605) (0.0933) (0.0629)
Out-group × Number of entries 0.0543 0.179** -0.0186
(0.0551) (0.0882) (0.0523)
Constant 16.92*** 15.15*** 18.15***
(3.155) (4.102) (5.119)
R squ. 0.065 0.094 0.102
Observations 312 185 127
Results from OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. Dependent variable is the number of entries produced in each working session.
HL, In-group, Out-group are treatment dummies set to one for the corresponding treatment (and zero otherwise). Controls account for the
difference in quantity of work produced with respect to the control. Standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01
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3.8 Appendix B - Questionnaires
To the research assistants:Thank you for participating in the short term job. At the end of your
contract agreement we would like to know your feedback regarding the experience of working with




39. Task was clearly explained
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
40. Please rate your level of satisfaction with regard to the payment recieved in
the first session
2 Very bad 2 Bad 2 Good 2 Very good
41. Please rate your level of satisfaction with regard to the payment recieved in
the second session
2 Very bad 2 Bad 2 Good 2 Very good
42. I would rate my performance in the first session to be:
2 Very poor 2 Poor 2 Good 2 Excellant
43. I would rate my performance in the second session to be:
2 Very poor 2 Poor 2 Good 2 Excellant
44. I believe that my performance relative to my team partner on the first working
session be
2 Much worse 2 Worse 2 Equal 2 Better 2 Much better
45. I believe that my performance relative to my team partner on the second
working session be
2 Much worse 2 Worse 2 Equal 2 Better 2 Much better
46. Suppose you are working in this firm, please specify the wage information
that you would like to know about, other than your own wage, if any?
2 Wages of other colleagues similar to me in gender
2 wages of other colleagues similar to me in caste
2 wages of other colleagues similar to me in gender and caste
2 wages of any other colleague
2 Only my own wage
47. Would you be interested in contract extension to participate in a third working
session?





Altruism: A field experiment with
children in Mumbai, India
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There is substantial generosity across the world (CAF, 2018). About 50 percent of the
population offer help to strangers, almost 30 percent donated money, and 20 percent volunteered
their time. According to the World Bank, in 2018 remittances accounted for US$689 billion,
while US$27 billion was invested in humanitarian assistance. Therefore to design policies that
encourage increased generosity, it is important to understand why people voluntarily contribute
and engage in charitable behavior.
Two prominent explanations for charitable behavior are provided. On one hand, the theory
of pure altruism assumes that individual donations are motivated solely by the interest in
the welfare of the recipient (Becker, 1976). This theory implies that third-party contributions
generate a one-to-one crowding out in donations (Warr, 1982). On the other hand, Andreoni
(1989), proposed that donations are also motivated by warm glow or the utility that the donor
experiences from contributing. Hence, as donations are motivated by an egoistic motive, there is
no perfect crowding out of third-party donations.
This paper makes two contributions to existing research. First, we examine how pure
altruism and warm glow motivations vary with the cognitive development of children. Second, we
investigate how those motivations are affected by the identity of the recipient. Ample empirical
evidence has identified that individuals display parochial altruism, discriminating in favor of
in-groups and against out-groups (Bernhard et al., 2006; Fehr et al., 2013; Corr et al., 2015;
Willard, 2017; Chiang and Wu, 2015). We trace the origins of such forms of identity based
discrimination by investigating the motivations for giving to different groups and how those
motivations change with age.
The context of our study is Mumbai, India. During the last decade, among other cities
Mumbai has experienced extensive communal violence between two main religious groups-
Hindus and Muslims. In addition to mass rioting, there is evidence of systematic institutional
discrimination toward Muslim minorities in economic and social spheres (e.g., access to public
goods (Banerjee et al., 2005), exclusion in education and labor markets (Deshpande and Sharma,
2016; Sachar, 2006), and lack of economic mobility (Asher et al., 2018)). Therefore, this context
provides a backdrop to study the role of deeply rooted and salient identities in social preferences.
Particularly, we study its impact among school age children between 7 and 17 years. To elicit
how motives for giving could be affected by the identity of the recipients, we implement a field
experiment in schools with a high concentration of either Hindu or Muslim populations.
To disentangle the role of pure altruism and warm glow, we use a modified version of the
experimental design by Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017). We invite children to complete a survey on
educational aspirations and pay them in the form of school materials. We then ask the children
if they would be willing to donate part of the materials they received to support a charity that
works with disadvantaged children. Following Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017), we present to each
participant six scenarios that vary in the value received by the donor and the value that we as
researchers donate to the charity. This allows us to disentangle the role of pure altruism and
warm glow using a structural estimation of the utility function.
The experimental uses a between subjects design that allows us to disentangle if there is
discrimination towards a particular group. The treatments vary the frame used to present the
charity. In the control treatment, donors receive a flyer of the charity that contains pictures
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of the library of the beneficiary organisation. The other two treatments present pictures of
school-age children who are either Hindu or Muslim and receive assistance from the organisation.
To compare the effect of in-group and out-group discrimination, we conduct the experiment in
schools with a majority Hindu or Muslim population.
We find that warm glow preference is the most important motivation of giving among children.
Yet, pure altruism is higher for older than younger cohorts. We find that for younger children,
the motivations for giving do not depend on the identity of the beneficiary. Children aged
between 14 and 17 display a higher degree of pure altruism toward the out-group than the
in-group. Hence, participants in this group engage a larger degree of crowding-out of donations
toward out-groups than in-groups.
In addition to the altruistic preferences of the children, we also measure the warm glow and
pure altruistic motivations of their parents. We find that for both mothers and fathers, the pure
altruism motivation of giving is more important than pure altruism We find a high degree of
correlation between the altruistic preferences of parents and children.
We contribute to the empirical literature that investigates the motivations of voluntary
giving. Previous papers tested theories of pure altruism (Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002; Eckel and
Grossman, 2005; Bolton and Katok, 1998), warm glow (Crumpler and Grossman, 2008), or a
combination of both (Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2014; Konow, 2010). The closest paper to ours
is Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017), who uses a lab experiment and a structural estimation of the
utility function to not only disentangle different motivations of giving but also provide evidence
of interdependence in social preferences. We contribute to this literature by investigating how
both warm glow and pure altruism vary toward recipients of different identities, and also how
those motivations vary for children of different age groups.
A relatively large body of literature has documented in-group favoritism and out-group
discrimination (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Kranton, 2016; Dotterer and Lowe, 2015). Similar
to Bauer et al. (2014), we consider how norms of discrimination develop in children. We
complement this research by investigating whether discrimination is associated with different
norms of altruism. The emphasis of our study is religious discrimination in India.
4.1 Literature Review
The notion that norms of altruism affect behavior can be traced back to Adam Smith who wrote
in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976): "However selfish man may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render
their happiness necessary to him, though they derive nothing from it except the pleasure of
seeing it." Such a sympathy-driven motivation for voluntary acts was also propounded by Arrow
(1977) and Sen (1977; 1985b).
Becker (1976) formalized this idea as a pure altruistic motive in which the utility of giving
increases with the increase in the social income i.e the total income of both the donor and
the recipient1. Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Warr (1983) show that this motivation for giving
generates a one-to-one crowding out when donations of a third party increase. Yet, contradicting
1Therefore, if the recipient receives transfer from a third party, the donor is expected to reduce own transfer so
as to retain the social income i.e the total income of the donor and recipient
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this proposition, empirical data revealed that any government grant did not result in the complete
crowding out of private transfers, but instead, people continued to donate (De Wit et al., 2017;
De Wit and Bekkers, 2017; Kingma, 1989).
An explanation on why complete crowding out did not occur was provided in Andreoni (1989,
1990)’s impure altruism model. He proposed that voluntary giving was associated with both a
pure altruistic motivation and a warm glow motivation. The latter was related with the utility
that individuals derive from the act of giving. One implication of warm glow giving is that
individuals would donate irrespective of government grants, or any other third-party. A series of
studies followed Andreoni proving the non-existence of the complete crowding out hypothesis.
An earlier study by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) reviewed this theory using experiments in the lab
and actual donations by people to real charities. They found that despite large membership
base of charities, people continued to donate. Thus, increase in the number of members and
donations to the charity increased individual contributions, supporting the presence of a warm
glow motivation of giving.
Eckel and Grossman (2005) – EGJ – introduced a novel method to disentangle this warm
glow motivation. They varied the degree of fiscal illusion by making one group aware that a tax
had been deducted from their earnings to benefit the charity, while the other treatment group
was unaware about the tax deductions for a charity. EGJ find when participants are unaware of
the tax deductions, there was incomplete crowding out, rejecting the null hypothesis of pure
altruism. However, when there was no fiscal illusion regarding the tax, the results were close to
a complete crowding out. Crumpler and Grossman (2008) – CG – implemented another method
to isolate and measure warm glow giving. Participants were asked to donate to a charity of
their choice, however, the amount that the charity received was fixed ex-ante. Any amount
donated by the participant would be complemented by the researcher to fulfill the criteria of the
fixed amount. A pure altruistic individual would not be expected to donate any amount (since
donating would not impact the total amount of the charity good, and would further reduce the
social income i.e the sum of own income and the income for the charity). A pure warm glow
individual would donate despite the crowding effect that this would generate on donations of the
research team. The results showed extensive warm glow motivations, wherein 57 percent of the
participants donated and, on average, the donations amounted to 20 percent of their endowment.
Similarly Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2014) found support for the warm glow motivation. The study
included an additional treatment to disentangle to experimenter demand effect by including one
treatment considering recipients to be the researchers, the other treatment replicated the CG
study and the third treatment tested for baseline altruistic preferences.
While the above studies test the pure altruism model i.e the crowding out hypothesis,
following the work by Andreoni (1989) and Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017), this study situates the
Impure altruistic model as the null hypothesis. Keeping in mind preference interdependence,
our contribution to this literature is measuring the relative importance of both pure altruism
and warm glow preferences in individuals. Furthermore, we observe these motivations of giving
for children across different age groups. Two papers close to our study are by Liebe and
Tutic (2010) and List and Samak (2013) who disentangle motivations for altruistic giving in
children. Liebe and Tutic (2010) conduct an artefactual field experiment in primary schools in
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Germany to study the effect of social status (determined by the type of schooling – Hauptschule,
Realschule, Gymnasium and private Gymnasium in increasing order of social status) on voluntary
contribution of children. They played dictator games and hypothesized that pure altruism is
prevalent when high-status schools donate more than low-status school children and receive
less compared to the latter. Warm-glow will persist if donations remain constant, irrespective
of the income status of the recipient. The results showed support for warm glow preference
of giving, whereby particularly students from high-status schools gave consistent amounts to
both high-status and low-status recipients. Unlike them, in our study, the deservingness of
the recipient (socioeconomic conditions of recipient) remains constant. List and Samak (2013)
measure warm glow giving among very young children (aged three to five). They rejected warm
glow motivations of giving as children donated less to teddy bears than to other children. In
our study, we are able to observe these motivations over a longer age range (7 to 17 year-olds).
Unlike these two studies, we are also able to estimate the relative importance of both warm glow
and pure altruism.
Our study adds to the burgeoning literature on the development of social preferences in
children which has been studied in both psychology (Fabes and Eisenberg, 1998) and economics
(Fehr et al., 2008). Most of the studies unanimously agree that social preferences such as
inequality aversion (Fehr et al., 2008), generosity, altruism (Gummerum et al., 2010; Harbaugh
et al., 2003), and fairness preferences (Almås et al., 2010) increase with age. A recent literature
review on the development of prosociality can be found in Fehr et al. (2013) and Angerer et al.
(2015b). We add to this line of research by investigating how motivations for giving is correlated
with age.
Apart from the importance of age, we are keen on studying how contextual factors such as
the identity of recipients impacts the relative strength of warm glow and altruistic giving among
children. Previous studies have shown that an increase in the social distance of the recipient
(from the donor) is negatively correlated with charitable giving (Roth, 1995; Hoffman et al.,
1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Rotemberg, 2014). The Familiarity Hypothesis (Konow, 2010)
and the Social Identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) is used to explain greater donations
toward recipients who are closer in terms of identities such as race, ethnicity or citizenship
(Gangadharan et al., 2014).
These theories have been operationalised in lab or lab in the field experiments using either
induced identities (Kranton et al., 2013; Chen and Li, 2009; Costard, 2011; Corr et al., 2015;
Ahmed, 2008; Pan and Houser, 2013) or make pre-existing identities salient (Chai et al., 2011;
Goette et al., 2006; Chakravarty et al., 2016; Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Friesen et al., 2012).
The studies find a strong in-group favoritism or out-group discrimination among adults when
the identity of the recipient is revealed.2 By making existing identities salient, Chakravarty
et al. (2016) found that religious homogeneous villages have greater cooperation and Selten and
Ockenfels (1998) observed greater altruism and reciprocal intentions toward in-group members
in various solidarity games.
The importance of Familiarity Bias and Social Identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 2019) has
2Kranton et al. (2013) find that participants willing to destroy the social welfare of a member from the
out-group at their own cost.
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been observed among children from the age of five years (Banerjee et al., 2005). It was found
that as children grow older, they increase altruism and decrease envy/spite toward recipients
who belonged to the in-groups (Friesen et al., 2012; Angerer et al., 2015b). The in-group bias is
seen to be higher in regions where individuals experienced conflict. This was observed by Bauer
et al. (2014) who identified children exposed to conflict and found a significant increase in giving
to the in-group compared to the out-group among those participants who had the most exposure
to the conflict.
However, none of the studies observe whether the identity of the recipient impacts pure
altruistic or warm glow giving. Our study contributes to this literature as it observes how
saliency of religious identities, in cultural contexts where these identities are prominent, can
motivate pure altruism and the warm glow preferences of giving, respectively.
In summary, our contribution to the existing research is as follows; first, we measure the
relative importance of pure altruism and warm glow as motivations for voluntary giving across
three cohorts of school children (7-10yrs, 11-13yrs and 14-17yrs). Second, we study how
motivations for giving change according to the identity of the recipient. Finally, we study how
the social background and other demographic factors of the children could affect overall altruistic
giving.
4.2 Conceptual Model
The conceptual framework follows the empirical strategy of Andreoni (1990) and Ottoni-Wilhelm
et al. (2017). Consider an economy in which individuals are endowed with wealth wi that they
can allocate between the consumption of a private good, xi, and a contribution to a charity
good, gi. Let n be the total number of individuals in the economy and G =
∑n
i=1 gi the total
amount of charity goods generated. Following the model of impure altruism by Andreoni (1990),
the utility function can be written as:
Ui = U(xi, G, gi); ∀ i = 1, ....n (4.1)
where U is assumed to be a continuous and strictly quasi-concave function of its components.
This model of impure altruism implies that the utility depends on the consumption of the private
good, the total charity goods generated, and the own contribution to the charity good. Assuming
a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas utility function of degree 1, Equation (4.1) can be written as:
U(xi, G, gi) = (1− α− β) ln xi + α(lnG) + β(ln gi) (4.2)
0 < α < 1 is the measure of pure altruism obtained from the total value of the charitable
good. 0 < β < 1 represents the degree of warm glow from own contribution to the charity. For a
pure altruist α > 0 and β = 0, whereas for a pure warm glow individual α = 0 and β > 0.
Equation 4.2 is subject to the budget constraint:
xi = wi − gi; ∀ gi = G−G−i (4.3)
Zi = wi +G−i (4.4)
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Zi is the donor’s social income i.e combination of own income wi and giving by others
G−i. Based on the utility framework of Becker (1976), Andreoni (1989), and Ottoni-Wilhelm
et al. (2017), the charity good in this model has the properties of a public good, namely both
non-excludability and the generation of positive externalities3.
Substituting the budget constraint 4.3 in Equation 4.2, the donor’s maximization problem
can be written as:
max U = (1− α− β) ln[Zi −G] + α lnG+ β ln[G−G−i] (4.5)
The first order conditions can be solved for the implicit demand functions for the total amount
of public good:







In terms of the individual’s giving, the predictions of warm glow and pure altruism within an
impure altruism model can be rewritten as:
g∗i = −G−i + 0.5[(1− β)G−i + (α+ β)Zi + {[(1− β)G−i + (α+ β)Zi]2 − 4αG−iZi}1/2] (4.7)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function4, the model tests the null hypothesis of Impure
altruism such that a.) α+ β− > 1 and an increase in giving by others increases own optimal
giving. b.) the warm glow parameter β is greater than 0 and increasing, showing evidence of no
complete crowd-out.
In the next section, we explain the experiment design, which uses different levels of giving by
others to test for the Impure altruism model (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017).
4.3 Experiment Design and Hypothesis
In this section, we will discuss the experiment design, hypothesis and the procedures used to
implement the experiment.
4.3.1 Experiment Design
We implement a between-within subjects design which allows us to disentangle different
motivations of altruistic giving such as warm glow, pure altruism. We implement modified
version of the within-subject design by Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017). Each individual has to
make six decisions as presented in Table 4.1. In each situation, participants receive a fixed
endowment, either 40 or 46 rupees, and can donate part of their endowment to a foundation
that receives an initial donation from us (researchers).
This design allows the analysis of three main effects – subsidy, tax, and income effect at two
different levels of donations from the third-party (researchers) to the charity. The subsidy effect
measures the change in a participant’s donation when the initial endowment of the participant
3We assume that a third-party contribution to the charity good creates a positive externality on the donor
who gains utility even when they do not contribute on their own for the same good.
4In the discussion section, we provide potential limitations of assuming a Cobb-Douglas function to estimate
the parameters.
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remains the same but the foundation’s initial donation increases by 6 units. This can be seen
in budgets 1 and 2 (also 4 and 5). If participants are motivated by warm glow preferences,
donations should be the same in both budget scenarios. Comparing the donation decisions in
budgets 2 and 3 (5 and 6), we can examine a lump-sum tax effect. From Budget 3 to Budget 2,
and from Budget 6 to Budget 5, 6 units are deducted from the participant’s endowment and are
directly transferred to the foundation’s initial donation. If participants are purely altruistic, they
would reduce their transfer by 6 units, resulting in a one-to-one crowd out. Finally, we analyze
an income effect comparing budgets 1 and 3 (also budgets 4 and 6) wherein the foundation’s
initial donation does not change but the participant’s endowment increases by 6 units.





social income (G−i + wi)
1 40 4 44
2 40 10 50
3 46 4 50
4 40 28 68
5 40 34 74
6 46 28 74
This is the original design by (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017) which we modify to test two
main hypothesis: the strength of warm glow and pure altruism for different age groups and
when the social identity of the recipient changes. Inorder to study how altruistic giving varies
for different age groups, we implement the experiment by Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) across
children of three cohorts; 7-10 yrs (youngest cohort), 11-13 yrs (middle cohort) and 14-17 yrs
(oldest cohort). Using the experiment design with 6 donation decisions we can obtain a warm
glow and pure altruism measure for each of the participants and compare the motivations of
altruistic giving for the different cohorts.
Second, we investigate whether motivations for giving change for beneficiaries of different
identities. To explore this question, we vary the information regarding the religious identity
of the recipients using a between-subject design. One group of students received an abstract
flyer showing photos of a school library (no identity treatment), a second group received an flyer
showing photos of recipients who belonged to their own religious group (in-group treatment) and
the third group received a flyer with photos of recipients who belonged to a different religious
group (out-group treatment). By inducing this experimental variation we can assess whether
participants discriminate positively or negatively towards beneficiaries of different identities
relative to the abstract framework.
4.3.2 Hypothesis
This modified version of the Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) experiment enables us to test two
hypothesis, which we discuss in this section.
Hypothesis 1: Pure Altruism, α, and warm glow, β, increase with age.
List and Samak (2013) find evidence of pure altruism but not warm glow giving among
children (aged 3 to 5 years), thus providing evidence of a fundamental nature of pure altruistic
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preferences. Since pure altruism is concerned with efficiency regarding the production of the
public good, a higher cognitive capacity would be required to evaluate it. As the increase in
bandwidth to assess the cost and benefits of contribution toward the good increases with age,
we postulate a pure altruism parameter to be higher for older ages. In addition, a study by
Harbaugh et al. (2007) reveals that as children grow older they are more aware of fairness,
distributive concerns (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008), and the presence of multiple
donors (Guzmán et al., 2014). As a result, older children could be more prone to acting in a
pure altruistic manner, since it reduces the inequality between themselves and the recipients.
On the other hand, warm glow which is benefit associated with own contribution to the
charity is considered to be a consequence of repeated socialization which might develop only with
time and is therefore more prominent among adults (Harris (1995)). Studies by Banerjee (2002)
and Engelmann et al. (2013, 2018) show how prosociality is affected by concerns regarding social
image, following social norms and peer influences, which are also higher among older children.
Therefore, warm glow is hypothesized to increase with age. Liebe and Tutic (2010) in their
study also provide support to the group socialisation theory and find that teenage children in
school reveal greater warm glow preferences of giving. Since they do not have a variation across
ages, the study is unable to provide conclusions on the role of age on such preferences. Finally,
if we assume that pro-sociality and altruism generally increases and occurs through sympathy
for other individuals (Sen, 1977; Smith and Adam, 1759), we would expect to see an increase
in both pure altruism and warm glow. We expect the older children to display higher levels of
both warm glow and pure altruistic motivations for giving. While there is sufficient empirical
evidence of increasing altruism with age (Angerer et al., 2015a,b; Cárdenas et al., 2014; Kosse
et al., 2019), we go one step further and compare the relative importance of the two motives,
pure altruism and warm glow.
Hypothesis 2: We expect that overall altruistic motives (both warm glow and pure altruism)
will be higher toward the in-group than toward the out-group. The relative degree of warm glow
will be higher when the recipient is from the in-group compared to the out-group.
There is considerable theoretical (Konow, 2010; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and empirical
evidence that shows a high degree of in-group favoritism in social preferences (Gangadharan
et al., 2014; Kranton et al., 2013; Chakravarty et al., 2016; Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Sutter
et al., 2019; Chakravarty et al., 2016; Chen and Li, 2009). Therefore, we expect altruistic motives
will be higher towards recipients from the in-group. However, our study focusses on how motives
of altruism; namely warm glow and pure altruism is affected by the identity of the recipient.
A warm glow giver is expected to gain utility from own contribution to the charity good. If
this warm glow is associated with status and reputational concerns, which are more relavant for
the close social network, we expect individuals to have a higher degree of warm glow towards
in-group members (Vesterlund, 2003; Hungerman, 2009; Banerjee, 2002; Engelmann et al., 2018).
On the other hand, assuming that a warm glow giver can have non-egoistical motivations, e.g.,
giving is motivated by sympathy(Arrow, 1977), or a sense of commitment to the society (Sen,
1977), it would still not rule out the Familiarity Hypothesis (Konow, 2010) which increases
non-egotistical motives depending on the closeness or familiarity to the recipient. Furthermore,
empirical studies in neuroscience support these theories and show that empathy decreases when
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the recipient is from an out-group (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Meyer et al., 2013; Xu et al.,
2009).
In addition to observing the age and recipient’s identity effect, we consider the association of
other factors with motivations of altruistic giving. Factors considered are peer expectations and
willingness to follow the social norm (Harris, 1995; Engelmann et al., 2013; Kosse et al., 2019;
Simpson et al., 2017), religiousity Andreoni (2006); Bekkers and Schuyt (2008); Li (2017) and
intergenerational transmission of altruistic giving Ben-Ner et al. (2017); Wilhelm et al. (2008);
Brown et al. (2014).
4.3.3 Experimental Procedures
In this section, we delve into the context where the experiment was conducted and the procedures
that were implemented.
We ran the experimental sessions in eight semi-randomly selected public schools in Mumbai.5
To identify biased social preferences towards the in-group and out-group, we selected half of
the schools with a high proportion of Hindu population, and the other half that was highly
Muslim-dominated. Our aim was to capture an extreme form of discrimination, if any. As a
result, we ensured that our sample came from segregated localities and particularly from areas
that had experienced the riots in 1992-93. Mumbai is comprised of multiple administrative wards
which are under the purview of the local municipality (BMC). Each ward has localities that are
extensively segregated by religion and income. Within each ward, we selected areas that are
either highly Hindu or Muslim dominant. Since we do not have information on the population
composition by religion at the Ward level, our chosen Hindu and Muslim locations are based on
detailed focus group discussions by our enumerators with various stakeholders, such as citizens
living in these areas to the officers at the municipality level.
Children from grades 4 to 10 participated in one session that lasted approximately one hour.
All the sessions were conducted during regular school hours, (i.e., there was no self-selection on
who participated in the experiments). The children’s participation was voluntary. Particularly
in many Indian public schools, due to the large number of students, each class had at least
three divisions. We randomized the identity treatments at the division level, but the altruism
elicitation was undertaken for all the students.
In each session, the surveyors were introduced as researchers who were keen on studying
the educational aspirations of young students. Accordingly, children were asked to complete a
30-minute educational survey and we informed them that all their answers and decisions would
be treated and analyzed anonymously. The survey included some socio-demographic questions,
a cognitive test (ravens matrices),6 and some questions on expectations and aspirations from
education. These questions were later utilized for another study on expected educational returns.
After completing the survey, as a means of thanking children for their time, it was announced
that each child would get some payment that could be redeemed in the form of school items
such as pens, pencils, notebooks, etc. At this point, participants where informed that they could
5In total we have 8 schools - Maroli church (Muslim), Anjuman Islam (Muslim), Jaffri (Muslim), SIES (Hindu),
Mori road(Muslim) , Sewri (Hindu) and Mahalaxmi (Hindu), Amarnath (Hindu).
6We selected a short version with 8 matrices of the original set of Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven et al.,
1998)
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donate part of the endowment to a NGO with presence across different states in India, and
whose objective is to help Indian children in need. Information of the NGO was given in the
form of a flyer.7
As explained above, in each flyer, we presented different photos of the beneficiaries according
to the treatment assignment. We asked participants to complete the six donation decision shown
in Table 4.1 directly in the flyer. In order to avoid spillover effects across classes, we collected
the flyers at the end of the session.
The selected NGO helped children across different religiously populated regions within India.
Therefore, we could show photos of either NGO facilities with only Muslim children or only Hindu
children who were potential beneficiaries without deception. While the information remained the
same, the identity of the beneficiaries varied across the treatments. In the first treatment, called
Abstract treatment, children saw photos of a school building and a library. In the other two
treatments, children were shown photos of only Hindu recipients or photos of only the Muslim
recipients of the NGO. We called the treatment in-group if they received flyers with photos
of children from their own religious group or out-group if they received the flyer with pictures
of children belonging to the other religious group. We implemented the control treatment to
measure an average lower limit of giving relative to the religiously salient treatments. Treatment
assignment was at the classroom level. The flyer, including the pictures and the information is
provided in the Appendix ( 4.8, 4.7 and 4.9).
In each situation, children knew their endowment received from completing the education
survey and the initial amount that the NGO received. They had to decide on the amount (from
their earnings) that they would like to give to the recipients of the NGO. It was announced that
the amount left would be given to the participants. Although each participant makes the six
decisions, only one was randomly selected to calculate payments.
At the end of this activity, each child randomly picked a colored ball from a bag with six
balls that represented the six situations from Table 4.1. Payments were calculated in a separate
room, and each child received a package with school items that corresponded to the amount
of rupees they kept for themselves. As a means to attenuate the experimental demand effects,
we implemented a double blind format such that both students and the enumerators did not
know the payment received by the participants. We ensured that the enumerators present in
the classroom during the session were different from those handing out the gift packages. The
students received a small voucher that stated which one of the six decisions was randomnly
selected for payment. The enumerators present in the class did not know what would be written
in the voucher. The student took this voucher to the enumerators outside the classroom to
receive their payment. This drill was made clear to the students from the beginning of the
session. One week after the sessions, surveyors came back to the schools and randomnly selected
around 60 percent of the children to conduct a post experimental survey. The survey included
questions regarding their religiosity and hypothetical questions such as willingness to follow a
social norm and expectations regarding their peers (post-experiment Survey).
We also elicit the parents’ pure altruistic and warm glow preferences. Attached to the consent
7Information given about the NGO: "The NGO helps children and gives them good schooling. They give books,
pens and pencils to the children. The children come from poor families. Some of the children do not have homes.
The NGO is in Delhi. But they work in others parts of the country".
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form for parents, they also received a survey and six questions (similar to those in Table 4.1),
but without the identity component. In addition to the parent’s consent, the project received
approval by the principals in each school. Moreover, we informed the parents and teachers
about the general objectives of the project and the payments to the children. Parents were also




In this section, we provide an insight into the socio-demographic characteristics of our sample as
well as their decisions in the experiment. Table 4.2 displays the mean values for the characteristics
of our sample across the three treatment groups; namely abstract, in-group and out-group.
The first panel of Table 4.2 describes the socio-demographics of our sample. Across all three
treatment groups, girls comprise of 48 percent of the sample. The children are on average 12
years-old, 50 percent of the sample are children from the Hindu religion and the remaining are
Muslims. On average, the children have three to four siblings and travel for 12 to 13 minutes
to their school. The cognition variable denotes the number of correct answers entered in the
Raven’s matrices test and, on average, the children answered three to four questions correctly.
The variable religiosity measures the frequency of visiting a religious shrine where 0 means never
and 6 denotes every day. On average in our sample, children visited a religious shrine such as a
temple or mosque a few times a month. All of the characteristics in our sample are balanced
across the treatment groups
In the second panel of Table 4.2 is the information on the post-experiment survey where we
asked the children some questions after the experiment regarding their decisions. Children who
were exposed to the in-group treatment, on average, perceived charity to be good and believed that
the NGO might be biased toward their own in-group (variable ‘NGOfavorsingroup’). Columns 4,
5 and 6 in Table 4.2 is the orthogonality test that shows whether the baseline characteristics
across the treatment groups are significantly different. The columns show on average (77%) of
the children in the in-group treatment believe that the NGO favors their in-group compared
to 58% of the children in the outgroup treatment (p=0.000). We consider this to be a sign of
confirmation that our priming treatments for in-group and out-group identity worked. It should
be made clear that the questions regarding the NGO and role of charity, i.e., from the variables
‘Known NGO’ onwards, were asked in a post-experiment survey only once the children had
completed their decisions and were given the gifts. As a result, these questions did not frame the
students before they made their donation decisions. It is worthy to note that majority of students
across the three treatments declared that they would increase their contributions when there is
a third party funding (variable: After subsidy). They also claim that their contributons would
increase when there is a tax imposed on them (variable: After tax). These survey responses
already hint at a tendency for the children in this sample to be more influenced by warm-glow
giving. Finally, we asked the children for the reason why they had donated. Across the three
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treatments, the children said they donated because the recipients were poor (the options included
Poor, Poor and own religion, Own religion). However, slightly more students who were in the
in-group treatment said they donated because the recipients belonged to their own religion and
this is significantly different across the treatment groups (see Table 4.2).
In addition to the main survey and the post-experiment survey, we also spoke to the parents
of the children and asked them a few questions. This household survey was conducted over
the phone and included questions such as parents’ education, monthly income, risk and time
preferences (non-incentivized), subjective opinions of the parents regarding equal opportunities
for all social identity groups in India. Parents were also asked questions on their charitable
giving patterns and whether their children were aware of these donations. Finally, we conducted
the same experiment on donation decisions with the parents (see Appendix tables 4.8, and 4.9).
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








Female 0.489 0.486 0.474 0.918 0.617 0.678
Age 12.002 11.892 11.842 0.317 0.160 0.635
AgeGroups 1.987 1.929 1.950 0.164 0.387 0.584
Hindu 0.517 0.498 0.553 0.498 0.226 0.049
Siblings 3.444 3.341 3.623 0.403 0.346 0.108
Distance to school 12.458 13.444 12.620 0.180 0.822 0.105
Nearest school 13.274 12.717 8.345 0.931 0.402 0.438
Cognition 3.486 3.403 3.431 0.384 0.565 0.771
Religiousity 3.738 3.799 3.586 0.606 0.237 0.053




Expectation 21.133 21.835 21.234 0.389 0.904 0.432
Familiar NGO 0.437 0.506 0.518 0.062 0.030 0.722
Charity is beneficial 0.855 0.920 0.857 0.005 0.956 0.003
NGOfavorsingroup 0.662 0.768 0.585 0.001 0.032 0.000
After subsidy 3.521 3.391 3.338 0.073 0.016 0.466
After tax 3.343 3.255 3.251 0.248 0.230 0.956
Follow norm
(ingroup)
3.423 3.325 3.243 0.196 0.022 0.265
Reason to donate 1.164 1.302 1.120 0.014 0.268 0.000
N 547 647 626
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.8, provides information on the work status of the parents, the class distribution of
the children across treatments, and mode of transport used to travel to school. Considering the
entire sample, 41 percent of the fathers have permanent employment in offices, 24 percent are
daily wage earners, and 16 and 8 percent of the respondents’ fathers owned a small or large
business, respectively, and 71 percent of the mothers in the sample were housewives. Table 4.9
provides information on certain subjective beliefs of the fathers and mothers. On average, 20
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percent of the fathers and mothers have experienced discrimination. Although 90 percent of our
sample of parents say they undertake charity, only 20 percent discuss their charitable giving
with their children. When asked if all religious and caste groups should have equal access to
education and work, only 30 percent of the sample agreed with this statement. When they
were asked if minority religious and caste groups face discrimination at work and education, 60
percent of mothers and fathers agreed to this statement.
Charitable behavior
Next, we discuss the mean giving of the children and their parents for each of the donation
decisions in the game. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are the mean proportion of income donated.
The initial endowments for the children were Rs.40 or Rs.46 and for the parents was higher -
Rs.100 and Rs.106.
For a pure altruism model to hold, we expect a compulsory tax to crowd out one to one
private donations. Comparing Budgets 3 and 2 (6 and 5), we find that a compulsory tax of
6 units decreases giving by 1.37 units and 2.14 units for low and high donations respectively.
Thus a tax in our sample results in a less than one to one crowding out effect (p=0.000). For
the parents, a compulsory tax of 6 units reduces giving by 2.07 units and 0.77 units respectively
for low and high level donations (p=0.000). Similar to Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017), we find a
significant difference in crowding out between low and high levels of giving (p=0.03) for adults.
We can reject the null hypothesis of complete crowding out (or a pure altruism model) for the
parents8.
We can assess the impact of the third party ’subsidy’ on donations by comparing budgets 1
and 2 (4 and 5). Under such an subsidy (without changing the donor’s income), the donation
is expected to decrease under impure altruism. For children, at low levels of giving by others
(comparing Budget 1 and 2), own giving decreases by 0.03 rupees and it is not significantly
different from zero (p=0.92). However, at high levels of giving by others (comparing budget 4
and 5), own giving reduces by 1.18 rupees (p=0.002). For the parents an increase in one rupee
from the third party decreases giving by 0.84 rupees for low levels (p=0.007) and by 0.71 for
high levels (p=0.01). From these preliminary non-parametric tests, we can already attribute the
impure altruism model to reflect the motivations of altruistic giving 9.
8Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) find very high crowding out at 97% and 82% for low and high levels of giving
compared to our study which is 30% and 14%. While levels of crowding out are different, both reject pure altruism
model for adults. Konow (2010) observes crowding out of 24% of endowment under tax treatment, Eckel and
Grossman (2005) observes complete crowd out when there is no fiscal illusion about the tax - a tax of 3$ decreases
giving by 2.84$ i.e 94% crowd out, fiscal illusion sees a crowding in of 78%
9Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in the Appendix are Kernel densities for the children and their parents. It depicts the
difference in the distribution of giving before and after a subsidy or tax. For the children, the left side of the figure
reveals the tax effect and the two distributions are not significantly different based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test for the equality of distributions. The right side of the panel shows the change in distributions under indirect
subsidy effect. The KS test is significantly different under an indirect subsidy and the giving after the subsidy
skewed the distribution to the right. These figures already provide a picture of the extent of the incomplete
crowding out on average in the abstract treatment. Thus, giving decreases by 1 rupee in the subsidy condition
and 2 rupees in the tax condition revealing incomplete crowding out (as opposed to a complete crowding out of 6
rupees).
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Fig. 4.1: Average Giving
Fig. 4.2: Average Giving
4.4.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we estimate the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas impure altruism utility function
from Equation 4.2. The optimal gift g∗ib derived from implicit demand function 4.6 is written as
follows:
g∗ib = −Gjb+0.5[(1−β)Gjb+(α+β)Zib+{[(1−β)Gjb+(α+β)Zib]2−4αGjbZib}1/2]+ei+uib (4.8)
Based on the theoretical model of Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) where i = 1, ...N is the
total sample size, b = 1, ..6 indexes the six decisions made by each participant. The first order
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condition given by Equation 4.8 implies that the optimal gift g∗ib is a function of the amount
given by others Gjb, and the social income in the economy Zib. ei is the individual-specific
random effect and uib is the randomness in each participant’s giving that is not correlated across
their six decisions. We utilise the above first order condition to obtain an estimation of the
coefficient of pure altruism α, and the coefficient of warm glow β.
Using a non-linear random effects Tobit estimation, we are able to calculate the pure altruism
α and warm glow β estimate for each participant in the sample. We address these results as the
individual estimations. The maximum likelihood routines assume the error terms uib and ei to
be normally distributed (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006). Similar to Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017),
we are able to calculate the likelihood of optimal giving accounting for corner solutions when
gib = 0 or gib = wib. As a robustness check, we also implement a maximum likelihood estimation
without accounting for the corner solutions. In section 7, we discuss the potential convergence
issues we faced while estimating the structural model.
Table 4.3 presents the mean estimates for the entire sample of all children who participated.
We find that the estimated coefficient of pure altruism is 0.10 which is smaller than the coefficient
of warm glow component (β) 0.289. Since the warm glow coefficient is significantly greater than
zero, the pure altruism model can be rejected. The correlation coefficient, ρ, is 0.63 (p=0.008).
This shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the error term for within-participants
decisions. Apart from the Table 4.3 for the entire sample, we estimate the individual effects of
age on altruistic preferences and present the results in Table 4.4. Table 4.5 presents the estimated
individual coefficients by the religious identity of the recipient and finally the interaction term
of age and treatment on altruistic preferences are presented in Table 4.6. In the Appendix, we
replicate the results by age, identity and the interaction using maximum likelihood estimations
for the average of the 6 decisions (without considing corner solutions).
In the following subsection, we provide a detailed analysis of the individual estimatations.
Table 4.3: Altruistic Preferences- No linear random effect Tobit estimation
Coefficient Standard Error p -value
α 0.10 0.0102 0.000
β 0.289 0.008 0.000
ρ 0.63 0.008 0.000
Notes: Sample size 1820 (All children who participated).
Altruistic Preferences and Age
We first study motivations for giving in the condition when the identity of the beneficiary is
neutral. Therefore, we focus on the decision under the Abstract treatment when the flyer
displayed the photo of a library). Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients for different age
groups without the identity effects. The total number of observations is 3162 (or 527 individuals).
The last columns of the table include the average of the individual estimations for all the parents
of our participants. The participants are grouped in three age categories – Group 1 comprises
children between 7 and 10 years, group 2 includes children between 11 and 13 years and group 3
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children between 14 and 17 years.10 Column 1 in Table 4.4 includes all children that participated
between age 7 and 17 years. The warm glow (β) component is 0.22 and pure altruism (α) is 0.17,
indicating warm glow to be the main motivation of giving11. The subsequent columns show the
estimated coefficients for the subgroups and parents respectively. Pure altruism, indicated by the
α parameter (top panel) is the lowest for the middle cohort (0.15) and is the highest for the oldest
cohort where α = 0.203. However, there is no significant differences in pure altruistic preferences
across the three cohorts. We can reject the Hypothesis 1 that pure altruistic preferences is
positively correlated with age. Column 5 is the estimated coefficient of pure altruism for the
parents of children across all ages.
The estimates of warm glow preferences of giving, represented by the β parameter are not
significantly different between the young and middle age groups (p=0.573). The oldest age group
displays a lower estimate of warm glow giving β = 0.26 and is significantly different from both
youngest (0.02) and middle cohorts (p=0.000). Thus, for our sample, warm glow preferences are
stable until the age of 13, but we see lower motivations for warm glow giving for the older age
group. Thus, we can reject our Hypothesis 1 that warm glow increases with age. We observe a
non-linear development of warm-glow preferences that are constant between 7 and 13 years, but
begin to decline for children up to 17 years of age. The coefficient of warm glow preferences
for parents, β is 0.18. While warm glow motivation is stronger in magnitude for the younger
and middle cohorts, this is not the case for the oldest cohort and parents. For the latter groups,
relative degree of pure altruism is a stronger motivation for giving. We find a similar pattern
when we consider the average of the 6 decisions i.e do not account for the corner solutions (See
Appendix Table 4.10). However, unlike the individual estimations, there is no evidence of pure
altruism (not significanlty different from zero) for the youngest cohort (7-10 yrs).
10The groups are divided based on the class categories such that the lowest group includes children in primary,
the second group has secondary students, and the oldest cohort are higher secondary students.
11This result is in line with previous research that found warm glow to be the stronger motivation to give
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Table 4.4: Altruistic Preferences - Age (Discrete)
All 7-10ys 11-13yrs 14-17yrs Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Pure altruism(α)
Constant 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.155*** 0.203*** 0.141***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002)
Warm glow(β)
Constant 0.224*** 0.247*** 0.234*** 0.181*** 0.127***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
Obs 3162 912 1392 858 2934
Hypothesis testing (2) vs (3) (2) vs (4) (3) vs (4)
H0: α 0.443 0.354 0.131
H0: β 0.573 0.020** 0.000***
Notes: Dependent variable amount of giving.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Altruistic preferences and identity of the recipient
In this section, we show how contextual factors could influence different altruistic motivations. We
particularly make salient the religious identity of the recipient and observe whether motivations
of pure altruism and warm glow would be impacted. Identities, be it ethnic or religious, play
an important role in different cultures. We use the strongly embedded Hindu and Muslim
identity in our study as a potential distinction between the in-group and out-group. Our three
treatment groups for comparison are in-group (same religion recipients), out-group (different
religion recipients) and the abstract treatment (discussed in the previous section). Keeping
the deservingness of beneficiaries constant, we observe how their religious identity might affect
the altruistic preferences of the donor. The between-subjects design enables us to compare the
proportion of warm glow and pure altruism, on average, across three treatment groups; abstract
(no identity salient), in-group and out-group.
Table 4.5 includes the individual α and β estimates for each treatment; namely abstract,
in-group and out-group. The hypothesis testing at the bottom of the table are Wald tests for
equality of coefficients across treatment groups for pure altruism and warm glow, respectively.
The maximum likelihood estimation for pure altruism is the highest at 0.20 when participants
donate to recipients from the out-group. We do not find pure altruism to be significantly different
when comparing the three identity treatments.
For warm glow, the estimated coefficient is the lowest in the in-group treatment. The warm
glow coefficient is significantly lower in in-group compared to both the abstract (p=0.016) and
the out-group(0.005). Considering the entire sample i.e. pooling the sample over all ages, we do
not have any evidence of favoritism to the in-group or exclusion of the out-group. We can reject
the Hypothesis 2 that warm glow and pure altruism will be higher towards the in-group. This
finding is corroborated in the robustness checks where we estimate the pure altruism and warm
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glow coefficients using the average of the 6 decisions (without accounting for corner solutions)
(See Appendix Table ??).





Constant 0.175*** 0.186*** 0.202***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Warm glow (β)
Constant 0.224*** 0.206*** 0.227***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs 3162 3744 3660
Hypothesis testing (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (2) vs (3)
H0: α 0.372 0.125 0.280
H0: β 0.016** 0.441 0.005**
Notes: Dependent variable amount of giving.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Altruistic Preferences by Age and Identity
In this subsection, we estimate the marginal change in pure altruism and warm glow for different
age groups across the three treatments. Table 4.6 shows the marginal change in pure altruism
and warm glow for the in-group and out-group treatment relative to the abstract (or control)
group. The analysis is conducted not only for the pooled sample (Column 1) but also for each
of the age-groups (Columns 2,3 and 4). For the pooled sample, we observe pure altruism to be
higher in both the in-group and out-group treatment relative to the abstract group. There is no
significant difference in altruistic motivations across the three treatments for the youngest age
group (Column 2). The aggregate results are driven by the middle age group which shows a
significantly higher pure altruistic preference in the in-group and out-group treatments. For the
oldest cohort, pure altruistic preference is significantly greater in the out-group treatment.
Relative to the abstract treatment, we observe warm glow motivations of giving to be
significantly lower in the in-group treatment (for the youngest and middle age group). However,
there is no significant differences in warm glow motivations across the three treatments for
the oldest age group. We can reject Hypothesis 2 that both pure altruism and warm glow
motivations of giving are in favor of the in-group. Disaggregation by age groups further reiterates
this finding. The total effect of warm glow and pure altruism by age and identity treatment
is shown in Figure 4.6 in the Appendix A. Considering the estimates for the robustness check
(See Appendix Table 4.12) where corner solutions are not accounted for, we observe a similar
magnitude and direction for the coefficients but they are not statistically significant.
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Table 4.6: Altruistic Preferences - Identity and Age
All 7-9 yrs 10-13 yrs 14-17 yrs Hypothesis test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
b/se b/se b/se b/se (2) vs (3) (2) vs (4) (3) vs (4)
Pure altruism (α)
Ingroup 0.011* 0.014 0.020** -0.001 0.861 0.643 0.518
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
Outgroup 0.027*** 0.013 0.042*** 0.022* 0.552 0.756 0.741
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
Control 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.155*** 0.203*** 0.443 0.354 0.131
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Warm glow (β)
Ingroup -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.028*** 0.012 0.669 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Outgroup 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.778 0.792 0.443
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Control 0.224*** 0.247*** 0.234*** 0.181*** 0.573 0.021** 0.000***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Obs 10566 2988 5118 2460
Notes: Dependent variable amount of giving.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
4.5 Drivers of Altruism
Among the two studies that attempted to disentangle warm glow and pure altruism, List and
Samak (2013) found pure altruism to be the strongest motivation for giving among children
aged between three to five. Liebe and Tutic (2010) observed giving by teenagers (aged between
14 and 18) and found warm glow to be the main motivation for altruistic giving. Other studies
that observe the development of social preferences in children predict altruism to be driven
by increased socialization (Engelmann et al. (2018)), saliency of identities (Shang and Croson
(2009)), social pressure (Dellavigna et al. (2012))and a decrease in altruism when social distance
from the recipient increases(Hoffman et al. (1996); Bohnet and Frey (1999)).
In our study, which observes warm glow and pure altruism in children aged seven to 17 and
their parents, we find pure altruism to be positively correlated with age. Warm glow is lower for
children over 14. For the oldest cohort and parents, we find pure altruistic motivations of giving
are stronger than warm glow. Regarding the identities, similar to previous studies we expected
religious identities to have a strong impact on motivations of altruistic giving. Particularly, we
hypothesized that warm glow would be stronger toward recipients from the same religious group.
On the contrary, we find warm glow to be decreasing both across age groups and treatments.
On the other hand, pure altruism is significantly greater in the out-group treatment relative to
the Abstract group, for the middle and oldest cohort.
Despite these tendencies on average, the positive and significant (ρ) parameter in Table 4.3
shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the donor’s random deviations from the model.
There is heterogeneity across individuals in their α and β parameters. It is possible to conclude
that the participants have neither pure altruistic or warm glow preferences, and there is a
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tendency to support Andreoni’s impure altruism model. We find evidence of interdependent
preferences in our sample.
Fig. 4.3: Distribution of Individual Estimates
Figure 4.3 presents a distribution of altruism and warm glow parameters at the individual
level. On the extensive margin, we can classify individuals as types; namely warm glow, pure
altruistic, and impure altruistic. We find individuals to be either impure altruistic or warm
glow givers (on average, 45%). The pure altruistic givers across the treatment vary from 10
to 13 percent. We observe a slight increase in pure altruistic givers toward the out-group and
decrease in the number of warm glow givers toward the out-group. For the intensive margin,
we observe the actual amount donated by the respondents. Even though a small proportion of
individuals are pure altruistic givers, the amount of their contribution is the highest ranging
from Rs.30.65 to Rs.28.82 for the in-group and out-group, respectively. Majority of the children
are classified as warm glow givers and their average donations to the recipient is significantly
smaller (ranging from Rs.14 to Rs.16). Back-of-the-envelope calculations show that even though
pure altruistic givers donate large amounts, the total amount donated by all those with higher
warm glow preferences is significantly larger, i.e., 3 times higher.
4.5.1 Other motivations for warm glow giving and overall altruism
Given the high heterogeneity, ρ parameter, in our sample, and the large deviations not only
across but within individuals, we create a new variable that measures the strength of warm
glow giving relative to the total measure of generosity, (α+ β), for each individual. This term
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is based on the assumption that more individuals are impurely altruistic and have a relative
degree of warm glow associated to their charitable decision-making. We create an index of warm
glow similar to that of Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) and it is defined as follows,
γ = β/(α+ β) (4.9)
The index (γ) ranges from zero (pure altruism) to one (warm glow). We use this parameter
γ, i.e., the degree of warm glow preferences, as a dependent variable in the following sections. In
this section, we estimate a simple OLS regression to observe other covariates (controlling for age
and recipient’s identity) that could explain the degree of warm glow giving and total altruism
for the participants in our sample.
We estimate two models with the following dependent variables - degree of warm glow or γ
(Column 1) and the combined motivation for altruistic giving or α+ β (Column 2). Since the
errors of the two dependent variables could be correlated, with estimate a Seemingly unrelated
OLS regression. Based on the results in Table 4.7, we observe that warm glow and overall
altruistic motivations of fathers are significant and positively correlated with prosociality of
their children. Furthemore, the parent’s engagement with recent charitable giving and their
beliefs on the importance of religous equality are both positively correlated with the child’s
donation in the experiment. This can be corroborated in other recent empirical studies that
observe inter-generational preferences to be positively correlated, particularly with older children
(Ben-Ner et al., 2017; Bettinger and Slonim, 2006; Brown et al., 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2008).12.
We find that religiousity, measured as the frequency of visiting a religious place to be positively
correlated with both relative degree of warm glow giving and overall altruistic motives. The
positive association between religious practise and prosociality has been discussed in theoretical
models whereby, religiousity is assumed to increase social contact among people and provide
them with more opportunities to engage in charity (Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008). It also makes
individuals more salient to other’s suffering and increases the emotion ’feeling good about
contributing’ (Andreoni, 2006; Li, 2017). We find this empirically for our sample.
In the post experimental survey, we asked the participants questions about the NGO, their
expectations regarding other’s prosociality and the willingness to follow social norms. We
measured peer expectations using first order beliefs i.e. ’How much do you expect the others in
your class to have given to the NGO?’. In another question, we ask whether the participants
would follow the social norm i.e contribute similar to others in their class and if the NGO favored
their respective ingroups. We find expectations regarding other’s giving is positively correlated
only with the total altruism. This is in line with previous research that shows prosociality to be
positively correlated with peer expectations and social norms (Kosse et al., 2019; Engelmann
et al., 2018; Vesterlund, 2016). The warm glow giving was negatively correlated among those
participants who believed that the NGO favored their ingroup and among those who were willing
to follow the social norm.
12Theories on inter-generational transmission of generosity (altruism) have been proposed by Becker et al. (2016),
i.e., children as an investment, and Wilhelm et al. (2008) emphasize the parents’ objective to make responsible
citizens and generosity part of their identity
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Table 4.7: Other explanations for warm glow and overall altruistic giving
Degree of Warm glow Altruism
(1) (2)
b/se b/se
Warm glow father 0.202***
(0.042)




















NGO favors ingroup -0.194*** 0.038
(1=Yes) (0.037) (0.025)
Follow social norm -0.151*** -0.113***
(1=Yes) (0.038) (0.025)
Father’s years of education 0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003)
Father recent charity 0.026 0.080***
(0.049) (0.029)
Parent’s beliefs on 0.070*** -0.009
Religious Equality (1-Agree) (0.019) (0.013)
Constant -2.109* -0.959
(1.156) (0.763)
R squ. 0.211 0.275
Observations 672 762
Treatment dummies Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes
VIF 1.55 1.57
Notes: Dependent variable is degree of warm glow, total atruism.
Seemingly unrelated regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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4.6 Future research and potential concerns
There are three important aspects with regard to the experiment design that need to be
highlighted and brought in perspective with the results. Our experiment was based on the
research design by Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017). The within subject six decisions to disentangle
altruistic motivations was provided to the participants without priming them about the tax and
third party subsidies. This design varies from the study by Eckel and Grossman (2005) who
implemented a between subject tax and subsidy based decision sets with and without priming
the participants. Their results reveal a 98% crowding out of private contributions when the
participants were aware of a 3$ tax imposed on them. On the other hand, when the tax was not
made salient, the participants increased their contributions (crowding in). Future research can
implement a similar design as our study or Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) but include the priming
treatment by Eckel and Grossman (2005).
Apart from disentangling the motivations of altruistic giving, our study attempted to observe
how pure altruism and warm glow vary when the identity of the recipient is from an out-
group. Despite historically contentious relations between the two selected groups and having
implemented the treatments in either Hindu dominant or Muslim dominant schools, we do not
find a significant difference in warm glow giving between the in and out-group treatment. In
our experiment, the identity treatment was between-subjects wherein participants received a
picture of either a library and school buildings (no identity), photos of potential Hindu recipients
or Muslim recipients. One of the reasons why there is no evidence of in-group bias could be
attributed to the weak identity treatment. However, we argue that this is not the case. In a
post-experiment survey we asked the participants if they thought that the NGO favored children
from their own religious group. We find that 78 percent of the sample in the in-group treatment
recognized that the recipients belonged to their own religion, and this is significantly larger than
the control and out-group treatments (Table 4.2).
Similar to Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017), we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function to estimate
the optimal demand for giving, pure altruism and warm glow parameters. Table 4.3 show the
maximum likelihood estimates for pure altruism and warm glow. One of the concerns regarding
the study is the use of a structural estimation assuming a Cobb-Douglas function. This could
entail two issues; namely difficulty in model convergence and high heterogeneity in parameters
across participants. To facilitate in the convergence of the model, non-linear Tobit estimation
allowed for both upper and lower limit corner solutions. However, it did not include subjects that
sometimes choose lower and other times choose upper limit across the 6 decisions (2 participants).
In addition, 3 participants mirrored the exact same donation as the researcher in each decision
set and 62 participants (7%) gave the same amount across all the decisions. For the last two
cases, the structural estimation assumed these participants to be warm glow givers.
Second, is the high heterogeneity across participants based on the ρ estimate (0.63). The
parameter indicates heterogeneity in individual’s random deviation from the Cobb-Douglas model.
This could be a consequence of misspecifying the model as a Cobb-Douglas function. Furthermore,
a Cobb-Douglas specification assumes constant elasticity of substitution and linearity (for the
parameters). While these assumptions have an advantage of algebraic tractability, they could
result in bias from omitted variables (other factors explaining voluntary giving). We attempt
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to overcome this bias by controlling for other factors that could explain demand for giving
(Table 4.7). However, in future studies, researchers could assume alternative utility functions.
4.7 Conclusion
One of the main contributions of our paper is to observe warm glow and pure altruistic motivations
when we consider voluntary giving, particularly across children of different ages. In addition, we
attempted to explain religious identity-based discrimination using these motivations of giving.
Inorder to obtain our estimates of pure altruism and warm glow, we run a structural estimation
and use non linear Tobit maximum likelihood techniques (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017).
Previous studies that utilized pre-existing identities found strong evidence of in-group bias
not only among adults but also children (Sutter et al., 2019; Ben-Ner et al., 2017; Chai et al.,
2011; Gangadharan et al., 2018; Chakravarty et al., 2016). We go a step further to analyse
whether such an in-group bias exists for different motives of altruistic giving. Our study is
based in the diverse city of Mumbai in India which experienced recurrent communal violence
between two main religious groups- Hindus and Muslims. Apart from communal tensions, there
is evidence of systematic discrimination, segregation, and unequal access to public goods across
these groups. Particularly, Muslims being the minority have faced extensive exclusion. In
this study, we were interested in observing whether this systematic exclusion and conflict has
percolated in the minds of the youth and children, particularly in non-market domains.
Inorder to study this question, we conducted surveys and charity experiments across different
public schools in Mumbai. We particularly found locations within the city that were extensively
segregated and as a result, the schools also had either only Hindu or Muslim children. Our
results reveal a small but significant increase in pure altruistic giving towards recipients of the
outgroup, among older ages (14-17 years). Warm glow remains constant across different identity
treatments and is negatively correlated with age. Apart from age and the recipient’s religious
identity, we find altruistic giving to be positively associated with religiousity. Furthermore, we
observe an intergenerational transmission of altruistic giving between the parents and children.
In terms of economic policy implications, we find that voluntary contributions under external
policies of direct taxes or subsidies, are highly motivated by impure altruistic preferences. This
finding contributes to the previous studies that do not observe a one to one crowding out.
Another policy-relevant aspect of our study is how such heterogeneous altruistic motivations
change when the recipient is from a salient outgroup. Given the widespread rhetoric that
heterogeneous societies negatively impact access to public goods, we do not observe an ingroup
bias in the domain of voluntary or charitable donations. On the other hand, pure altruistic
preferences increase towards recipients from the outgroup (for the older ages) in our sample. We
do not find in-group bias in warm glow motivations of giving.
CHAPTER 4. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND ALTRIUSM 104
4.8 Appendix A
Table 4.8: Frequency Table
Control Hindu Muslim Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Class
4 57 7.5 85 10.6 79 9.7 221 9.3
5 159 20.9 181 22.6 163 19.9 503 21.1
6 69 9.1 23 2.9 65 7.9 157 6.6
7 141 18.5 269 33.6 239 29.2 649 27.3
8 118 15.5 63 7.9 81 9.9 262 11.0
9 177 23.3 113 14.1 154 18.8 444 18.7
10 40 5.3 66 8.3 37 4.5 143 6.0
Total 761 100.0 800 100.0 818 100.0 2,379 100.0
Father Work
Job 315 41.4 298 37.3 375 45.8 988 41.5
Daily wage 174 22.9 211 26.4 178 21.8 563 23.7
Small Business 136 17.9 137 17.1 125 15.3 398 16.7
Big Business 53 7.0 62 7.8 71 8.7 186 7.8
At home 19 2.5 19 2.4 22 2.7 60 2.5
Missing 64 8.4 73 9.1 47 5.7 184 7.7
Total 761 100.0 800 100.0 818 100.0 2,379 100.0
Mother Work
Job 52 6.8 61 7.6 67 8.2 180 7.6
Daily wage 64 8.4 60 7.5 61 7.5 185 7.8
Small Business 23 3.0 39 4.9 33 4.0 95 4.0
Big Business 6 0.8 8 1.0 9 1.1 23 1.0
At home 549 72.1 555 69.4 600 73.3 1,704 71.6
Missing 67 8.8 77 9.6 48 5.9 192 8.1
Total 761 100.0 800 100.0 818 100.0 2,379 100.0
Travel to school
Walk 502 66.0 536 67.0 590 72.1 1,628 68.4
Cycle 17 2.2 23 2.9 12 1.5 52 2.2
Auto 15 2.0 17 2.1 15 1.8 47 2.0
School Bus 70 9.2 60 7.5 61 7.5 191 8.0
Public Bus 36 4.7 35 4.4 39 4.8 110 4.6
Van 33 4.3 39 4.9 30 3.7 102 4.3
Train 5 0.7 9 1.1 7 0.9 21 0.9
Taxi 2 0.3 1 0.1 2 0.2 5 0.2
Motor Bike 21 2.8 22 2.8 16 2.0 59 2.5
Private bus 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.0
Car 2 0.3 1 0.1 3 0.4 6 0.3
Missing 58 7.6 57 7.1 42 5.1 157 6.6
Total 761 100.0 800 100.0 818 100.0 2,379 100.0
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Table 4.9: Balance Table - Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









12875.629 13763.446 14348.840 0.119 0.018 0.371
Years
Education
8.674 8.780 8.845 0.634 0.445 0.764
Religiousity 4.140 4.098 4.175 0.444 0.533 0.134
Experience
discrimin
0.203 0.217 0.220 0.666 0.584 0.917
Recent charity 0.881 0.910 0.886 0.285 0.842 0.325
Discuss charity 0.161 0.224 0.197 0.039 0.222 0.350
Risk seeking 0.727 0.695 0.681 0.223 0.091 0.614
Impatient 0.792 0.794 0.763 0.941 0.235 0.188
All equal
education
0.269 0.281 0.325 0.653 0.041 0.093
All equal work 0.349 0.331 0.382 0.520 0.251 0.062
Respect all 0.403 0.348 0.447 0.059 0.140 0.000
Minority
discrimin work
0.575 0.607 0.627 0.265 0.078 0.489
Minority
discrimin edu




6697.312 7819.643 8460.507 0.223 0.104 0.539
Years
Education
7.375 7.994 7.606 0.012 0.352 0.102
Religiousity 4.136 4.122 4.071 0.789 0.224 0.299
Experience
discrimin
0.269 0.215 0.208 0.096 0.061 0.807
Recent charity 0.857 0.883 0.886 0.308 0.311 0.900
Discuss charity 0.217 0.198 0.200 0.558 0.613 0.931
Risk seeking 0.767 0.713 0.691 0.041 0.005 0.396
Impatient 0.816 0.807 0.768 0.715 0.050 0.092
All equal
education
0.296 0.285 0.350 0.677 0.056 0.014
All equal work 0.376 0.339 0.395 0.187 0.522 0.040
Respect all 0.397 0.368 0.452 0.323 0.062 0.003
Minority
discrimin edu
0.593 0.608 0.650 0.604 0.049 0.126
Minority
discrimin work
0.496 0.557 0.585 0.042 0.003 0.319
N 547 647 626
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Fig. 4.4: Distribution under tax and subsidy
Fig. 4.5: Distribution under tax and subsidy- Parents
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Table 4.10: Motivations of altruism - by Age
All 7-10ys 11-13yrs 14-17yrs Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Pure altruism(α)
Constant 0.042 0.035 -0.006 0.118** 0.119***
(0.036) (0.070) (0.060) (0.057) (0.022)
Warm glow(β)
Constant 0.337*** 0.362*** 0.372*** 0.264*** 0.181***
(0.026) (0.051) (0.044) (0.040) (0.013)
sigma_m
Constant 12.227*** 11.776*** 12.670*** 11.859*** 28.819***
(0.151) (0.273) (0.235) (0.282) (0.366)
Obs 544 155 242 147 517
Hypothesis testing (2) vs (3) (2) vs (4) (3) vs (4)
H0: α 0.138 0.213 0.025**
H0: β 0.783 0.001*** 0.000***
Notes: Dependent variable amount of giving.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01





Constant 0.042 0.093*** 0.129***
(0.036) (0.028) (0.030)
Warm glow (β)
Constant 0.337*** 0.286*** 0.287***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.021)
sigma_m
Constant 12.227*** 11.748*** 11.812***
(0.151) (0.133) (0.136)
Obs 544 645 624
Hypothesis testing (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (2) vs (3)
H0: Alpha 0.052 0.000 0.123
H0: Beta 0.000 0.033 0.953
Notes: Dependent variable amount of giving.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 4.12: Motivations of altruism - by Age and Identity
All 7-10yrs 11-13yrs 14-17yrs Hypothesis test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
b/se b/se b/se b/se (2) vs (3) (2) vs (4) (3) vs (4)
Pure altruism (α)
Ingroup 0.050 0.010 0.097 0.033 0.017 0.805 0.384
(0.046) (0.090) (0.071) (0.078)
Outgroup 0.087* 0.005 0.143** 0.081 0.053 0.217 0.477
(0.046) (0.095) (0.072) (0.075)
Constant 0.042 0.035 -0.006 0.118** 0.138 0.213 0.025
(0.035) (0.069) (0.058) (0.055)
Warm glow (β)
Ingroup -0.051 -0.033 -0.087* -0.023 0.266 0.893 0.011
(0.032) (0.066) (0.051) (0.053)
Outgroup -0.050 0.002 -0.087* -0.047 0.211 0.227 0.343
(0.033) (0.070) (0.052) (0.051)
Constant 0.337*** 0.362*** 0.372*** 0.264*** 0.78 0.001 0.000
(0.025) (0.050) (0.042) (0.038)
sigma_m
Constant 11.915*** 11.657*** 12.233*** 11.467***
(0.081) (0.149) (0.119) (0.161)
Obs 1813 544 645 624
Notes: Dependent variable amount of giving.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Fig. 4.6: Total effect of Warm glow and Pure altruism
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Fig. 4.7: Flyer-Hindu Identity treatment (English version)
(a) Pages 1 and 4
 
 
 This NGO provides poor children 
support for their education.  
 They provide the children with 
books, pens, pencils and other items 
that can help them to study. 
 The children come from poor 
families. Many of them do not even 
have homes.  
 The NGO is based in Delhi, but works 










(b) Pages2 and 3
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Fig. 4.8: Flyers-Abstract treatment
Fig. 4.9: Flyers-Identity treatment (Muslim children)
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4.9 Appendix B - Questionnaires
I. Education survey
The education survey is the same as the survey 2.8 in Chapter 1.
II. Exit survey
The enumerators randomnly selected 50% of the students in the class and asked them questions
regarding the pictures and the NGO mentioned in the flyer. In addition, they were also asked






53. Have you heard of this NGO (Show picture) before?
2 Yes
2 No
Below are some statements. Please answer by selecting one of the following options:
54. Giving some of your earned gift to this NGO will benefit the entire society.
2 Yes 2 No
55. After looking at these pictures, do you think the NGO will help only those
children from your own religion?
2 Yes 2 No
56. You would give your gift to the children of this NGO because: You can answer
more than one option
2 They were children from your religion
2 They were poorer that you
2 They were poor and from your religion
2 They were poor but not from your religion
57. If other children increased their giving to the poor children, what will you
do?
2 Follow what the other children did
2 I will give more
2 I will give less
2 I will give the same as before
2 I do not know
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58. If we reduce some money from your gift and give it directly to the children,
what will you do?
2 I will give more
2 I will give less
2 I will give the same as before
2 I do not know
59. If other children from your own religion increased their giving to the poor
children, what will you do?
2 I will give more
2 I will give less
2 I will give the same as before
2 I do not know
60. Expectation: How much do you think the other children in your class gave
to the children of this NGO? State a number.
Minimum:




2 None [End the questionnaire]
2 Others:
62. How often do you visit this religious place
2 Everyday
2 Once a week
2 Few times in one month
2 Once in 6 months
2 Once a year
2 Never
III. Parents survey
Both mothers and fathers of the respondents were asked a few questions over a telephonic
conversation. At the end of the survey, they played a dictator game and received some money in
the form of telephone recharge. Both the survey questions and the dictator game is explained
below.
To the parents:I am a researcher conducting research on schooling in Mumbai. We had
recently visited your child [name of child] in their school. We would also like to ask you few
questions. The questions relate to your household situation and your opinions regarding the
society. We would be grateful if can respond to these questions. I would like to tell you that this
information will be treated with complete confidentiality and never disclose your views.
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63. Are you willing to answer the questions that I will be asking you? You can
withdraw your consent incase you do not wish to answer any of the questions
at anytime of this survey.
2 Yes [Continue to next question]
2 No [End survey]
Opportunities 1
64. All religious groups and caste groups should have equal chances to get a good
education in this country.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
65. Women should have the same rights as men in every way.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
66. All religious and caste groups should have equal chances to get good Jobs in
this country.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
67. Schools should teach students to respect members of all religious groups.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
68. When Jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
Opportunities 2
69. Children who are members of certain minority religious and caste groups have
fewer chances than other children to get a good education in this country.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
70. Girls have fewer chances than boys to get a good education in this country.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
71. Adults who are members of certain minority religious and caste groups have
fewer chances than others to get better jobs in this country.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
72. Women have fewer chances than men to get Jobs in this country.
2 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 2 Agree 2 Strongly agree
73. Have you faced discrimination from people of other religions?
2 Yes
2 No
74. In the last 6 months, have you donated anything for charity or to poor people?
2 Yes
2 No [Skip to 26]
75. Do your children know about this?
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2 Yes
2 No





78. What is the name of your child?:
79. What is your relationship with the child?
2 Mother 2 Father 2 Guardian
80. What is your total monthly income? (in Rs.):
81. We would like to know something about the organisations in which you
participate. Here is a list of several organisations. Please indicate if you
are a member or not, if you are an active or non active member (Mark only
one answer per line)
I am not a
member
I am an active
member









Development of Social preferences in
informal risk sharing: A field
experiment with Colombian children
CHAPTER 5. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES 118
In the absence of alternative mechanisms for formal protection such as insurances and social
security, informal networks of risk-sharing, also referred to as solidarity networks, play an
important role protecting households against idiosyncratic risks (Dercon, 2002). Gift-giving,
interest free credit, shared meals, communal access to land, and work-sharing arrangements have
been extensively documented in developing countries (Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994; Fafchamps
and Lund, 2003; de Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010; Angelucci
et al., 2015; Kinnan and Townsend, 2012). Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First,
we disentangle the role of different motivations for risk-sharing. Second, we investigate the
development of risk sharing norms from childhood to adolescence.
The theoretical literature outlines various motivations that enable risk-sharing when there is
limited commitment. In this paper, we consider five main motivations. First, following Becker
(1981) we study the role of altruism. The theoretical models that formalized this idea show that
while imperfect commitment constraints informal transfers in risk sharing networks, altruism
counterbalances it, thereby increasing the utility of income pooling (Cox et al., 1998; Foster and
Rosenzweig, 2001; Lin et al., 2014, 2019). The second norm that we consider is image concerns.
Andreoni (1989) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) consider that giving can elicit social esteem.
Hence, individuals are expected to give more to the social network when their actions are public.
An alternative motivation that could guide participation in risk sharing networks is reputational
concerns. The theoretical models of Ligon et al. (2002) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2001),
consider that past history matters so individuals that have made net transfers in previous rounds
are more likely to receive subsequent transfers than households that have been the net recipients
of transfers. Following, this prediction, individuals should transfer larger amounts when this
gives them the possibility to receive larger transfers. Associated with this motive, the fourth
aspect that we consider is the norm of reciprocity. Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion
(1993) propose that expected future reciprocity, or quid pro quo norms, in which ‘I will help
you today if you help me tomorrow’, explain the subsistence of informal risk sharing. Last, we
consider norms of deservingness. Individuals who are more prosperous could attract more giving
(Fong, 2007; Cardenas et al., 2008; Candelo et al., 2019), but being more prosperous could also
lead to more demands from the social network (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016).
The second aspect that we investigate is how motivations for risk sharing develop with aging.
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development(Piaget, 1971) proposes that children analyze problems
differently than adults and that they change the way they analyze problems as they get older.
Kolberg’s theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1964) builds on this idea and proposes that
there is a close relation between cognitive and moral development. At an early age, children
are motivated by hedonistic motives. At this stage children act in an individualistic way and
try to seek pleasure and minimize punishment. At this stage they are more individualistic. At
early adolescence a child’s acts are guided by social norms. Children care about what others
would think and therefore are guided by maintaining a good image. At this stage children
recognize that there is something to gain by behaving in a prosocial way and are guided by
strategic motives. As adolescences and young adults internalize the social norms they act to
maintain social order. At the highest stage of moral development individuals can act according
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to internalized principles.
In order to better understand the motivations for risk sharing and how they develop with
age, we designed an economic experiment and implemented it with a population group that
is exposed to substantial amount of risk and for whom risk sharing is common. The context
of our analysis is Bogota, Colombia, where the population is subject to substantial degree of
idiosyncratic risks, such as unemployment and diseases. Among our sample, almost 40 percent
of the participants reported that their household had faced a difficult economic situation in
the previous month. Risk sharing is common and about one third of the sample reported that
their families received or offered help to others in need. To trace the development of norms of
altruisms, we built a panel data set in which school-age children between 7 and 16 years are
followed over three consecutive years. Hence, we can study the development of motivations for
risk sharing at the critical age when social preferences are nurtured.
Our empirical strategy is based on a lab-in-the-field experiment that uses a modified version of
the Selten and Ockenfels (1998) solidarity game. This experiment replicates the main components
of informal risk-sharing agreements. In this three-person game, participants engage in a real
effort task and receive piece-rate payment. Simulating the effect of negative income shocks,
one randomly selected participant in the group loses all their earnings. Before knowing who is
affected, participants simultaneously and privately decide how much of their earnings they want
to transfer to the affected participant. Hence, solidarity has the character of a public good.
To disentangle different motivations for giving, we use a within-between experimental design
in which each of the participants play the solidarity game repeatedly over four rounds without
receiving feedback. The within treatment conditions vary the privacy of the information on
decision makers behavior (private or public), and the extent to which participants can react to
this information (not at all or possible). The between treatment conditions vary the type of
information that is public knowledge (donations, earnings or both).
We find that solidarity is a common behavior among children and, on average, 79 percent
decided to send a transfer. Yet, transfers were relatively low and participants only sent on
average 17 percent of their endowment. The probability of sending a transfer increased between
the age of seven and 13 and remained rather stable for older children. We find that the main
motivation for risk sharing is altruism. Social image concerns or strategic motives do not appear
to motivate additional transfers or likelihood to send a transfer. Lastly, we find that there
is positive reciprocity in older cohorts but not for the youngest children. Reciprocity norms
are rather weak as there is a low correlation between the value sent and the value transferred.
Participants in our experiment did not display norms of deservingness and the amount given
did not increase proportionally with the amount lost. The motivations for solidarity are rather
stable over aging. Yet, we find that between the age of 7 and 11 there is an increase in altruism.
Norms of reciprocity developed between the age of 13 and 17.
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The closest to our paper are Ligon and Schechter (2012) and Beer and Berg (2012). Similar
to them, we consider the relative importance of different social preferences on solidarity giving.
Yet, in this paper we analyze different set of motivations for giving. In our design we consider
explicitly the difference between image concerns and strategic motives for giving. In addition,
we can explicitly distinguish whether giving is motivated by reputation or reciprocity motives.
In our experimental design, participants receive information on the behavior of others and can
react to this information by conditioning the value transferred.
There is an increase interest in investigating the social preferences in children in both psychology
(Eisenberg et al., 1991; 2005) and economics (Harbaugh et al., 2001, 2003; for a recent review
of the experimental literature see Sutter et al. (2019)). This is the first paper that focuses on
risk sharing norms among children using a solidarity game. The modified three-player solidarity
game Selten and Ockenfels (1998) that we use in our analysis, has the advantage over dictator
games that the context of the decision is much clearer for participants. In addition, as different
norms are evaluated for each individual, we can asses whether the development of one norm
complements or substitutes the other norms.
Previous studies considered the stability of social preferences with an adult population (e.g.,
(Chuang and Schechter, 2015; de Oliveira et al., 2012; Carlsson et al., 2014). Yet, relatively few
papers have used panel data to study the development of social preferences of young to teenage
children (Deckers et al., 2015; Eisenberg et al., 1991, 2005; Van der Graaff et al., 2018; Malti
et al., 2012). We extend this line of analysis considering a longer age range (7- to 17-year-olds)
to capture the critical age at which social preferences change.
This paper is divided into six sections. In Section 5.1, we present a review of the related
experimental the literature. Section 5.2 presents the experimental design and procedures. In
sections 5.3, we present the data and results. In Section 5.4, we discuss our results and present
our conclusions.
5.1 Related experimental literature
Following Harbaugh and Krause (2000), a relatively large number papers have investigated
the development social preferences in children (For a recent review of experimental literature
see Sutter et al. (2019)). The evidence indicates that older participants transfer a larger
proportion of the income in dictator games and in public good games (Bettinger and Slonim
(2006); Gummerum et al. (2010); Brocas et al. (2017); Chen et al. (2016b); Sutter et al. (2018);
Angerer et al. (2015b)). Similarly, there is a positive association between children’s age and
egalitarian preferences (Fehr et al. (2008); Almås et al. (2010); Bauer et al. (2014); Martinsson
et al. (2011)) and lying aversion (Maggian and Villeval (2016)). We extend this line of research
by implementing a modified three player solidarity game (Selten and Ockenfels (1998)) and by
following the same set of individuals over three consecutive years.
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In Selten and Ockenfels (1998) three-player solidarity game, participants decide on the amount
that they would like to transfer in case they win and one or two of the other players lose. Our
paper is closely related to Bolle et al. (2012) and Beer and Berg (2012) who modify the solidarity
game to identify different motivations for risk sharing. Bolle et al. (2012) allow participants
to condition their donation on the value donated by the other benefactors. As the conditional
donations are constant, decreasing or increasing they can identify the role of warm-glow, pure
altruism or guilt. They found that most of the participants could be classified as altruistic
followed by guilt. Beer and Berg (2012) use a four-person solidarity game and show that solidarity
is motivated by direct reciprocity (give more to those that gave them more) rather than indirect
reciprocity (give to participants who have donated more).
Leider et al. (2009) and Ligon and Schechter (2012) used dictator games to investigate different
motivations for giving. Subjects make multiple transfer decisions that vary i) the anonymity of
the recipient, and ii) the social distance of the recipient. Leider et al. (2009) find that transfers
are 52 percent larger to close friends compared with strangers. When decisions are public,
participants increase transfers toward friends relative to strangers, suggesting that norms of
reciprocity favor pro-social behavior. Ligon and Schechter (2012) uses four dictator games to
elicit altruism toward an anonymous person, altruism toward friends, generalized reciprocity,
enforced reciprocity (social sanctions). They find that the most important motive for giving to an
anonymous person is altruism. In this paper, we aim at disentangling the role of altruism, image
concerns and strategic behavior as intrinsic motivations for giving. In addition, we consider how
perceived deservingness and reciprocity of the beneficiary affects solidarity.
Ours is one of the few papers that build a panel data set to study the development of norms of
cooperation in children. Deckers et al. (2015) show that there is a high stability in giving for 7-
to 10-year-old children. Eisenberg et al. (1991, 2005) observed an increase in prosociality among
children over a 11-year time frame. They ascribed that moral reasoning for empathy-related
responses are a key predictor of increasing prosociality with age. A recent six-wave longitudinal
study by Van der Graaff et al. (2018) for children aged 13 to 18 also paid tribute to higher moral
reasoning and perspective, taking increasing prosociality as the main drivers. Carlo et. al (2007,
2010) observed 700 children in a middle income neighborhood in Spain and Eastern United
States over a period of three years and found the initial presence of prosociality both in terms
of cognitive reasoning and parental influence to have a strong positive impact on adolescents’
prosociality in the future. Their study supports the internalization of motives and cognitive
development as key roles in the development of social norms in children (Fabes and Eisenberg,
1998). However, similar to the cross-sectional studies, the few longitudinal studies have a short
age span, mostly specific to mid and late adolescence.
Other experiments have examined the efficiency of risk sharing. For example, Barr and Genicot
(2008) find that under the exogenous commitment contract, participants take more risk and
receive higher payments than in the condition with limited commitment. Public information
on the defection of risk pooling decrease risk-pooling compared with the condition of secret
information. This suggests that there are either costly enforcement mechanisms in place or
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that individuals avoid temptations to default the risk-sharing network and experience public
shame thereafter. Barr et al. (2012) findings support this idea as public information on defection
decreases risk sharing with members of the same cooperative group. Charness and Genicot (2009)
find that transfers increase with risk aversion and continuation probability. A recent paper, Jain
(2015) show the proportion of people who contribute to the mutual insurance increases with
monitoring.
Following Selten and Ockenfels (1998)’s seminal paper, various studies have investigated how
self-inflicted neediness affects solidarity. For example, Costard (2011) extended the solidarity
game, allowing participants to select between two lotteries with the same expected payment but
a different probability of losing. They find that risk-takers receive fewer transfers than those
who select the safer option. Similar results are reported by Bolle and Costard (2015), Trhal
and Radermacher (2009), Cettolin and Tausch (2015), Lenel (2017) and Attanasio and Pavoni
(2011). On the other hand, de Oliveira et al. (2014) show that participants who prefer not to
insure, increasing their neediness, receive the same conditional gifts as those insure. In our
paper, shocks are exogenously determined and bad luck cannot be attributed to participants
therefore we do not assess the role of self-inflicted neediness. Instead, close to Eberlein (2008),
we consider how performance in a real effort task affects solidarity. Our analysis focuses on the
perceived deservingness of the beneficiary.
5.2 Experimental Design and procedures
5.2.1 Experimental Design
To simulate an informal risk-sharing network with limited commitment, we implemented a
modified version of the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). Participants were
randomly and anonymously matched in groups of three members. To disentangle the solidarity
motives in risk-sharing groups, we used a repeated game over four rounds. Yet, to replicate
decisions under repeated interaction over an infinite number of periods, the number of rounds was
not announced to participants as in Charness and Genicot (2009). Similar to Schildberg-Hörisch
(2010) individuals made decision under the veil of ignorance, hence they did not receive feedback
on income shocks or solidarity decisions between rounds. This allows to avoid income effects.
Following Ligon and Schechter (2012), and with the objective of making transfer decision more
consequential, we randomly selected only one of the four rounds for payment at the end of the
session.
Each round of the game has a common structure of two stages. In the first stage, participants
perform a real effort task and received a payment based on individual performance. The task is
an adaptation of the experiment by Gill and Prowse (2012) (see a test of this method in Gill
and Prowse (2013)). On the screen of the tablets, 30 slider bars were displayed, and participants
were asked to to position as many slider bars as possible exactly in the middle of a bar within
120 seconds. They received information on their individual performance as well as the time
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left for the task. Participants received 500COP (0.16USD)1 for each slider bar that they could
move at exactly 50.The maximum amount that participants could earned was therefore slightly
larger than the 10,000COP (3.27USD) that they reported to receive as weekly pocket money.
Compared with a daily minimum wage of 22,981 COP (7.52USD) in Colombia, this represented
a relatively high value (Source: https://www.salariominimocolombia.net/en/). The aim of this
first stage of the game was to entitle individuals to these earnings and avoid ‘house money’ effects
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Cherry et al., 2002, 2005). Each participant received payments from
the research assistants using play money. Children received a combination of bills and coins,
such that they could transfer any value multiple of 500COP. We use tangible endowments to
trigger a ‘cash-in-hand’ situation (Reinstein and Riener, 2012; Brandts and Charness, 2000).
In the second stage of the game, one member of the group was randomly selected and lost
all her endowment. The other participants decided how much of their endowment they wanted
to transfer. We used the strategy method and allowed all participants to behave as donors
and only at the end of the experiment was it revealed who had lost their endowment, and
the decisions of the other participants were implemented. Participants had two envelopes per
round, in one envelope they had to insert the amount of bills and coins that they wanted to
transfer in that round, and in the other they put in the amount that they wanted to keep for
themselves. Finally, they had to register their decisions on the tablets. We verify that the values
registered on the tablets were consistent with those from the envelopes. We did not find any
statistically significant difference between the two values. Thus, payments were calculated based
exclusively on the information collected on the tablets. To facilitate mental calculations, each
transfer was restricted to a multiple of 500 COP. Furthermore, instructions were explained using
neutral phrasing in order to avoid framing effects. Instead of ‘donation’ to refer to the amount
transferred, we use the word ‘pass,’ which does not imply charitable giving.
Treatments
To dissentangle the different motivations for giving and how they change with aging we used a
between-within subject design. We randomly allocated participants to one of four treatments.
Table 5.1 summarizes the structure of the experimental design. In the control treatment (T0),
information regarding participation in the game remained anonymous in all four rounds. This
treatment allows to control for trend in earnings and transfers over the different rounds. The
other three treatment groups, are identical to the control treatment in the first round. However,
at the beginning of the second round, before starting the real effort task, it was announced that
information on behavior in the round would be public knowledge. The treatments varied the
type of information that would be public at the end of the game: Transfers (T1), Earnings (T2)
or Both (T3).
In the third round, it was announced that participants would not only know the behavior
of the others in the game, but could in addition condition their transfer decisions based on
the behavior of others. They made two types of transfer decisions: an unconditional transfer
1Average exchange rate in 2016 was 3054.12COP per 1USD (Source: The World Bank).
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decision that was independent of others’ behavior and a conditional transfer that could vary
according to the transfers (T1), earnings (T2) or transfers and earnings (T3) of others. Both
decisions were payment-relevant. If that round was selected for payments, the unconditional
donation determined the payoff for one of the donors and the conditional decision for the other.
It was randomly decided at the end of the payoff who received which type of payment. In order
to capture any possible end game effects, the fourth round was identical to the third round.
Table 5.1: Informational conditions for experimental treatments
Treatments Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
T0 Anonymous Anonymous Anonymous Anonymous
Control
T1 Anonymous Info. transfers Unconditional / Unconditional /
Transfers Cond. on transfers Cond.
T2 Anonymous Info. Earnings Unconditional / Unconditional /
Earnings Cond. on Earnings Cond. on Earnings
T3 Anonymous Info. transfers Unconditional / Unconditional /
Transfers/Earnings and earnings Cond. on both Cond. on both
5.2.2 Hypothesis
The experimental design allows us to disentangle five motivations that promote informal risk
sharing where there is limited commitment. Furthermore, the real effort task allows us to observe
how earnings change in the presence of informal solidarity networks for risk sharing. Below we
describe the main hypothesis tested in our experiment. First we explain how the experimental
design can allow to identify different motivations for risk sharing. Then we explain how those
preferences change with aging.
Motivations for risk sharing
When participant’s identity is anonymous and there are no possibilities to enforce risk sharing,
transfers can be associated with a norm of altruism. Therefore behavior in the first round of
the game can be associated with altruistic preferences. Following the theoretical models that
propose altruism enables risk sharing (Cox et al., 1998; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Lin et al.,
2014), we expect there would be positive transfers in the first round of the game. In one shot
dictator games, when participant’s identity is anonymous, it has been observed that individuals
transfer a large part of their endowment to the beneficiary (Castillo and Carter, 2011; Camerer,
2003a; Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Cox and Fafchamps, 2007). We expect that in the treatments
there would be positive transfers in the fourth round when there are no possibilities of further
interaction.
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Hypothesis 1: Participants send positive transfers when risk sharing is anonymous.
Another motive considered for participating in solidarity giving is reputation or social image
concerns (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Barr et al., 2012). Giving can be motivated not only by
a strategic motive but is also associated with self-esteem. The possibility that transfers could
become public is expected to motivate individuals on building a reputation of a ’good’ contributor.
Thus, strengthening the risk sharing networks (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Engelmann and
Fischbacher, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). We identify the
impact of social image concerns by observing whether transfers increase when giving is public
knowledge. We expect that in (T1:Transfers) and (T3:Both) transfers will increase in round two
relative to transfer in rounds one.
Hypothesis 2: Participants care about their image and increase transfers when giving is
public knowledge.
Ligon et al. (2002) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2001)’s theoretical models suggests that
reputational concerns can motivate risk sharing. In their models, the likelihood to receive a
transfer increases with the net transfers sent in previous rounds. This opens the opportunity for
strategic behavior. Individuals can increase transfers with the objective of receiving transfers
in the future. In round three, we give participants the opportunity to reciprocate generous
behavior. Consistent with evidence on reciprocal behavior, we expect that participants will
send more transfers to participants who have been more generous. As participants anticipate
this behavior, they can act strategically and send more transfers when reciprocity is possible
compared to cases when it is not. In our experiment this would be in round three compared
with rounds one and two for treatments T1-Transfers and T3-Both.
Hypothesis 3: Participants reciprocate giving behavior. As participants anticipate reciprocity
motives in giving, they act strategically and increase transfers when there are opportunities to
act strategically.
A burgeoning literature shows that presence of public insurances and redistribution could
have a detrimental effect on effort supply and productivity (Azam and Gubert, 2006; Alger
et al., 2018; Alger and Weibull, 2010). Further highlighting the ’dark side’ of social capital,
the presence of kin networks or relatives shows lower self protection (Di Falco and Bulte, 2012)
and participating in informal risk sharing groups is seen to act as a barrier to entrepreneurial
activities and profits (Grimm et al., 2011). There are studies that also show individuals willing
to hide their income at a cost, so as to avoid participating in informal risk sharing (Beekman
et al., 2015; Alger and Weibull, 2010; Di Falco and Bulte, 2012). When there is public knowledge
on earnings, we expect that individuals might prefer to be perceived as poor so as to avoid
making large transfers (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Alger et al., 2018).
Hypothesis 4: Demands of social network have a detrimental effect on productivity when
earnings are public knowledge.
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Empirical evidence, on the other hand, shows that the perception of deservingness of the
beneficiary is an important factor affecting giving behavior (Fong, 2007; Cardenas et al., 2008;
Candelo et al., 2019). It is observed that solidarity is partially crowded out when the neediness
is self-inflicted (Trhal and Radermacher, 2009; Lenel, 2017). High effort levels could portray
the image of a ’hard worker’ motivating high transfers in case of a negative income shock. We
expect that transfers would be positively correlated with deservingness measured as effort levels
(Jain, 2015; Chavanne et al., 2014; Eberlein, 2008). In case that norms of deservingness are
common, we expect that individuals will attempt to act strategically keeping high levels of
productivity to elicit more transfers. Therefore, compared with round 2, we expect that in round
3 participants will maintain higher levels of effort in T2-Earnings and T3-Both. In other words,
norms of deservingness are expected to mitigate the detrimental effect of re-distributional norms
on productivity. We expect that:
Hypothesis 5: Transfers are larger to individuals that are perceived to be more industrious
and who lost higher income compared to individuals that are less industrious. Individuals
anticipate this behavior and increase effort to attract more generosity.
Development of prosocial giving
To understand how the motivations for risk sharing develops with age, we identify two salient
pillars within the development psychology literature: social-cognitive theories and social affective
theories.
Based on the seminal work by Piaget (1971)2 and Kohlberg (1964)3, social cognitive theories
explain the development of prosocial norms within children as a combined impact of logical
or operational thought and moral reasoning (Crone and Dahl, 2012). Basic social detection
and perspective taking4 are expected to start developing between the age of 7 and 12 years.
Furthermore, this age is also associated with a shift from self-oriented behavior to other oriented
behavior (Crone and Dahl, 2012; Eisenberg et al., 2005). Specific skills such as mentalizing –
defined as the ability to infer other’s mental states, expectations or beliefs regarding other’s
action develop after 12 years (Crone and Dahl, 2012; House et al., 2013; Leimgruber, 2018).
Consistent with those theories, we expect:
Hypothesis 6: Reciprocity and deservingness increases with age.
Within the purview of social-cognitive development, self-presentation theory Bond (1982)
and audience effect Triplett (1898) suggest that individuals maintain an image of themselves
and consider how their actions would be evaluated by others in case it became public. Similar
to these image theories is the reputation management theory Tennie et al. (2010), wherein
individuals work to ensure a good reputation of themselves subject to changing context and
social norms. All of these theories are embedded within the social-cognitive umbrella. Unlike
2Basic logical operations
3Moral Judgement theory
4the ability to consider other people’s feelings, thoughts and action
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the perspective taking and mentalizing theories, the audience effect is already expected to be
salient in early childhood from the age of 5 years (Banerjee et al., 2012; Engelmann et al., 2013;
Hamilton and Lind, 2016).
Hypothesis 7: Social image and reputation building for younger cohorts is greater than
transfer based on strategic giving.
The second pillar is social-affective development. It includes empathy or ‘einfühlung’, a term
derived by German Philosophers Vischer and Lipps. An important distinction from cognitive
theories, empathy is the ability to share an affective state of another person, spontaneously e.g.
your sorrow can become my sorrow (Stietz et al., 2019). While Kolhberg and Piaget’s theories
suggested that affective development was an extension of the cognitive process, recent evidence
reveals that the morality based decisions and empathy are a spontaneous response to other
people’s feelings, actions or expectations (Francia, 2018; Decety and Michalska, 2010). There is
a distinction between moral based judgments motivated by cognitive processes and empathy
driven decisions.
Hypothesis 8: Altruism, as an affective process develops with age.
5.2.3 Experimental Procedures
The experimental sessions took place between August and November 2016, 2017, and 2018.
We conducted the sessions in two private and two public low-income schools located in Bogota,
Colombia. The experimental game and questionnaires were programmed using the open-source
software oTree and implemented with tablets (Chen et al., 2016a). The children in selected
schools can study from the first grade of elementary school until the 11th grade of high school
within the same facilities. This allowed us to follow children from primary to secondary school.
All sessions were implemented in the morning during regular school hours, and each session
lasted approximately one and a half hours. On average, there were three classrooms per grade
in each school with 20 to 30 students in each group.
In 2016, around 1,660 children from four schools participated. Next year, we could follow
1304 children from the initial sample. In addition, we included one additional school with 391
students. In 2018, we could follow 550 children from the initial panel and 131 of the additional
school. Due to a high children mobility between public schools and dropouts, the attrition rate
in our sample is around 30 percent from one year to the next. Figure 5.1 presents the structure
of the data set over the panel.
In 2016 the treatment assignment was done randomly at the classroom level, so that we
could implement at least three treatments in the same grade per each school. In order to lessen
spillovers between children of the same grade, we scheduled three sessions the same day to collect
the information of all groups per grade. in 2017 and 2018 we could repeat the sessions with most
of the students that participated in 2016, yet, we could not implement the same treatments for
all of them because children were distributed in different classes each year. Prior to starting the
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sessions, we verified the number of children that participated in each treatment the previous
year and the treatment with the highest number of children was implemented.5
Teachers were informed of the schedule of activities, so that they could adjust their regular
teaching hours. Furthermore, parents were sent a letter from us with information on the main
objective of our study and children’s payments. They were also informed that participation was
voluntary and that they could refuse their child’s participation.6
In all sessions, one research assistant read the standardized instructions out loud, so that
participants from different sessions received the same information (see Section 5.6.1 for experimental
instructions). Children knew that their participation was voluntary and they could abandon the
session at any moment. We also informed them that they were not allowed to interact with their
classmates during the session and all the information collected would be managed and analyzed
anonymously. At the end of the game, participants were asked to answer a post-experimental
questionnaire that included basic socio-demographic data, and social capital questions (see the
complete questionnaire in Section 5.6.2).At the end of the session, participants received a voucher
equivalent to a participation fee of 1,500COP (0.51$) and the payments that they received from
the game. They could redeem this voucher at the school store for food and refreshments.
Fig. 5.1: Sample size per year
5.3 Results
In this section, we present our main results from the economic experiments. First, we describe the
characteristics of our sample and children’s prosocial behavior. Next, we explain the empirical
strategy used in the study to disentangle different motivations for solidarity giving. The third
section of the results is divided into three parts: First, provides estimates on the various
motivations of solidarity transfers for the pooled sample. Second, we discuss an important
negative aspect or the ’dark side’ of social capital and solidarity transfers. Finally, using the
advantage of the panel data, we show how each of the motivations develop for children over time.
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
This longitudinal study includes data collected in a baseline and two follow-up years. Table 5.2
summarizes the socio-demographic information of our sample in each wave. In the baseline, girls
5The attrition from 2016 to 2017 was around 30%. This is explained by dropout rates and the high mobility of
students between schools, especially in public schools.
6We received, in total, four denials from parents.
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represent 43 percent of participants. On average, children are 13 years old, have three friends in
the classroom, 25 friends in total, have visited around two schools, and had been in the same
school for five and a half years. An average household has six members, with three children. In
one third of households, parents live together and almost all parents work (96 percent of fathers,
and 81 percent of mothers). More than one third of the households (38 percent) have faced a
difficult economic situation in the last month, and 65 percent of the time receive help from other
families, and only 10 percent of the time receive help from the state.
In the post-experimental questionnaire, children answered some questions about their social
capital. Helping behavior is common for half of them, either helping family members, other
families or the community. At schools, 63 percent of them had participated in socio-cultural
activities. Around 72 percent of children preferred to cooperate than compete. Moreover, 65
percent of them trusted their friends and only 28 percent had trust in other people. In the
baseline, 2016, we found that our sample is balanced across treatments across most of the
socio-demographic characteristics, except for age, where the control group is the youngest group,
and father’s employment status (see Table 5.7 in the Appendix).
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics
2016 2017 2018
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Panel A: Children characteristics
Age 12.94 2.71 13.92 2.71 14.28 2.41
Female 0.43 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50
Number of attended schools 2.02 2.89 1.99 1.44 2.15 1.49
Years in the current school 5.48 3.34 6.09 3.47 5.95 3.47
Years with the same group 3.63 3.04 3.14 2.63 3.38 2.83
Friends in the classroom 2.81 0.84 2.90 0.83 2.82 0.88
Total friends in general 24.88 37.43 22.36 34.14 20.99 35.14
Low SES school 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.90 0.30
Work in the last month 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
Help household members in the last month 0.69 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.78 0.41
Helped other families in the last month 0.43 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50
Helped community in the last month 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.50
Socio-cultural activities participation 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.59 0.49
Trust in friends 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.60 0.49
Trust in others 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
Cooperation better than compete 0.68 0.47 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.44
Others opinion about my helping behavior 2.26 0.56 2.27 0.53 2.24 0.54
Others help me 2.44 0.58 2.40 0.58 2.32 0.59
Importance of others’ opinion about me 1.68 0.72 1.58 0.68 1.44 0.61
Forgiveness 2.57 0.55 2.53 0.53 2.51 0.55
Panel B: Family characteristics
Family with both parents 0.59 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.45 0.50
Single parent family 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.50
Total household members 5.58 14.84 5.07 2.74 5.43 2.91
Total siblings 2.18 2.01 2.09 1.86 2.55 1.94
Father has a job 0.97 0.17 0.96 0.19 0.95 0.21
Mother has a job 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.79 0.41
father’s education 3.30 1.43 3.35 1.46 2.50 1.19
mother’s education 3.36 1.39 3.37 1.40 2.81 1.22
Father’s age 44.30 9.51 45.15 9.05 43.36 9.55
Mother’s age 40.06 8.33 40.70 8.04 39.36 7.71
Difficult economic situation in last month 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.47 0.50
Family helped others in the last month 1.24 0.67 1.24 0.66 1.14 0.67
Someone would help your family? 1.35 0.55 1.35 0.54 1.43 0.58
Help from other families or people 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48
Help from the state 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27
Observations 1666 1695 911
Note: This table includes all children that participated at least in one wave.
Table 5.3 summarizes the results of the children’s decisions in the solidarity game over the
three years. On average, participants received 11,110COP (SD=173.2) in the real effort task.
Giving was quite frequent among children with 89 percent of them deciding to transfer part of
their endowment. In comparison, in experiments with adults, Selten and Ockenfels (1998) found
that 79 percent of participants in their study were not completely egoistic and transferred a
positive amount.
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Table 5.3: Mean values of game outcomes across treatments - All rounds all years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T0 T1 T2 T3 Overall p-value
Earnings (1.000 COP) 10.73 10.99 11.56 11.06 11.11 0.00
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Transfer (1.000 COP) 1.61 1.94 1.94 1.83 1.85 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Positive transfer 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prop. of income transferred 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. earnings (1000COP) 8.57 8.30 8.96 8.58 8.59 0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
Exp. transfer (1000COP) 2.22 2.32 2.20 2.15 2.22 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Redistributive equity 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 2600 4444 4040 6004 17088
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Average results including final round. Sample includes all children
who participated, even if they participated only one year.
In our sample, children transferred on average 1,850COP (SD=100) which is equivalent to
approximately 17 percent of their endowment. This result is slightly lower than similar studies
with adults, e.g., Bolle et al. (2012) found that participants gave away 23 percent of their
endowment. Participants in our sample on average underestimated what their partners received,
8,590COP (SD=200), and overestimated what their partners transferred, 2,200 (SD=141).
Moreover, the proportion of children who followed a re-distributive equity principle, i.e., transfer
between 30 to 36 percent of their income, is only 6.79 percent.
5.3.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we present the econometric specification used to evaluate motivations for solidarity
giving and participating in informal risk sharing. Our research design allows to estimate a
difference in difference model to disentangle three motivations for giving: altruism, social image
concerns and strategic giving. We also consider the role of social demands of the group and
norms of deservingness on motivations to exert effort. In order to control for unobserved time
invariant individual characteristics, we use our panel database and random effects or fixed effects
model for robust estimates. 7
Yir = β0 + βRRoundi + βTTreatmenti + βRTRoundi x Treatmenti
+βEEarningsi + βZZi + εi + υir
(5.1)
7We use two tests to determine whether the panel analysis is random or fixed effects. Hausmann test, but
when Hausman shows that matrix of difference in variance is not positive definite, HT is invalid. Instead we
use the Breusch-Pagan test in favor of using RE. The Hausmann Test rejects the fixed effects model Prob>chi2,
p=0.14, the Breusch-Pagan test cannot reject the homoskedasticity assumption Prob>chi2, p=0.000.
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In Equation 5.1, Yir is the dependent variable which measures either the likelihood of a positive
transfer, proportion earnings transferred or the income earned by the participants in each round.
In order to disentangle image concerns, strategic giving and deservingness we use the positive
and proportion transferred as the dependent variable. β0 is the constant and estimates the
altruistic motivations for transfers in the first round. The coefficients βR and βT denote the
rounds (R = (2, 3, 4)) and treatments (T = (1, 2, 3)) in the game. The first one considers the
change in altruism over rounds, while the second captures initial differences in altruism between
treatments and control. The coefficient βRT of the interaction term ‘Roundi x Treatmenti’
estimates whether information about the behavior of others or strategic motives affect game
outcomes over rounds compared to the control group. βE controls for the income earned by the
individuals, Z is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics of the children and εi constant
individual unobserved effects and υir the error term.
When individuals have image concerns, we expect that the likelihood of positive transfers and
value transfer will be larger when donations are public knowledge (T1-Transfers and T3-Both).
Hence, the coefficients β21 and β23 are expected to be positive. This reflects a motivation to
create a positive social image or giving. If strategic giving is an important motivation, we expect
that the likelihood to transfer and the value transfered to increase when reciprocity is possible.
Therefore, coefficient β31 and β33 should also be positive.
When information of earnings is public, members of the social network can increase the
demands of transfers. Therefore, we expect that earnings will decrease in the second round for
T2-Earnings and T3-Both, compared with the control. The interaction term β22 can explain the
’dark side’ of social capital, wherein individuals tend to either hide income (at a cost) to avoid
contributing.We expect that this coefficient to be negative for the regression on earnings. On the
other hand, norms of deservingness are expected to mitigate and even reverse the detrimental
effect of redistribution networks. The interaction term β32 is expected to be positive.
In order to measure reciprocity we regress conditional donations in round three on transfers
of others. Deservingness is measured as the correlation between conditional donations in round
three and earnings of others. In T1-Transfers, we estimate only reciprocity conditional on
previous transfer by others and T2-Earnings, we estimate deservingness since the conditional
transfers is based on the previous earnings by others. We estimate motivations for risk sharing
among participants within an unbalanced panel data. We run separated regressions for each of
the treatments (T1 to T3). The specification can be written as follows:
Yir = β0 + βPBYj,r−1 + βEEarningsi + βZZi + εi + υir (5.2)
Here βPB captures the norm of reciprocity and deservingness as the response to other’s
behavior in the previous round.
In order to observe how altruism develop for children over time, we use the unbalanced
panel dataset over three years- 2016, 2017 and 2018. We divide the children into three cohorts
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according to the age in 2016, c=(9 years, 13 years and 16 years). An important contribution of
our study is to understand how motivations explaining informal risk sharing develops in children
over time. The panel structure of the data allows us to answer this question. We use the random
effects model and estimate the following specification:
Yir = β0 + βTTreatmentic + βY Y earicr + βCY Treatmentic x Y earicr + βEEarningsic+
βZZic + εi + υir
(5.3)
To understand how image concerns develops over time, we estimate Equation 3, where Yir
is the difference in the likelihood of transferring or proportion of earnings transfered between
round 1 and round 2. Similarly, to understand how strategic motives change over time, we
estimate Equation 5.3, where Yir is the difference in likelihood and proportion between round 1
and round 3. Equation 5.3 is estimated separately for each cohort ci = (1, 2, 3).
Reciprocity and deservingness are measured as the conditional transfers of participants in
round 3 given the past transfers or earnings of the other’s in the previous round. Hence, the
specification is slightly different and can be written as follows:
Yi,r = β0 + βPBYj,r−1 + βY Y earitcr + βPBY Yj,r−1 x Y earitcr+
βEEarningsict + βZZict + εi + υit
(5.4)
The Equation 5.4 is estimated separately for each cohort and for each treatment.
5.3.3 Behavioral Results
Motivations of solidarity giving and earnings
In this section we consider first the different motivations of solidarity giving namely altruism,
reputation or image concerns, strategic giving. Then we discuss the potential dark side of
solidarity networks, and conclude with an analysis of reciprocity and deservingness. In the
analysis we pool data over treatments and years.8 Panel A in Table 5.3.3 presents the estimates
of Equation 1 for the likelihood of positive transfers, Panel B presents the estimates of the
amount transferred and Panel C presents the estimates on earnings. The estimated coefficients
and significant levels are presented in Table 5.7 in Appendix.
In the control treatment, 73% of the participants send a positive transfer in the first round,
while only 66% did so in the fourth round. The difference is however, not statistically significant
indicating that altruistic preferences are quite stable over the different rounds (See Appendix
Figure 5.7). Similar trend is found for the proportion of earning transfered. While in T0-Control
the fraction of the earnings transfer drop from 7.1% in the first round to 5.9% in the last round,
the difference is not statistically different. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
8Includes all the children who participated in the experimented at least twice (i.e an unbalanced sample).
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In treatment groups T1 to T3, the proportion of participants that transfer income and
the proportion of earnings transfered is not significantly different than in T0-Control in the
first round. While in T0-control, the proportion of participants that transfer income and the
proportion of income transfered tend to decrease over time, in treatments T1 to T3, they are
more stable (see Figure 5.7 in Appendix). This indicates that social image and strategic motives
help to sustain more risk-sharing.
Table 5.4: Motivations for solidarity giving
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Altruism Social Image Strategic motive End game
Panel A:Positive Transfers
N=15011
T0-Control 0.735 0.71 0.707 0.66
(0.051) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
T1-Transfer 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.73
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.052)
T2-Earnings 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.71
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053)
T3-Both 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.73
(0.051) (0.05) (0.053) (0.051)
Panel B:Proportion Transferred
N=13910
T0-Control 0.071 0.065 0.065 0.059
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
T1-Transfer 0.074 0.076 0.076 0.077
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
T2-Earnings 0.074 0.08 0.078 0.076
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
T3-Both 0.074 0.069 0.069 0.074
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Panel C:Effort or Income earned
N=15184
T0-Control 8.38 8.8 9.07 9.38
(0.73) (0.73) (0.739) (0.737)
T1-Transfer 8.33 8.76 9.03 9.52
(0.744) (0.747) (0.759) (0.746)
T2-Earnings 8.604 8.91 9.18 9.49
(0.732) (0.752) (0.764) (0.749)
T3-Both 8.33 8.83 9.11 9.43
(0.744) (0.734) (0.747) (0.73)
Mean values; Standard deviations in parenthesis
To understand how image concerns and strategic motives affect giving behavior, we plot in
Figure 5.2 the estimated coefficient of the interaction terms in Equation 1. Panel A presents the
results for the likelihood to send a positive transfer (extensive margin) while Panel B presents
the results on the proportion of earnings transfer (intensive margin). Panel C considers the
impact of solidarity giving on earnings and allows to evaluate the hypothesis on the ’dark side’ of
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social capital. To compare the effect of image concerns, we consider first the interaction between
round two and the different treatments which we denominate as image concerns. We find that
image concerns do not have an effect at the extensive nor at the intensive margin. Contrary
to Hypothesis 2, we find that in T1-Transfers and T3-Both, the estimated interaction term
is positive but not significant for the likelihood to send a transfer and proportion of income
transfered. This indicates that social image concerns do no trigger risk sharing when transfers
are public information. As expected, the interaction for round two with T2-Earnings, does not
affect the likelihood to send a positive transfer nor the proportion of earnings transfered.
The third aspect that we consider in our design is strategic motives. Hypothesis 3, considers
that when there are opportunities to reciprocate, participants act strategically increasing transfers
to attract more future solidarity. To understand the effect of strategic motives, we plot the
estimated coefficients of the interaction between round 3 and the different treatments in Figure 5.2.
We find that strategic motives, have a positive and significant effect on the extensive and intensive
margin. Possibilities to reciprocate transfers trigger a positive effect on the likelihood to send a
transfer and the proportion of earnings transfered in of T1-Transfers while information on both
earnings and transfers (T3-Both) have a positive and significant effect on the intensive margin.
This finding hence provides support for Hypothesis 3. Unexpectedly, we find that T2-Earnings
have a positive effect on the intensive margin.
The last column in Figure 5.2 presents the estimated coefficients of the interaction between
round four and treatments. As this is the last round of the experiment, we denominate this as
end-game effects. As in the last round there are no opportunities for future interaction, the
value of participation in a risk-sharing network decreases. This is expected to lead to a drop in
contribution in the last round. Contrary to that hypothesis, we find that treatment conditions
T1-transfers and T3-Both have a significant and positive effect on both the likelihood to transfer
and the proportion of income transfered. This suggests that having the opportunity to build an
image in order to attract reciprocity helps to sustain risk sharing.
’Dark side’ of social capital and solidarity giving
Using the dependent variable Yir as earnings in each round in Equation 5.1 we can test the
hypothesis of the ’Dark side’ of social capital. Hypothesis 5 considers that availability of informal
risk sharing options could result in a disincentive for effort. Panel 3 presents the estimated
coefficients of interaction effects of rounds and treatments on the regression with earnings as a
dependent variable (See also Table 5.7). In the control treatment, by magnitude the earnings
increase over the four rounds, although they are not significantly different. The small increase
in earnings can be attributed to a learning effect as participants get better at the slider task
with each round. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, we find that public knowledge of earnings does not
have a negative effect on effort. We find that T2-Earnings, follow the same increasing trend in
effort as the control treatment, while T3-Both, result in significantly higher levels of effort. This
indicates, that participants in the sample care about keeping an image of hard workers.
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Fig. 5.2: Motivations of solidarity giving and earnings - Difference in Difference estimates
(a) Positive transfers (b) Proporiton transferred
(c) Income earned-Marginal effects
Reciprocity norms and Deservingness
Norms of reciprocity indicate that participants send transfers to participants that have sent
more transfers in previous round. Estimation results of Equation 2 in T1-Transfers indicate
that participants follow norms of reciprocity. For one unit transfered, participants transfered
back 0.15 units. Similar patterns for social image and strategic giving is observed in T3-Both
such that amount transferred is positively correlated with past transfers of the loser. One unit
of transfered in the previous round increases transfers in 0.18. Our results, hence, support
Hypothesis 3.
The last factor that we consider is the impact of deservingness, or a norm that consider
giving more to those that appear as hard workers than those that are perceived as lazy. We
expected that when there are opportunities to act strategically participants would increase in
effort. Contrary to Hypothesis 5, we find that participants do no follow norms of deservingness.
On the contrary, we observe an increase in past earnings of the loser significantly decreases the
amount transferred in 1.4 percent. When participants receive information on both transfers of
others and earnings, participants do not display norms of deservingness. We conclude that there
is no support for Hypothesis 5.
137
Dynamics of risk sharing motivations
Altruism
In this section we study how the different motivations supporting risk sharing develop among
children. We benefit from the panel dataset. To consider the dynamics of risk sharing, we
consider three cohort groups. The first cohort correspond to children that in 2016 were in grade
3 or 4 and that on average had 9 years old. The second cohort is the children that in 2016 were
in the grade 7, 8 and had on average 13 years. The last cohort was in grade 9, 10 or 11 and had
on average 15 years.
For each cohort we were able to analyze how their decisions in the game changed over years.
To understand the development of altruism we estimate Equation 3 considering decisions in the
first round where all information about the decisions of others in the game is anonymous. We
pool information over different treatments. To estimate the model in Equation 5.3 we decided
to use a random effects model (Based on Hausmann test, Prob>chi2 = 0.140 and we cannot
reject the test of homoskedastic variance Breusch-Pagan test, Prob>chi2=0.000). The marginal
effects of the coefficients are in the Appendix Table 5.8.
Following the previous analysis, we estimate the development on both likelihood of a positive
transfer and proportion of earnings transferred. Panel A in Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of
children who decided to transfer part of their income by cohort and for each of the three years
while Panel B presents the proportion of earnings transferred. We find that the probability of
transferring increases significantly over time for those who are in the 9-year-old age cohort in
the baseline. The proportion of children who transferred a positive amount is relatively stable
over time for older children and there is no significant change in the likelihood to send a transfer
for those cohorts. The proportion of income transferred is constant for all cohorts over time.9.
We conclude that the data supports Hypothesis 8 and we observe an increase in altruism with
aging. The critical age at which altruism develops is between the age of 9 and 10 years old.
Social image concerns and strategic giving
In order to understand whether public information affects individual behavior over time, we
estimate Equation 5.3 using random effects model with differences in transfers between round 2
and round 1. Estimated marginal effects are presented in Appendix Table 5.1110. Figure 5.4 plots
the estimated coefficients on image concerns by year, cohort and treatment. Panel A presents the
estimated coefficients for T1-Transfers and Panel C for T3-Both. A positive coefficient indicates
that public information on transfers, earnings or both, result in a larger change in transfers
(likelihood or proportion) relative to the control treatment. We find that for the youngest
cohort (9-years) image concerns have a significant positive effect at the extensive margin. In
9As a robustness check, we consider a sample of children who exclusively participated over two years, e.g., they
participated in 2016 and 2017 but not in 2018, or in 2017 and 2018 but not in 2016. We found similar results
when we analyzed the unbalanced panel with the whole sample, and can confirm that there is an overall increase
in altruism over time, but this change is smaller for older children (See Table 5.9 in the Appendix).
10Hausman test: T1:Prob>ch2=0.526, T2: Prob>chi2=0.982, T3:Prob>chi2=0.6823. We cannot reject RE is
consistent and efficient.
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Fig. 5.3: Dynamics of Altruistic giving
(a) Positive transfers (b) Proporiton transferred
2016 participants in the youngest cohort, are 17 percent more likely to send a transfer in T1
compared with the control treatment. This is consistent with Triplett (1898) audience effect
theory, that suggests already at an early age children care about their reputation. We find
that image concerns are rather instable for the youngest cohort. In 2017, image concerns are
significantly lower than in 2016 for this group in T1-Transfers, but in 2018, they are again at the
same level as 2016. For the other cohorts, image concerns do not result in a significant increase
in neither the likelihood or the proportion transfer. This finding suggest, as previously observed
that image concerns do not promote risk sharing. Hence we cannot reject the Hypothesis 7.
Contrary to expected, we find that public information on earnings in T2-Earnings results in a
decrease in likelihood of transfers for the youngest cohort compared with the control treatment
in 2016. Yet, this effect reverses with aging and in 2018, the coefficient is positive.
Next we compare the differences in game outcomes for the third round relative to the first
round across cohorts, years and treatment groups. In this case, we are measuring a combined
effect of image concerns and the strategic behavior of participants. Figure 5.5 plots the estimated
coefficient of Equation 3 when the dependent variable is difference in transfers. Estimated
coefficients are presented in Appendix Table 5.12. When we consider each cohort separately by
year, we find that participants do not respond to strategic motives and the likelihood to transfer
and the proportion transfered do not change significantly when there are opportunities to elicit
reciprocity in T1-Transfers and T3-Both. We find that strategic motives are rather stable and
we find no significant changes in strategic motives across periods. We therefore reject Hypothesis
7.
Dynamics- Reciprocity and Deservingness
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of reciprocity and deservingness as motives for solidarity
transfers by enabling participant’s transfer to be conditional on other players’ behavior in
the previous round. Furthermore, we observe how conditional reciprocity and deservingness
develop over time for different cohorts. The model described in Equation 5.4 is estimated for
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Fig. 5.4: Dynamics of Social image motivated giving
(a) T1-Transfer (b) T2-Earnings
(c) T3-Transfer & Earnings
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Fig. 5.5: Dynamics of Strategic giving
(a) T1-Transfer (b) T2-Earnings
(c) T3-Transfer & Earnings
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Fig. 5.6: Dynamics of Reciprocity and Deservingness
(a) T1-Transfer (b) T3-Transfer
(c) T2-Earnings or Deservingness (d) T3-Earnings
each treatment using a fixed effects model. Estimated coefficients are presented in Appendix
Tables 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14.11 Panels A and B presents the dynamics of reciprocity in treatments
T1-Transfers and T3-Both, while Panels C and D present the dynamics of deservingness for
T2-Earnings and T3-Both.
We observe that reciprocity motives are not important for the youngest cohort and the value
transfered is not correlated with the transfers of others in none of the treatments. The middle
and older cohort do display norms of reciprocity. One unit transfered in the past by the loser is
reciprocated with 0.18 to 0.2 units. This suggest, that norms of reciprocity while present for
older cohorts, are quite weak. Across years, there is no significant change in the reciprocity
norms for any of our groups. In T3-Both we observe that reciprocity decreases over time for the
middle and older cohort, though this effect is not significant. We reject Hypothesis 6 - reciprocity
increases with age.
Earnings signal the hardworking nature of the loser, hence we would expect that if participants
follow a norm that favor hard working losers over lazy ones, there should be a positive correlation
between conditional transfers and earnings. Figure 5.6 plots the estimated coefficients of Equation
11Hausman test for C1:Prob>chi2=0.0005, C2:Prob>chi2=0.000, C3:Prob>chi2=0.0006. We reject the H0: RE
is consistent and efficient. Hence we use a fixed effects model
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4 considering how conditional value transfered is correlated with previous earnings of the loser.
In T2-Earnings, we find that only the youngest cohort follows a norm of deservingness. In 2016,
for one unit of income lost, participants in the youngest cohort transfered 0.17 units. Between
2016 and 2018 this norm losses importance significantly for the youngest cohort. Older cohorts
do not observe norms of deservingness and over time there is no change in the correlation between
conditional transfers and earnings. Considering T3-Both, we find no evidence on norms of
deservingness playing an important role on solidarity decisions. Thus, we can reject Hypothesis
6 that importance of deservingness increases with age.
5.3.4 External Validity
In this section, we correlate solidarity transfers and income earned in the game with reported
experiences of the participants outside the lab. Table 5.5 is a panel random effects regression
model for each of the dependent variables - positive transfer, proportion transferred and earnings
used in the analysis. Controlling for the rounds, treatments and school dummies, we observe
the correlation between socio economic characteristics of the participants and their behavior
in the game. The results shows altruism and reciprocity as important intrinsic motivations of
solidarity giving. We measure real life altruism using two variables - Index offer help and Parent’s
charitable actions. The index of offered help is a combination of different avenues when the child
or their family has helped others. It includes - helping other people, other households, other
communities and outsiders. We observe that frequency of helping others is positively correlated
with the likelihood and proportion of transfers. However, parent’s voluntary or charitable action
is not correlated with increased transfer for the children. We also observe parent’s lending and
gift giving activities as positively correlated with the likelihood of transfering by the children.
However, experiencing direct reciprocity from others does not increase transfers in the game.
Similar to the results of the game, image concerns, measured by the statement ’I care about
what my friends think about me’ does not correlate with solidarity giving.
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Table 5.5: Survey data and Transfer outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Positive Transfer Proportion trasnfer Earnings
b se b se b se
13 years-old 0.1450** (0.064) 0.0304 (0.036) 4.1423*** (0.563)
16 years-old 0.1820*** (0.059) 0.0647* (0.038) 5.5698*** (0.566)
Earnings (1.000 COP) -0.0041 (0.005) -0.0046 (0.003)
Female 0.0132 (0.036) 0.0022 (0.020) -0.8865** (0.395)
Low SES school -0.0584 (0.055) 0.0212 (0.032) -1.3985** (0.625)
Economic shock(last month) 0.0003 (0.063) -0.0145 (0.034) -1.0272 (0.880)
Mother works -0.0007 (0.034) 0.0040 (0.020) 0.5745 (0.481)
Number of siblings -0.0026 (0.007) -0.0001 (0.005) 0.0337 (0.104)
Total household members -0.0106*** (0.003) -0.0010 (0.001) 0.0305 (0.028)
Friends in the class -0.0004 (0.021) 0.0169 (0.012) 0.6428*** (0.232)
Socio-cultural activities -0.0265 (0.038) -0.0118 (0.025) 0.3364 (0.440)
Single parent family -0.0106 (0.029) -0.0164 (0.022) 0.4704 (0.386)
Index offer help 0.0367*** (0.014) 0.0248*** (0.007) 0.0905 (0.153)
Index received help -0.0465 (0.031) -0.0147 (0.016) 0.0378 (0.289)
Image concerns -0.0084 (0.027) -0.0300 (0.022) -0.3223 (0.408)
Reciprocity from others -0.0015 (0.029) -0.0152 (0.020) -0.6676** (0.336)
Parent’s charity -0.0050 (0.013) 0.0172 (0.013) 0.1917 (0.223)
Parent’s lend to others 0.0756* (0.040) 0.0385 (0.030) -0.4524 (0.600)
Parent’s gift giving 0.0338* (0.018) -0.0048 (0.010) -0.3536 (0.275)
Constant 0.4905*** (0.151) -0.0964 (0.094) 6.7050*** (1.972)
Period Yes Yes Yes
Treatment dummies Yes Yes Yes
School dummies Yes Yes Yes
sigma_u 0.138 0.109 2.201
sigma_e 0.287 0.099 1.888
rho 0.188 0.549 0.576
Observations 805 714 820
Groups 152 152 152
Note: Pooled sample of children who participated over the three years. Random effects model and clustered standard errors at session level
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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5.4 Conclusion
In this study, we implemented a modified version of Selten and Ockenfels (1998) solidarity
game. This lab-experiment was set-up with children from between 7 and 16 years old. Children
participated in the solidarity game for four rounds under different informational conditions. The
experimental design allowed us to measure motivations for solidarity giving such as altruism,
image concerns, strategic giving, deservingness and reciprocity in an informal risk-sharing group.
One of the primary motives of implementing the solidarity game among children was to observe
motivations for solidarity giving without the endogeneity resulting from adult networks and
groups. Previous findings amongst adults shows that informal risk sharing networks are not
randomly formed but are seen amongst kin, friends, neighbors and across households Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007); Attanasio et al. (2012); Murgai et al. (2002). Children being not only an
important recipient of informal solidarity transfers, but also potential social security for parents
in their old age, we believe that it is essential to understand how they perceive the importance
of different motivations of solidarity giving.
In addition, there has been a recent interest in studying social preferences shifting the
narrative from self interested utility maximizing agent. While studies within the experimental
literature have shown how motivations such as altruism, egalitarianism, efficiency concerns and
trust are positively correlated with age (See a detailed review by Sutter et al. (2019)), our aim
is to study motivations for solidarity giving and informal risk sharing. We followed a sample of
Colombian children over three years. Our findings revealed reciprocity and altruism as strong
motives for solidarity giving similar to Leider et al. (2009); Ligon and Schechter (2012); Cox
et al. (1998) and Lin et al. (2014). Furthermore, altruism was observed already at early age and
increased over time. Reciprocity was only observed for children of the middle and older cohort
and it remained quite constant over time. This is in contrast to survey based panel studies in
psychology that find reciprocity motivated by perspective taking and cognitive development
to increase with aging, while altruism based pro-sociality requires effortful control and self
regulation and arise earlier in life (Luengo Kanacri et al., 2013; Van der Graaff et al., 2018).
Apart from reducing the information asymmetry, our information treatments in the experiment
allowed to disentangle deservingness as a motive for risk sharing. Similar to the study by Jakiela
and Ozier (2016) we find that participants attribute more importance to neediness than whether
the beneficiary was a ’good worker’. The income earned also enables us to test the ’dark side’
of social capital hypothesis Di Falco and Bulte (2012). Our sample of children from Bogotá,
Colombia do not reduce their effort supply when earnings are public information. On the contrary,
we observe an increase in income earned when participants can act strategically and elicit more
transfers by keeping an image of hard workers. For this finding, it is important to highlight that
previous studies observing the negative impacts of informal risk sharing networks focused on





Table 5.7: Orthogonality table baseline - 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





Age 12.24 12.92 13.47 12.95 0.00
(0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Female 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.35
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Work in the last month 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.72
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of attended schools 1.90 1.78 2.11 2.19 0.14
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18)
Years with the same group 3.67 3.76 3.53 3.59 0.73
(0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12)
Total friends in general 25.48 22.40 25.62 25.76 0.52
(2.03) (1.73) (1.98) (1.64)
Total siblings 2.01 2.43 2.07 2.18 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Total household members 5.66 5.20 4.86 6.28 0.48
(0.37) (0.13) (0.12) (1.01)
Family with both parents 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.57 0.31
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Single parent family 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.56
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Diff. econ. situation last
month
0.39 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.83
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Father has a job 0.98 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother has a job 0.87 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 284 392 400 590
Proportion 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.35
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.7: Difference in Difference across all rounds and treatments
Positive transfer Proportion Transfer Income Earned
(1) (2) (3)
b se b se b se
Period=2 -0.0211 (0.017) -0.0055 (0.006) 0.4144*** (0.091)
Period=3 -0.0278* (0.017) -0.0060 (0.006) 0.6882*** (0.101)
Period=4 -0.0709*** (0.018) -0.0121* (0.006) 0.9968*** (0.107)
T1-Transfer 0.0206 (0.019) 0.0029 (0.010) -0.0502 (0.210)
T2-Earnings 0.0422** (0.018) 0.0034 (0.009) 0.2169 (0.200)
T3-Earn./Transfer 0.0238 (0.018) -0.0057 (0.009) -0.2164 (0.199)
Period=2 × T1-Transfer 0.0307 (0.020) 0.0084 (0.007) 0.0090 (0.121)
Period=2 × T2-Earnings 0.0206 (0.020) 0.0115 (0.007) 0.1606 (0.132)
Period=2 × T3-Earn./Transfer 0.0095 (0.020) 0.0099 (0.007) 0.2537** (0.126)
Period=3 × T1-Transfer 0.0365* (0.020) 0.0159** (0.007) 0.0216 (0.131)
Period=3 × T2-Earnings 0.0126 (0.019) 0.0131* (0.008) 0.0914 (0.137)
Period=3 × T3-Earn./Transfer 0.0059 (0.019) 0.0148** (0.007) 0.3230** (0.135)
Period=4 × T1-Transfer 0.0456** (0.021) 0.0153* (0.008) 0.1941 (0.138)
Period=4 × T2-Earnings 0.0204 (0.022) 0.0145* (0.008) 0.1638 (0.145)
Period=4 × T3-Earn./Transfer 0.0418** (0.021) 0.0217*** (0.008) 0.2634* (0.140)
Earnings (1.000 COP) 0.0012 (0.001) -0.0031*** (0.001)
Female 0.0173* (0.009) -0.0033 (0.005) -0.6984*** (0.163)
ID school=2 -0.0006 (0.016) -0.0049 (0.009) -0.6389*** (0.222)
ID school=3 0.0143 (0.016) 0.0111 (0.009) -0.3256 (0.240)
ID school=4 -0.0106 (0.017) 0.0015 (0.009) -1.0067*** (0.254)
Constant 0.7356*** (0.051) 0.0711*** (0.023) 8.3875*** (0.738)
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes
sigma u 0.116 0.079 2.341
sigma_e 0.318 0.104 2.321
rho 0.118 0.368 0.504
Observations 15011 13910 15184
Note: Individual RE regression. Breusch-Pagan Prob>chi2: p=0.000
Standard errors in parentheses and robust to heteroskedasticity.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 5.8: Dynamics of Altruism unbalanced panel.
Positive transfer Proportion Transfer Income Earned
(1) (2) (3)
b se b se b se
year=2017 0.0750** (0.037) 0.0112 (0.014) 2.4507*** (0.159)
year=2018 0.0785* (0.045) 0.0170 (0.017) 2.2729*** (0.287)
13 years-old 0.2054*** (0.031) 0.0656*** (0.012) 3.5341*** (0.188)
16 years-old 0.2169*** (0.032) 0.0863*** (0.013) 4.9292*** (0.195)
year=2017 × 13 years-old -0.0961** (0.038) -0.0080 (0.015) -0.8267*** (0.216)
year=2017 × 16 years-old -0.0967** (0.039) 0.0048 (0.016) -0.8378*** (0.209)
year=2018 × 13 years-old -0.0974** (0.047) -0.0095 (0.019) -1.0635*** (0.342)
year=2018 × 16 years-old -0.0857* (0.049) 0.0184 (0.022) -1.9305*** (0.400)
Earnings (1.000 COP) 0.0081*** (0.002) -0.0070*** (0.001)
Female 0.0416*** (0.011) 0.0004 (0.006) -1.0540*** (0.127)
ID school=2 -0.0128 (0.020) 0.0039 (0.010) 0.0796 (0.209)
ID school=3 0.0121 (0.020) 0.0039 (0.010) -0.3144 (0.211)
ID school=4 -0.0006 (0.021) -0.0065 (0.010) -0.7560*** (0.213)
Constant 0.6323*** (0.035) 0.1744*** (0.015) 7.0782*** (0.240)
sigma u 0.108 0.059 1.751
sigma_e 0.258 0.132 2.428
rho 0.150 0.166 0.342
Observations 3396 3396 3422
Note: Individual RE regression. Dependent variable is the average value of outcome per individual.
Standard errors in parentheses and robust to heteroskedasticity.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 5.9: Altruism two waves participation
FE RE FE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decision Decision Proportion income Proportion income
b se b se b se b se
Age in 2016 0.0448*** (0.005) 0.0167*** (0.002)
year=2017 0.4965*** (0.071) 0.4692*** (0.065) 0.0742** (0.034) 0.0666** (0.031)
year=2018 0.3438* (0.182) 0.4010*** (0.138) 0.0898 (0.086) 0.1164* (0.067)
year=2017 × Age in 2016 -0.0343*** (0.005) -0.0338*** (0.005) -0.0036 (0.002) -0.0037 (0.002)
year=2018 × Age in 2016 -0.0226 (0.014) -0.0313*** (0.011) -0.0024 (0.007) -0.0062 (0.005)
Earnings (1.000 COP) 0.0027 (0.005) 0.0053** (0.003) -0.0084*** (0.002) -0.0077*** (0.001)
Female 0.0457*** (0.016) 0.0010 (0.008)
Constant 1.0394*** (0.149) 0.1625* (0.089) 0.2168*** (0.071) -0.0758* (0.043)
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Children behavior Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment dummies No Yes No Yes
School dummies No Yes No Yes
R squ. 0.093 0.033
R squ. adj. -0.992 -1.126
sigma_u 0.272 0.109 0.122 0.060
sigma_e 0.258 0.258 0.123 0.123
rho 0.526 0.151 0.498 0.191
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717
Groups 918 918 918 918
Mean 0.901 0.901 0.166 0.166
Note: Sample of children who participated in two waves. Fixed and random effects models for (1)-(2) decision whether transfer or not and
(3)-(4) proportion of income transferred as dependent variables.
Standard errors in parentheses.

























Table 5.10: Dynamics - Image concerns
Table 5.11: Treatment comparison - Diff-in-Diff coefficients – all years, FE
Positive transfer Proportion Transfers
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
9 years 13 years 15 years 9 years 13 years 15 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T1-Transfer 0.1734* 0.0239 -0.0208 0.0243 0.0090 0.0111
(0.092) (0.036) (0.025) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014)
T2-Earnings -0.2115* 0.0057 -0.0266 -0.0017 0.0002 0.0068
(0.120) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.010) (0.017)
T3-Earn./Transfer 0.0813 -0.0143 -0.0366 0.0410 -0.0098 0.0043
(0.094) (0.036) (0.030) (0.026) (0.012) (0.013)
year=2017 0.0188 -0.0454 -0.0107 0.0229 -0.0043 -0.0181
(0.084) (0.035) (0.029) (0.031) (0.010) (0.011)
year=2018 -0.0858 -0.0688 -0.0222 0.0323 -0.0026 -0.0026
(0.107) (0.057) (0.024) (0.040) (0.015) (0.016)
T1-Transfer × year=2017 -0.2751** 0.0280 0.0270 -0.0441 0.0100 -0.0040
(0.119) (0.044) (0.033) (0.039) (0.016) (0.017)
T1-Transfer × year=2018 -0.0512 0.0508 -0.0206 -0.0459 -0.0289 -0.0614*
(0.137) (0.064) (0.041) (0.047) (0.023) (0.036)
T2-Earnings × year=2017 0.1397 0.0480 0.0259 0.0005 -0.0126 0.0197
(0.152) (0.043) (0.038) (0.041) (0.016) (0.019)
T2-Earnings × year=2018 0.3818** 0.0409 0.0668 0.0059 0.0053 0.0073
(0.175) (0.069) (0.044) (0.051) (0.019) (0.024)
T3-Earn./Transfer × year=2017 -0.0989 0.0430 0.0081 -0.0476 0.0103 -0.0017
(0.112) (0.045) (0.040) (0.036) (0.014) (0.016)
T3-Earn./Transfer × year=2018 0.1329 0.0502 0.1146* -0.0044 0.0222 -0.0065
(0.134) (0.065) (0.067) (0.047) (0.021) (0.027)
Constant 0.1183 0.0238 -0.0609 -0.0392 -0.0022 -0.0646
(0.218) (0.074) (0.095) (0.058) (0.026) (0.048)
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
rho 0.012 0.003 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 617 1495 901 617 1495 901
Note: Individual RE regression. Hausman test Prob>chi2 = 0.5266
Standard errors in parentheses and robust to heteroskedasticity.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 5.11: Dynamics - Strategic giving
Table 5.12: Treatment comparison - Diff-in-Diff coefficients – all years, FE
Positive transfer Proportion Transfer
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
9 years 13 years 15 years 9 years 13 years 15 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T1-Transfer 0.1202 -0.0059 0.0144 0.0114 0.0091 0.0016
(0.083) (0.046) (0.027) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010)
T2-Earnings -0.3126** -0.0582 0.0109 0.0039 -0.0086 0.0170
(0.153) (0.050) (0.028) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014)
T3-Earn./Transfer -0.0379 -0.0505 0.0053 0.0211 -0.0126 0.0276**
(0.084) (0.047) (0.028) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012)
year=2017 -0.0339 -0.0533 -0.0156 -0.0068 0.0006 -0.0092
(0.076) (0.044) (0.027) (0.022) (0.007) (0.009)
year=2018 -0.0649 -0.1233* 0.0753*** 0.0418 -0.0030 -0.0196
(0.091) (0.073) (0.028) (0.032) (0.016) (0.013)
T1-Transfer × year=2017 -0.0908 0.0254 0.0006 0.0007 0.0038 0.0153
(0.098) (0.052) (0.033) (0.024) (0.018) (0.013)
T1-Transfer × year=2018 -0.0615 0.0771 -0.0946*** -0.0463 -0.0314 0.0090
(0.125) (0.074) (0.031) (0.039) (0.023) (0.018)
T2-Earnings × year=2017 0.2767* 0.0716 0.0323 0.0359 -0.0116 0.0032
(0.158) (0.053) (0.033) (0.028) (0.014) (0.017)
T2-Earnings × year=2018 0.3537* 0.1348 -0.0829*** -0.0498 0.0197 -0.0001
(0.184) (0.084) (0.030) (0.052) (0.022) (0.020)
T3-Earn./Transfer × year=2017 -0.0202 0.0611 0.0054 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0095
(0.109) (0.051) (0.035) (0.027) (0.014) (0.015)
T3-Earn./Transfer × year=2018 0.1767 0.1115 -0.0400 -0.0102 0.0058 -0.0055
(0.115) (0.077) (0.056) (0.038) (0.020) (0.024)
Constant 0.1125 -0.0454 -0.1617* -0.0431 -0.0008 -0.0105
(0.218) (0.079) (0.088) (0.090) (0.032) (0.059)
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 616 1494 901 616 1494 901
Mean
Note: Individual RE regression. Hausman test Prob>chi2 = 0.5266
Standard errors in parentheses and robust to heteroskedasticity.

























Table 5.12: Dynamics - Reciprocity (T1-Transfer)
All Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se b se b se b se
Prev. other’s transfer (1000COP) 0.1551*** (0.012) 0.0216 (0.015) 0.1677*** (0.024) 0.2068*** (0.032)
Earnings (1.000 COP) 0.1479*** (0.028) 0.1214* (0.071) 0.1307*** (0.044) 0.1451** (0.070)
Female -0.2947 (0.204) 0.0602 (0.283) -0.0738 (0.268) -0.6379 (0.499)
ID school=2 -0.6026** (0.259) -2.4991* (1.299)
ID school=4 -0.6547*** (0.237) -2.1329* (1.146) -0.0428 (0.386) -0.3756 (0.594)
year=2017 -0.4057 (0.340) -0.0443 (0.246) -0.2658 (0.306)
year=2018 -0.2965 (0.368) 0.0585 (0.324) 0.1815 (0.623)
year=2017 × Prev. other’s transfer (1000COP) 0.0443 (0.032) 0.0190 (0.032) -0.0131 (0.036)
year=2018 × Prev. other’s transfer (1000COP) 0.0033 (0.029) 0.0018 (0.035) 0.0129 (0.070)
ID school=3 0.1064 (0.372) 0.3310 (0.561)
Constant -1.7574* (0.919) -1.3878 (1.321) -0.7055 (2.222)
sigma u 1.846 1.000 1.976 2.142
sigma_e 1.899 1.312 1.883 2.025
rho 0.486 0.367 0.524 0.528
Observations 3980 850 1920 1210
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Individual FE regression. Dependent variable is positive transfers, proportion transfered and the income earned.
Hausman test H0: Random effects is consistent and efficient Prob>chi2 = 0.005, Reject H0 and use FE.
Clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 5.13: Dynamics - Deservingness (T2-Earnings)
All Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se b se b se b se
Prev. other’s earnings (1000COP) -0.0150* (0.008) 0.1753* (0.100) 0.0110 (0.017) -0.0182 (0.024)
Earnings (1.000 COP) 0.0434 (0.032) 0.1002 (0.069) 0.0196 (0.036) 0.2515** (0.104)
Female -0.0583 (0.156) -0.6716 (0.503) 0.0110 (0.190) 0.0491 (0.372)
ID school=2 -0.1908 (0.278) -0.6973 (0.714) -0.5786 (0.493) 0.0261 (0.424)
ID school=3 -0.1834 (0.284) -2.2397** (1.012) -0.3657 (0.474) -0.0742 (0.704)
ID school=4 -0.7177*** (0.275) -0.3387 (0.538) -1.0160** (0.497) -0.0523 (0.452)
year=2017 -0.2436 (0.696) 0.2336 (0.219) 0.2013 (0.321)
year=2018 -0.4081 (0.574) 0.6538** (0.295) 0.7804 (0.487)
year=2017 × Prev. other’s earnings (1000COP) -0.1735 (0.110) -0.0363 (0.022) -0.0254 (0.031)
year=2018 × Prev. other’s earnings (1000COP) -0.1857* (0.102) -0.0386 (0.028) -0.0569 (0.044)
Constant 0.3231 (0.944) 4.1784 (2.717) -0.4218 (1.312) 0.5658 (1.820)
sigma u 1.624 1.533 1.538 1.803
sigma_e 1.397 1.451 1.246 1.483
rho 0.575 0.527 0.604 0.596
Observations 3470 355 2045 1070
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Individual FE regression. Dependent variable is positive transfers, proportion transfered and the income earned.
Hausman test H0: Random effects is consistent and efficient Prob>chi2 = 0.005, Reject H0 and use FE.
Clustered standard errors.

























Table 5.14: Dynamics - Reciprocity and Deservingness (T3-Transfer & Earnings)
All Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se b se b se b se
year=2017 -0.0766 (0.262) 0.0966 (0.367) 0.2226 (0.274) -0.3663 (0.525)
year=2018 -0.5045*** (0.186) -0.5720 (0.370) -0.4909 (0.320) -0.9005 (0.849)
Prev. other’s earnings (1000COP) -0.0163 (0.013) -0.0391 (0.034) -0.0066 (0.017) -0.0373 (0.025)
year=2017 × Prev. other’s earnings (1000COP) -0.0020 (0.024) -0.0027 (0.044) -0.0243 (0.025) 0.0402 (0.041)
year=2018 × Prev. other’s earnings (1000COP) 0.0384** (0.018) 0.0553 (0.046) 0.0379 (0.028) 0.0639 (0.069)
Prev. other’s transfer (1000COP) 0.2114*** (0.037) -0.0062 (0.062) 0.2023*** (0.046) 0.2962*** (0.055)
year=2017 × Prev. other’s transfer (1000COP) 0.0091 (0.053) -0.0995 (0.112) 0.0149 (0.056) -0.0600 (0.066)
year=2018 × Prev. other’s transfer (1000COP) -0.1264** (0.050) 0.0482 (0.098) -0.0982 (0.062) -0.2099* (0.118)
Earnings (1.000 COP) 0.1023*** (0.012) 0.0510** (0.022) 0.0986*** (0.016) 0.1030*** (0.032)
Female -0.0538 (0.081) -0.0484 (0.142) -0.0894 (0.115) -0.0413 (0.200)
ID school=2 -0.0995 (0.143) -0.0475 (0.197) 0.0115 (0.286)
ID school=3 0.1352 (0.140) 0.3097 (0.213) 0.0321 (0.198) 0.3691 (0.324)
ID school=4 0.1737 (0.142) 0.4489** (0.202) 0.0923 (0.209) 0.1561 (0.297)
Constant -1.4549*** (0.368) -1.3607** (0.631) -1.4896*** (0.536) 0.1777 (0.997)
sigma u 0.912 0.588 0.847 1.191
sigma_e 1.013 0.892 0.979 1.035
rho 0.448 0.303 0.428 0.570
Observations 2148 434 1090 624
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Individual FE regression. Dependent variable is positive transfers, proportion transfered and the income earned.
Hausman test H0: Random effects is consistent and efficient Prob>chi2 = 0.005, Reject H0 and use FE.
Clustered standard errors.



























Fig. 5.7: Motivations of solidarity giving across treatments and rounds
(a) Positive transfers (b) Proportion transferred
(c) Income earned
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Fig. 5.8: Positive transfers
Fig. 5.9: Proportion transferred
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Fig. 5.10: Positive transfers
Fig. 5.11: Proportion transferred
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Fig. 5.12: Positive transfers
Fig. 5.13: Proportion transferred





Before starting please open your tablets and press the update button that is in the upper-right
corner of your screens, where the icon of the house is located.
- Wait for the coordinator’s instructions to continue -
This activity has been organized by a group of students from the University of Goettingen,
Germany, and will be carried out in different courses and in different schools. To make sure that
everyone receives the same information, we will read the explanation out loud.
The goal of this activity is to understand the economic decision-making of middle and
high-school students. During this activity we ask that you remain silent and do not talk to any
of your classmates until the activity is finished. If you have any questions please raise your hand
and one of our assistants will come to you to help. Regardless of the results of the activity, each
of you will receive 1,500 pesos for participating.
What are we doing today?
We will be doing an activity where you can earn money that will be paid at the school store
in the form of food and drinks. The amount of money you get will depend on your decisions,
the decisions of your colleagues, and luck.
Please pay close attention to the instructions that we will give you during the game. We will
then ask some simple questions and you will be ask to fill out a survey. The game takes roughly
one an a half hours.
Before we start the activity, you will be organized into groups of three people. The groups
are going to be randomly picked by the computer. You will be identified not by name, but by
color: Yellow, Blue or Red. Each group will be made up of one Yellow participant, one Blue,
and a Red. The group will be kept the same for the entire activity. During the game, you will
not know what color you have been given, nor will you know the color of the other members of
your group or who they are.
What is the game about?
During the game you have to do two things. Let’s show an example of the first task.
- Enter the screen with the bars -
On the screen you will see 30 bars, divided into two columns, 15 on the left and 15 on the
right. Each of these bars has a cursor that is located on the left at zero. Your task is to slide
the cursor of each bar and place it exactly at 50. In some tablets at the bottom there are two
hidden bars, slide the screen up to view them. You can make the number of bars you want.
Since this is just an example, you have 1 minute to try it out. Go ahead and give it a try!
- When everyone finishes with the example, continue with the reading -
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Remember that this was just an example. For each bar that you can position exactly at the
50 mark, you will receive 500 pesos (show a 500 pesos coin). If the bar is not exactly on 50, you
will not receive any payment. You will be given 2 minutes to perform this activity.
Let’s look at this example
- The examples of income are shown in the tablets -
The income in this activity will be equal to the number of bars located on the 50 times 500
pesos. That is, if you correctly place 10 bars at 50, how much will you receive? 500 x 10 = 5000
pesos
If you position 15 bars at exactly 50, how much will you receive? 500 x 15 = 7500 pesos
One of our assistants will pay you your income from this round in play money. Are there
any questions so far?
- The trial round page is displayed -
Now, we are going to do a test round so you can learn how to do the activity. This round
will NOT affect your final payments.
At the end of the round you will know how many bars you positioned at 50 during the
2 minutes. When the results appear, please read them and then press the “next” button to
continue. During the activity, it is very important that you DO NOT COMMENT out loud on
the results to your colleagues, nor should you look at the results of others. These results are
private. Let us begin!
- At the end of the trial round, wait for the results to be shown and continue reading -
Please read the information that appears on the screen and press “next” to continue.
- Wait for the coordinator’s indication to continue -
Second part of the explanation:
In this game there is the possibility that you may lose all the money you have won. This is
all just a question of luck. At the end of each round, the computer will select a color, and the
person who is identified with this color will lose all the money they got for positioning the bars.
In each round one player in your group will lose all their income.
Your second task is to decide how much, from the money you earned, you want to give away
to the player who lost. You can give away any value, how ever much you want, you can also
decide to give nothing.
You will find on your table a total of 8 envelopes, 4 with the word PASS (PASAR originally
in Spanish) and 4 blank envelopes.
If you want to give some of your money to the player who lost all theirs then put it in the
envelope marked with the word PASS (show envelope). The rest of the money is yours to keep
and you can put it safely away in one of the other blank envelopes (show envelope).
Please check that the envelopes have your tablet identification number on them and the
number of the round. The number of the tablet is found in the upper-left part of the screen. The
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envelopes are marked with R1, R2, R3, and R4. If you have any inconsistency or the number on
the envelope does not match the number on your tablet, please raise your hand and one of our
assistants will help you.
Once you have finished this task, you will find a bar on the tablet screen that shows the
amount of money you deposited in the PASS envelope. Please remember that the amount of
money you put in the envelope and the amount you enter in the tablet must match.
Please do not write, scratch, fold, seal, or make any marks on the envelopes, we need them
again in other courses. Do you have questions so far?
How much will you win in the game? If you are not selected to lose, what you receive in the
round will be equal to your income minus the amount you put into the PASS envelope.
For example, if you received 5000 pesos and spent 1000 pesos, your earnings will be 4000
pesos; if you received 7500 pesos and spent 3000 pesos, your earnings will be 4500 pesos. Keep
in mind that the money that you and the other person in the group place in the PASS envelope
will be what the loser in your group receives.
What happens if you lose? In that case you will receive what the other two members of the
group have placed in the PASS envelope.
For example: if one player passes 500 pesos and the other passes 2000 pesos, you will receive
2500 pesos. Another example, if one player passes 3000 pesos and the other 1000 pesos, you will
receive 4000 pesos.
To make things even clearer, let’s look at an example on the tablet.
- The example of the game is shown on the tablets.
I will read the example and if you have any questions please raise your hand.
Suppose someone managed to position 12 bars at the 50 mark. Then their income would be:
12 x 500 = 6000 pesos
If the participant passed 3000 pesos to the person who lost, if he has good luck his profit
will be: 6000 - 3000 = 3000 Pesos
How much do you get if you lose? It all depends on how much the other players in the group
have given you. If they give 1000 pesos to the player who lost their money then that player will
get 1000 pesos, if you are given 5000 pesos, you will receive 5000 pesos and so on. Do you have
any questions so far?
Before we start we would like to ask you some questions to make sure we explained thinks
clearly. Please read carefully and answer the questions. Do not use full stops, or commas when
you write thousands, only numbers. When you finish answering the questions, press “next” to
continue the activity. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of our assistants
will help you.
- Do not read the control questions -
Control questions
1. There are three players in a group: Yellow, Blue and Red. The computer selects the
player Red, who loses all his income.
a. The yellow player completes 10 bars and receives 5000 pesos. If she deposits 2000 pesos
in the PASS envelope, what is the yellow player’s payment? (Answer, 3000)
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b. The blue player completes 12 bars and receives 6000 pesos. The Blue player decides to
place in 1000 pesos PASS envelope. How much does this player receive? (Answer, 5000)
c. The Red player completes 8 bars and receives 4000 pesos. He passes 1000 pesos in the
envelope. How much does the Red player get? (Answer, 4000)
2. Another situation: The Yellow player receives 8000 pesos for the bars and deposits 3000
pesos in the PASS envelope,
a. How much does the Yellow player win if they have good luck and is not selected to lose
their money? (Answer, 5000)
b. How much does the Yellow player receive if they have bad luck, loses what they won in
the bars, if it is known that the Red player placed 3000 pesos in the PASS envelope, and the
Blue player placed 1000 pesos in the envelope? (Answer, 4000)
- Read the following sentence after 3 minutes -
Remember that if you have doubts you can raise your hand and one of our assistants will
help you.
- Wait for everyone to answer the questions and instructions of the coordinator to continue -
When will you know whether you have lost or not? The game consists of four rounds. At
the end of the four rounds the computer will randomly select a round for payment. Each player
will receive the winnings ONLY from the selected round.
Between the rounds you will not know if you lost or not. Only at the end will you find out
the color given to you and whether you lost your income or not. In addition, if you lose, you
will know the total value that the other two players in your group passed on to you.
At the end of the game, the screen will show the amount of money you will be getting from
the game. However, we will check that the amount of money in the envelopes matches the sum
recorded on the tablet. It is very important that these values are the same. Therefore, you may
receive more, or less of the amount shown on the tablet.
In the next few days we will give the store the list of the amount each person has in credit.
The store will only give the payment in the form of things to eat (cookies, potatoes, etc.), and it
is not authorized to give the payment in cash. Also, without the authorization of your parents
we cannot make the payments. Is this clear?
First round
Let’s start the game. The first task is to position the bars exactly at 50. For each bar that is
exactly at 50 you will receive 500 pesos. You have two minutes to do this activity. If you finish
before 2 minutes, please remain silent and wait until the 2 minutes are over. Let us begin!
- After 2 minutes. Continue reading -
Remember that the results are INDIVIDUAL. Now our assistants will go through each of
your seats to give you the money for this round.
Please: Prepare the envelopes for ROUND 1, that is, the envelope marked with the word
PASS and the other blank envelope (show envelopes). Remember that in the PASS envelope,
you must put in the money you want to give to the person in your group who lost their money
and you should put the rest of the money in the other envelope.
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- The assistants distribute the income. Wait for the coordinator’s instructions to continue -
A bar will now appear on the tablet, please record the amount you put into the PASS
envelope by moving the cursor on the bar and pressing “next” to continue.
- When everyone decides how much to pass, the assistants collect the envelopes. Wait for
instructions from the coordinator to continue and read the paragraph in bold -
While we collect the envelopes, please answer the following questions. For each correct
answer you will receive 500 pesos, if this round is selected for payments. Do not use full stops
or commas when you write thousands, only numbers. When you have finished answering the
questions, please press “next” to continue the activity. Remember: If you have any questions,
please raise your hand and one of our assistants will help you.
- Read and clarify questions only in sessions with elementary students -
1. How much do you think that, on average, each member of your group RECEIVED for the
bar task in this round?
2. How much do you think that, on average, each member of your group PASSED on to the
unlucky loser in this round?
- Everyone must be on the page to start round 2, wait for the coordinator’s instructions to
continue -
Second round
Instructions T0: In this round the rules of the game will be the same as in the previous
round. Let us begin!
Instructions T1: The rules of the game are now going to change a bit. The players in your
group will know the amount that you PASS ON to the loser in this round. The rest of the rules
will stay the same as before.
Instructions T2: The rules of the game are now going to change a bit. The players in your
group will be told the amount you RECEIVE for the bar task of this round. The rest of the
rules will stay the same as before.
Instructions T3: The rules of the game are now going to change a little: The players in your
group are going to be told the value that you RECEIVE for the bar task and what you decided
to PASS ON to the loser in this round. The rest of the rules will stay the same as before.
- After 2 minutes. Continue reading -
Remember that the results are INDIVIDUAL. Now our assistants will go to each of your
seats, giving you the money for this round.
Please prepare the envelopes for ROUND 2, that is, the envelope marked with the word
PASS and the other unmarked envelope (show envelopes). Remember that you should deposit
the money you want to give to the person who lost all of theirs in the PASS envelope and in the
other envelope you deposit the remaining money.
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- The assistants distribute the income. Wait for the coordinator’s instructions to continue -
A bar will now appear on the tablet, please record the sum you put into the PASS envelope
by moving the cursor on the bar and pressing “next” to continue.
- When everyone decides how much to pass, the assistants collect the envelopes. Wait for
instructions from the coordinator to continue and read the paragraph in bold -
While we collect the envelopes, please answer the following questions. For each correct
answer you will receive 500 pesos, if this round is selected for payments. Do not use full stops or
commas when you write thousands, only numbers. When you finish answering the questions,
please press “next” to continue the activity. Remember: If you have any questions, please raise
your hand and one of our assistants will help you.
- Read and clarify questions only in sessions with primary school children -
1. How much do you think that, on average, each member of your group RECEIVED for the
bar task in this round?
2. How much do you think that, on average, each member of your group PASSED on to the
unlucky loser in this round?
- Everyone must be on the page to start round 3, wait for the coordinator’s instructions to
continue -
Third Round
Instructions T0: We are going to start the third round. In this round the rules of the game
will be kept the same as in the previous round. Let us begin!
Instructions T1: The activity continues as before, except that at the end of the round, you
can decide how much you want to pass on to the player who lost in this round, depending on
what he or she PASSED ON to the loser in the previous round. Let’s look at an example: (Go
to the reading of the example below the table). For example: If the player who lost in this round
PASSED from $0 to $3000 in the previous round, how much would you like to pass?
Instructions T2: The activity continues the same as before, except that at the end of the
round, you can decide how much you want to pass on to the player who lost in this round,
depending on what he or she RECEIVED from the bar task in the previous round. Let’s look at
an example: (Start reading the example below the table). For example: If the player who lost in
this round RECEIVED between $0 to $3000 in the previous round, how much would you like to
pass on to them?
Instructions T1 and T2: To indicate the value you want to pass, you will see at the end of
the round one bar per row, which you can move to the corresponding value. Keep in mind that
each row is independent and that all your decisions are going to be taken into account during
the game. The amount you decide to pass on does not need to be equal to the values of the
interval, you can pass ANY amount. Do you have any questions? (Read the explanation again
if necessary) If you have doubts about the table, at the end of the round raise your hand and
one of our assistants will help you. Let us begin!
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Instructions T3: The activity continues as before, except that at the end of the round you can
decide how much you want to pass on to EACH MEMBER OF YOUR GROUP, DEPENDING
ON WHAT HE OR SHE HAS RECEIVED AND PASSED TO THE loser IN THE PREVIOUS
ROUND, IF THEY ARE PICKED TO LOSE IN THIS ROUND. Is it clear? (Read again if
necessary) Let us begin!
- After 2 minutes. Continue reading -
Remember that the results are INDIVIDUAL. Now our assistants will go to each of your
seats, giving you the money for this round.
Please prepare the envelopes for ROUND 3, that is, the envelope marked with the word pass
and the other unmarked envelope (show envelopes). Remember that in the PASS envelope, you
should put in the money you want to give to the person in your who lost all theirs and in the
other envelope you can put aside the rest of the money.
- The assistants distribute the income. Wait for the coordinator’s instructions to continue -
A bar will now appear on the tablet, please record the value you deposited in the PASS
envelope by moving the cursor on the bar and pressing “next” to continue.
- When everyone decides how much to pass, the assistants collect the envelopes. Wait for
instructions from the coordinator to continue reading -
Instructions T0: While we collect the envelopes, please answer the following questions. For
each correct answer you will receive 500 pesos, if this round is selected for payments. Do not
use full stops or commas when you write thousands, only numbers. When you have finished
answering the questions, please press “next” to continue the activity. Remember: If you have
any questions, please raise your hand and one of our assistants will help you (same questions
about expected behavior as in rounds 1 and 2).
Instructions T1 and T2: While we collect the envelopes, please complete the table that
appears on the screen. Record the corresponding amount that you want to pass for each interval.
Instructions T1: For example: If the player who lost in this round PASSED from $3500 to
$6500 in the previous round, indicate the value that you want to pass by moving the bar of the
corresponding row.
Instructions T2: For example: If the player who lost in this round RECEIVED between
$3500 and $6500 in the previous round, indicate the value you want to pass on by moving the
bar of the corresponding row.
Instructions T1 and T2: Guys! You do not need to pass on the same amount as in the
interval, you can pass ANY value.
Instructions T1: When you finish filling the table, you will see what the participants in your
group passed to the loser in the previous round. Please read this information and press “next”
to continue to the following round.
Instructions T2: When you finish filling in the table, you will see what the participants in
your group received in the previous round for the bar task. Please read this information and
press ?next? to continue to the following round.
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Instructions T3: While we collect the envelopes, please indicate on the tablet, how much
you want to pass to each member of your group if they lose in this round, depending on what
they have received for positioning the bars and the amount they passed on to the loser in the
previous round. When you have recorded the amount, press “next” to continue.
Fourth Round
- Everyone must be on the page to start round 4, wait for the coordinator’s instructions to
continue -
Instructions T0: We are going to start the final round. In this round the rules of the game
will be kept the same as in the previous round.
Instructions T1: We are now going to start the final round, the conditions will stay the same
as in the previous round: That is, you can decide how much you want to spend on the player
who lost in this round, depending on what they PASSED to the loser in the previous round.
Instructions T2: We are now going to start the final round, the conditions will stay the same
as in the previous round: That is, you can decide how much you want to pass on to the player
who lost in this round, depending on what they RECEIVED in the bar task in the previous
round.
Instructions T1 and T2: Remember that to indicate the amount you want to pass, at the
end of the round you will see one bar per row, which you can move to the corresponding value.
Each row is independent, it is not necessary that what you decide to pass equals the values of
the interval. Remember that all your decisions will be taken into account during the game.
Instructions T3: We are now going to start the final round. The conditions will remain the
same as in the previous round: That is, you can decide how much you want to pass on to the
player who lost in this round depending on what he or she RECEIVED and PASSED on to the
loser in the previous round.
Let us begin!
- After 2 minutes. Continue reading -
Remember that the results are INDIVIDUAL. Now our assistants will go to each of your
posts giving out the money for this round.
Please: Prepare the envelopes corresponding to ROUND 4, that is, the envelope marked
with the word pass and the other unmarked envelope (show envelopes). Remember that in the
envelope PASS, you must deposit the money you want to give to the person in your group who
lost and you should put the rest of the money in the other envelope.
- The assistants distribute the income. Wait for the coordinator’s instructions to continue -
A bar will now appear on the tablet, please record the amount you deposited in the PASS
envelope by moving the cursor on the bar and pressing “next” to continue.
- When everyone decides how much to pass, the assistants collect the envelopes. Wait for
instructions from the coordinator to continue and read the paragraph in bold -
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Instructions T0: While we collect the envelopes, please answer the following questions. For
each correct answer you will receive 500 pesos, if this round is selected for payment. Do not use
full stops or commas when you write thousands, only numbers. When you finish answering the
questions, please press “next” to continue the activity. Remember: If you have any questions,
please raise your hand and one of our assistants will help you. (same questions about expected
behavior as in rounds 1 and 2)
Instructions T1 and T2: While we collect the envelopes, please complete the table that can
be seen on the screen. Record the corresponding amount that you want to pass in each interval.
Instructions T1: For example: If the player who lost in this round PASSED to the loser
between $3500 and $6,500 in the previous round, show the value that you want to pass by
moving the bar of the corresponding row.
Instructions T2: For example: If the player who lost in this round RECEIVED between
$3500 and $6500 in the previous round, indicate the value they want to spend by moving the
bar of the corresponding row.
Instructions T1 and T2: You do not need to pass the equal value of the interval, you can
pass ANY amount that you choose.
Instructions T3: While we collect the envelopes, please indicate on the tablet, how much you
want to pass to each member of your group if they were picked to lose in this round, depending
on what they received for positioning the bars and the amount they passed to the loser in the
previous round. When you have recorded the values, press “next” to continue.
- Wait for instructions from the coordinator to continue reading -
Instructions T0: When you answer the questions, the final results of the game will appear
on the screen.
Instructions T1 and T2: When you finish filling in the table, you will see what the participants
in their group passed to the loser in the previous round. Please read this information and press
“next” to continue to the following game.
Instructions T1, T2 and T3: The final results of the game will now appear on the screen.
You will find out your assigned color and the round selected for payment.
If you were chosen to lose, you will receive the value that the other two members of the
group passed on to you. If you did not lose, you will receive the value of your income for the bar
task, minus the amount that you passed to the loser in that round.
Please read the information, press next, and continue to the final game.
- Read instructions of the other game. When the other game ends, make the clarifications of the
final survey and the questionnaire to parents -
- Wait for the coordinator’s instructions to continue with the questionnaire -
Subsequently, you will answer the questionnaire that is shown on the tablet. Don’t worry, the
questions are very simple.
You can start now.
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Thank you to the teacher for letting us interrupt their normal schedules and to you (students),
thank you very much for participating in this activity! We will now wait for the teacher’s
instructions.
- End of instructions -
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5.6.2 Exit questionnaire
A. Your opinion about the game
1. How often do you use mobile phones and/or tablets to play? (Select an answer from the
following options)
() Everyday () Some days of the week () A few days of the month () Never
2. How well did you understand the rules of the game? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() Very well () More or less okay () I did not understand
3. For me, finishing the tasks of the game was: (Select an answer from the following options)
() Very easy () More or less () Very hard
4. During the game I tried to ...
a. Get a high income for myself: (Select an answer from the following options)
() Too much () A little () Never
b. Get a high income for the group: (Select an answer from the following options)
() Too much () A little () Never
c. Help the other members of the group: (Select an answer from the following options)
() Too much () A little () Never
5. The people played badly because ... (Select an answer from the following options)
() They have fewer skills () They are lazy () They have bad luck () None of the above
6. If the results are bad for the participants of the game, it is your responsibility to help
them? (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes () No
7. Have you ever participated in a similar game? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() No. This was the first time. () Yes. I participated in the past.
8. You are? (Select an answer from the following options)
() Boy () Girl
9. How old are you? [Box to type in (numbers)] years old
10. In which neighborhood do you live? (Box to type in)
11. How long have you been a student the school? (Include this year) [Box to type in
(numbers)] years
12. How many have you been with the same classmates? [Box to type in (numbers)] years
13. How many schools have you attended? (Include this school; DO NOT include
kindergarden) [Box to type in (numbers)] school(s)
13.1 How many years did you attend kindergarden? (Select from the drop-down list) (Next
button)
14. During the last month,
a. Did you help other children from your school when they needed it? (Select an answer
from the following options)
() Yes () No
b. Did you help family members without receiving any payment? For instance, babysitting,
helping sick people or helping with repairs at home. (Select an answer from the following options)
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() Yes () No
c. Did you help other families or people without receiving any payment? For instance,
babysitting, helping sick people or helping with repairs at home. (Select an answer from the
following options)
() Yes () No
d. Did you help your community without receiving any payment? For instance, keeping the
community clean. (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes () No
e. Did you participate in social and cultural activities? For instance, arranging parties,
meeting, social activities (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes () No
15. How much money do you get from your parents weekly? Include the money to buy food
or drinks at school, transportation, MATERIALS, ETC. [Box to type in (numbers)] pesos.
16. During the last month, have you been given money for a job or for completing a task?
(Select an answer from the following options)
() No () Yes (Next button)
B. You and your family.
17. How many siblings do you have in total? (Box to type in)
17.1 How many brothers do you have? (If you do not have brothers record zero) (Box to
type in)
17.2 How many sisters do you have? (If you do not have brothers record zero) (Box to type
in)
17.3 Among your siblings you are?
() I am the younger sibling () I am the middle sibling () I am the older sibling
20. In total, how many people live in your home (including yourself)? [Box to type in
(numbers)] people
21. Do you live with your mother and father in a house? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() Yes, with both () Only with my mom. () Only with my dad. () I do not live with my
parents
22.1 How old is your father? (Box to type in)
22.1.1 What is the highest educational level of your father? (Select from the drop-down list)
() Incomplete primary education () Complete primary education () Incomplete secondary
education () Complete secondary education () Incomplete Tertiary education () Technical level
() College education () I do not know
22.2 How old is your mother? (Box to type in)
22.2.1 What is the highest educational level of your mother? (Select from the drop-down list)
() Incomplete primary education () Complete primary education () Incomplete secondary
education () Complete secondary education () Incomplete Tertiary education () Technical level
() College Education () I do not know
23.1 Does your father work?
() Yes () No () I do not know
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23.2 Does your mother work?
() Yes () No () I do not know
24. If your family were in a difficult economic situation, do you think that somebody would
help you? (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes, absolutely () I am not sure () Nobody would help us
25. During the last month, has your family had a difficult economic situation? (Select an
answer from the following options)
() I do not know () No () Yes
27. During the last month, does your family help some relatives of yours or neighbors when
they needed it?
() Yes, almost always () Sometimes () No, almost never
C. You and your friends
28. About your friends:
a. How many female friends do you have in total? [Box to type in (numbers)] friends
b. How many male friends do you have in total? [Box to type in (numbers)] friends
30. What would you say about your classmates? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() Every student in this course is a good friends of mine. () Many of the students in this
course are good friends of mine. () Few students in this course are good friends of mine. () I do
not have any friends in this course.
31. Please specify if you belong to a group from below
a. Do you belong to a sports team? (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes () No
b. Do you belong to a religious group? (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes () No
c. Do you belong to a musical group? (Select an answer from the following options)
() Yes () No
d. Do you belong to a theater group or something similar? (Select an answer from the
following options)
() Yes () No
e. Please state if you belong to a different group, besides those mentioned above (Box to
type in)
32. When you have a task to be done in groups, do you like to compete or cooperate with
others? (Select an answer from the following options)
() I prefer to compete to have better results. () I prefer to cooperate to have better results.
33. What would the other students say about you? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() You help others a lot. () You help others only occasionally. () You never help others.
34. If you needed something, do you think the other students would help you with it? (Select
an answer from the following options)
() Yes, I am sure. () I am not sure. () Nobody would help me.
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35. Do you care about what the others think of you? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() I care about it very much. () I care about it a little () I do not care
36. If your friend damages a personal belonging that he or he borrowed from you, What
would you do? (Select an answer from the following options)
() I would forgive my friend because they did not mean to damage it. () I would not lend
them my personal belongings anymore, but we would still be friends. () I would get mad and I
would not want them to be my friend anymore.
37. Do you think that you can rely on your friends? Or do you have to be very cautious
instead? (Select an answer from the following options)
() I can rely on my friends. () I have to be very cautious.
38. Do you think that you can rely on other people? Or do you have to be very cautious
instead? (Select an answer from the following options)
() I can rely on other people. () I have to be very cautious.
39. Generally, do you think you are someone that ... ? (Select an answer from the following
options)
() likes to take risks. () prefers to avoid risks.
Well done! You have successfully finished this activity. Thank you for your participation.
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